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Preface and Acknowledgments
could not (and still cannot) answer. But that is
not what prompted me to undertake this report.
Rather, I was troubled that in such an important
area of public policy, an open debate including
researchers, practitioners, and other concerned
parties was not adequately being fostered. This
seems particularly ironic given that the
substantive background of this debate is tenets of
consensus, collaboration, community, and trust
building.
Fortunately, I think that the need to openly
examine the thorny issues is now becoming more
widely recognized. Thoughtful research, on all
sides of the issues, has begun to emerge, although
these are only first steps. The following report is
one of those first steps, designed mainly to
organize and frame questions, rather than to
provide answers. Frankly, I don’t feel qualified
at the present time to offer strong opinions on
most of the issues raised in the following report; I
am only certain that those issues are important.
Initial feedback from the draft report has
convinced me that the time for this research has
arrived.
In publishing this report, I wish to thank
those funding organizations that have, either
directly or indirectly, supported this line of
inquiry. Research for the initial Source Book was
primarily provided by the Ford Foundation, while
support for the revision has been provided by the
General Service Foundation, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation,
Ford
Foundation,
Hewlett
Foundation, and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. I am also greatly indebted to
those individuals who have brought these issues
to my attention, and that have been so willing to
share their experiences and thoughts with me—
albeit often on the condition of anonymity. I
certainly cannot thank all of those parties, but
some of the individuals that have helped shaped
my thinking include (alphabetically): David
Bayles, Reed Benson, Gail Bingham, Louis
Blumberg, Steve Born, Ron Brunner, Guy and
Heidi Burgess, Sam Burns, Hanna Cortner, Ann
Dahl, Maxine Dakins, Don Elder, Michael Fife,

The origins of this project were twofold.
First was ongoing work updating The Watershed
Source Book, a seminal study in the Natural
Resources Law Center’s research pertaining to
the world of watershed initiatives and similar
efforts in community-based, collaborative
resource management. As part of the ongoing
Source Book revision, the Center promised to
undertake one or more “special studies” of issues
that emerged as most significant in shaping the
long-term health and viability of the western
watersheds movement. At this point in time, no
issue is of more obvious concern than the
emerging backlash against consensus-oriented,
community-based strategies of resources
problem-solving and management.
The other motivation for this study came
from
several
dozen
parties,
mostly
environmentalists and academics, that have
approached me in the past year with a troubling
problem. It seems that individuals raising thorny
issues regarding the effectiveness and
appropriateness of watershed initiatives and
similar collaborative groups have not been
welcomed into what should be an active and
constructive arena of debate, but have rather
been encouraged to remain silent.
This
“encouragement” has certainly not been anything
sinister, but has rather taken the form of
systematic exclusion at events and in
publications, and in the competition for limited
research funds.
I chose to test the pervasiveness of this
experience by floating an article in the Chronicle
of Community articulating the need for a more
rigorous and impartial examination of
collaborative groups, and immediately began to
hear from dozens of individuals I had never met
in my previous research endeavors. Each, to
paraphrase the general sentiment, had been
labeled a radical or heretic by one or more
groups for raising issues that, at the least, seemed
worthy of consideration and discussion. In most
cases, the issues they raised were disturbing and
quite complex—issues that I, as a researcher,
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John Folk-Williams, Robert Frodeman, Karen
Hamilton, Mike Hart, Dan Helig, DeWitt John,
Rick Knight, Peter Lavigne, Ralph Longobardi,
Mark Lubell, Dan Luecke, Larry MacDonnell,
Sean McAllister, Roz McClellan, Matt
McKinney, Sarah Michaels, Ann Moote,
Deborah Paulson, Maggie Shannon, Toddi
Steelman, Steve Toben, Dan Tarlock, Sarah Van
de Wetering, and my colleagues here at the
Natural Resources Law Center, University of
Colorado School of Law. Of course, this report
has also been shaped by those authors cited
throughout the report—especially those from

whom I have extensively quoted. While I alone
take full responsibility for the content herein, I
must acknowledge that many of the opinions
expressed reflect a much broader community of
voices than simply my own thinking, and in
several cases, are not even consistent with my
own thinking. The following document is not
intended as an essay of my own arguments, but
rather as a synthesis and overview of ideas
emerging from a community that I respect, but
with whom I only partially agree.
Doug Kenney, November 1999
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Executive Summary
initiatives and similar collaborative groups (e.g.,
forestry partnerships). Without question, the
most common source of such skepticism is from
the community of environmental activists, many
of whom are understandably concerned about the
possible
on-the-ground
ramifications
of
significantly modifying arrangements in natural
resources governance and problem-solving. On
the other hand, few parties—including the
skeptics—are completely (or even remotely)
content with the functioning of the existing
institutional framework. Some of the most
common criticisms of existing arrangements
focus on the high costs (both time and money) of
decision-making, the frequency of gridlock, the
failure to embrace integrated and creative
solutions, and the subordinated decision-making
role of local interests and other sectors of the
public.
Widespread dissatisfaction with the existing
“system” is a strong rationale for trying new
solutions, but does not invalidate the importance
or practical necessity of evaluating these new
approaches on their own merits. Measuring
success, however, is a deceptively difficult
challenge, since many efforts are relatively young
(and many problems long-term) and operate in a
complex institutional and social environment, and
given that both the process and outcome
characteristics of collaborative problem-solving
approaches raise difficult questions and evoke
widely different opinions.
Some of these
opinions are normative in nature, describing what
a party may believe to be appropriate or
desirable, while others are presumably more
factual in nature—although a closer examination
of the underlying working assumptions suggests
that many of these assertions may feature more
speculation than fact.

Problem-Solving in a New Era
Recent years have seen a tremendous
increase in watershed initiatives and other
collaborative groups in the western United States.
Although highly variable from case to case, these
efforts often take the form of working groups of
both public (i.e., federal, state, and local
agencies) and private (e.g., citizens, water users)
interests, organized in largely ad hoc associations
to address natural resources problems of mutual
concern. The self-defined mandates of these
efforts typically recognize the legitimacy of both
environmental and economic aspirations, and
support the design and/or implementation of onthe-ground problem-solving strategies at the
watershed (or similar) scale.
Given their emphasis on local involvement,
deliberative processes, and consensus-based
decision-making, these efforts are described as
featuring a “community/collaborative model” of
governance, part of a larger set of institutional
reforms currently endorsed by parties as
ideologically
diverse
as
the
Clinton
Administration and the Western Governors’
Association. These new trends in “governance”
are most notable for featuring a strong reliance
on positive incentives (i.e., the carrot rather than
the stick); partnership arrangements (both
intergovernmental and public/private) providing
an enhanced decision-making role for local
stakeholders; enhanced substantive, geographic,
and intergovernmental integration and/or
coordination; and a more explicit commitment to
ad hoc and consensus-based decision-making
processes based on field-level experimentation
and learning.
Frequently lost in the fervor to endorse and
implement these “alternative problem-solving”
tools are the concerns of “skeptics” who fear that
these approaches may have significant limitations
and drawbacks that are not fully appreciated. Of
particular interest in this report are those
criticisms questioning the merits of watershed
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Common Arguments
Collaborative Groups

for

and

litigation). Closely tied to this argument is the
idea that cooperative interactions within a
specified locale help to build a sense of
community and of place, which in turn,
improves the quality of life for all residents, and
improves the ability of a community to achieve
social, economic and environmental goals.
The arguments of the skeptics often begin
with the notion that existing processes of
decision-making and problem-solving, while
admittedly far from perfect, are not
fundamentally flawed, and can be expected to
work now and in the future.
Additionally,
without the regulatory framework provided by
the frequently maligned programs (deriving
from legislation such as the Clean Water Act
and Endangered Species Act), it would likely be
impossible to even attempt collaborative
approaches. This line of argument is at least
partially reactionary—offered as a defense to
those that would dismantle existing systems.
The most direct argument made by the skeptics is
the assertion that most collaborative group
processes have not been effective in solving onthe-ground problems, and are not likely to be so
in the future. Additionally, in those cases where
some success is difficult to deny, it can be argued
that the success was achieved by concentrating
on those problems that had obvious solutions
that were easy to implement, but long-term
effectiveness will not be maintained once those
opportunities are quickly exhausted (the socalled “low hanging fruit” argument). Also in
those cases, it is often argued that these goals
were not achieved any faster or cheaper than
what would have been possible through
traditional means.
Another major set of arguments against
collaborative processes deal with issues of
representation and decision-making. Specific
criticisms
include
the
assertion
that
environmental viewpoints are not adequately
represented in collaborative group processes, or
conversely, that commodity interests are overrepresented. Additionally, to the extent that
environmental interests are represented, they
are likely to be at a strategic disadvantage given
the greater financial resources and training of
their “anti-environmental” counterparts. Also

Against

The argument in favor of collaborative
groups often begins with the assertion that
traditional means of management and problemsolving do not work, and that traditional means
of management and problem-solving will not
work in the future.
These arguments are
frequently used in a roundabout manner to
support the use of collaborative groups based on
the reasoning that, even if they are largely
unproven experiments in resources management
and problem-solving, collaborative groups are
not likely to be any worse than existing
processes and have a real potential to be
notable improvements in terms of speed, cost,
equity, and on-the-ground results.
Many other supporting arguments are based
on collaborative groups’ alleged track record of
success.
Two arguments are of particular
importance: first is the argument that many
collaborative groups have already achieved
significant organizational objectives (e.g.,
establishment, holding meetings, building
relationships); and second, that many
collaborative groups have already achieved
significant on-the-ground improvements in
natural resource conditions. The reason it is
useful to distinguish between these two
arguments is that the first of these opinions is
typically married to the idea that organizational
achievements will lead to on-the-ground
success, and/or the idea that organizational
gains are of intrinsic value regardless of any onthe-ground consequences.
Other common arguments include the idea
that local residents should be involved in
making decisions with local impacts, an
assertion that is typically linked to the
assumption that this local involvement does not
occur in existing (traditional) arrangements,
and/or the opinion that this desired outcome can
be better achieved through the use of
collaborative groups. Also pervasive is the
argument that cooperative approaches to
decision-making are inherently preferable to
conflict oriented approaches (especially
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intergovernmental and inter-agency competition,
the high cost of resources management, the
phenomenon of institutional inertia and the
constraints of incremental change, the
subordination of public interests to special
interests, the failure to use science effectively,
and
most
importantly,
the
frequently
disappointing on-the-ground track record of
many programs presumably designed to protect
resources.
While there is undoubtedly considerable
room for improvements, a closer look at existing
systems of natural resources and environmental
management suggests that both successes and
failures can be found in abundance.
Furthermore, it is difficult to conclude that the
system is “broken” or “fundamentally flawed”
without calling into question many of the
elemental concepts of the American system of
governance. Some of these concepts include
dispersed power with multiple checks and
balances, competing forums of decision-making,
interest group activity, and federalism. To the
extent that these features are viewed as
deficiencies to be overcome, then dramatic
reforms are in fact called for—not only in natural
resource institutions, but in broader arrangements
in American governance. If, instead, these
qualities are viewed as reasonable constraints to
work within, then the challenge is to more
selectively
and
strategically
implement
substantive reforms within that framework that
promise to more efficiently achieve agreed-upon
goals, and procedural reforms that promise to
better reconcile or balance competing objectives.
Collaborative efforts can presumably play a role
under either scenario, but very different roles—
viewed in the first as a replacement for existing
processes and, in the second, as a supplement.
This line of inquiry takes on added
complexity when future natural resource
problems are considered.
For example,
controlling nonpoint source pollution (the
primary unmet management challenge in current
and future water quality programs) presents a
very different challenge than point source
pollution. Similarly, resources restoration can
feature different obstacles than attempts at
resources preservation. In order to understand

common is the opinion that the typical decisionrule of consensus (often implemented as
unanimity) does not lead to efficient or
productive decision-making exercises.
Responding to the frequent call for greater
local control, skeptics counter that most natural
resources are, at least to some degree, public
resources, and should managed in accordance
with the values held by the nation and society at
large—not just a local constituency. A related
argument is that public policy-making is a
function of government, and it is inappropriate
to shift these decisions to ad hoc, public/private
groups that may not satisfy democratic norms
regarding representation, process, professional
expertise, and related considerations. It is also
argued that conflict-oriented processes are a
legitimate and essential approach to decisionmaking, and that venerating consensus can
promote an inappropriate social pressure to
compromise.

Searching For Answers
Given the difficulty in assessing the
performance of collaborative groups, both in
terms of data collection and interpretation, this
report does not provide a definitive assessment of
the merits of western watershed initiatives and
other collaborative groups, but rather seeks to
better illuminate and explore those working
assumptions that currently separate the
proponents from the skeptics. It is the hope that
this effort will encourage both parties to engage
in a richer debate of these emerging mechanisms
of problem-solving, a real need given that many
policy-makers appear anxious to formally adopt
these new approaches in law and practice.
The logical starting place for this debate is
the recognition that much of the argument in
favor of collaborative groups (and related tools)
is a negative one, based on highlighting the
presumed deficiencies of the existing system of
governance. These assessments frequently focus,
for example, on the existing system’s emphasis
on highly formalized (and frequently adversarial)
modes of decision-making, the prevalence of
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which types of problem-solving approaches are
most likely to be effective in a given situation, it
is necessary to consider these differences
carefully. For example, there is reason to believe
that collaborative processes (due mostly to their
consensus orientation) are likely to be most
effective in those situations in which parties have
similar interests (i.e., value-based conflicts are
not significant) and incentive structures. This, of
course, is only a broad generalization. However,
generalizations of this nature become very
powerful when they are explicitly based on the
recognition that different types of problems, just
like different types of problem-solving strategies,
offer different sets of incentives, opportunities,
and constraints. A better understanding of this
conceptually simple observation can provide real
insights into the debate over collaborative
groups, given that the empirical field-level data
needed to provide definitive answers about
effectiveness may still be several years away.1
A better understanding of the incentives,
opportunities and constraints provided by
different problem-solving approaches is also
central to understanding the relationship between
the so-called “alternative” means of problemsolving and the “traditional” means. As a
practical matter, these different types of
approaches often go hand-in-hand, a phenomenon
perhaps best illustrated by the use of litigation to
encourage negotiation. A working understanding
of this relationship strongly encourages viewing
watershed initiatives and similar collaborative
efforts as supplements, rather than replacements,
for traditional processes such as regulation and
litigation. In fact, many of the arguments that
distinguish proponents from skeptics are largely
diminished when the working assumption is that
the “alternative” processes are intended, both

now and in the immediate future, to be
supplementary in nature.
Also of note is the idea that locally-oriented,
consensus-based processes are often endorsed
based on concepts drawn from the “social
capital” literature, which asserts that certain
types of activities help to build closely-knit
communities of skilled individuals better able to
jointly solve problems of community interest.
Certainly this line of thought is supported by
many natural resource problem-solving efforts in
the third world. However, those are situations in
which technical and financial resources are
frequently unavailable and where well-developed
legal and administrative systems are lacking—not
the conditions in the American West.
Additionally, to the extent that certain activities
can build these skills, is it accurate to assume
that only consensus-based processes have this
quality? The educational value of watershed
initiatives and similar collaborative efforts is well
established and provides considerable reason for
enthusiasm; but education and problem-solving
are not necessarily equivalent activities,
especially to the extent that conflicts are linked to
value differences. Furthermore, if community
interactions and the joint pursuit of “community
interests” are the key to solving modern natural
resource problems, why then are market
mechanisms the other pillar—along with
collaborative
processes—in
comprehensive
reform proposals of the National Performance
Review and the Western Governors’ Association
(e.g., Enlibra), among others? Clearly, more
thought is needed to fully explore the social
capital argument when applied to natural
resources management and problem-solving in
the American West.
One of the research areas most in need of
scholarly attention is how a reliance on consensus
decision-making—often interpreted in practice as
a
unanimity
requirement—impacts
the
functioning of collaborative groups. Throughout
much of western philosophy is a rich mythology
that surrounds consensus processes.
Of
particular note are the ideas that consensus is a
social good, and that consensus decisions are
inherently more accurate or valid than other types
of decisions. While there is sound theory and

1

The Natural Resources Law Center is among those
research organizations engaged in this empirical
research. Currently, the Center is compiling survey
data on western watershed initiatives, including
those first investigated by the Center in 1995 leading
to publication of The Watershed Source Book
(NRLC, 1996). Research of this kind begins to
satisfy the need for long-term data necessary to offer
more precise conclusions about effectiveness.
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surpassing even “consensus” in its ability to
promote confusion, misunderstanding, and
hollow dogma.
This and other observations herein reinforce
the working premise upon which this study was
initiated: i.e., that assessing the merits of western
watershed initiatives and similar collaborative
groups is not easy, but is a topic of sufficient
importance to encourage a more active and
rigorous exploration of all opinions, both in favor
and against. Given that the opinions of the
skeptics still comprise the minority in both the
scholarly and “gray” literatures,2 it is particularly
important to note that those opinions generally
stand-up well to an initial examination, and
certainly therefore deserve more serious
attention. This conclusion, however, comes with
two caveats. First of all, the relevance of any
specific criticism or supporting argument is
ultimately something that must be concluded on a
case-by-case situation.
Generalizations are
extremely valuable, but only to the extent that
they are not blindly applied to specific cases.
Secondly, the normative content of this subject
area is quite high, suggesting that the academic
community may prove more useful in structuring
and informing the debate, than in reaching
defensible conclusions.
The Natural Resources Law Center
continues to recommend that the experimentation
with collaborative groups continue, guided by a
policy of “guarded optimism” and explicit
scholarly critiques.
Learning through
experimentation is a legitimate means of crafting
improved institutional arrangements only to the
extent that the scientific construction of
experimentation is honored—namely, that issues
and assumptions are well defined, that
information is collected and analyzed in a
credible manner to test those assumptions, that
measurable results are used to shape conclusions,

credible evidence to support both ideas, there is
also reason to challenge these assumptions. For
example, current democratic norms suggest that
diversity and value pluralism (rather than
homogeneity) are key elements of healthy
democracies, and current patterns of interest
group governance suggest that group decisions
are neither inherently right nor wrong, but are
simply viable. On a more practical level, there is
reason to question some consensus-based
processes on the basis of inadequate
representation, the further concentration of power
in already powerful interests, and the potentially
coercive quality of processes demanding
consensus decisions. Of course, these alleged
qualities of consensus processes, both pro and
con, vary considerably from case to case,
discouraging sweeping generalizations and
promoting caution—ideas equally applicable to
evaluations of traditional processes of decisionmaking.

Tentative Conclusions
Perhaps the most significant conclusion
emerging from this exploration of collaborative
groups is that the merits of consensus-building
processes are largely interpreted by both
proponents and skeptics based on normative
criteria, and those criteria tend to evolve over
time as key assumptions about democracy
change. For example, modern popular discourse
increasingly promotes participatory democracy
(i.e., Jeffersonian democracy), an ideal that is
arguably more popular today than during the
Constitutional Convention when Madison’s ideas
about representative democracy carried the day.
In the context of natural resources management,
this familiar debate over participatory versus
representative democracy is complicated by two
related factors: the role of science and scientists
in decision-making, and the merits of an interest
group mode of public policy-making. Both of
these factors have been the focus of considerable
change in the past century. Thus it is not
surprising that virtually all parties “arguing
about consensus” can, and do, support their
opinions by appealing to “democracy,” a term

2

“Gray literature” is the term given to publications
that are not subject to peer review or extensive
critical editing. The gray literature includes
newspapers, newsletters, most Internet postings,
many in-house publications, and other documents
outside the world of academic journals and scholarly
books.
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and that peer review is used to validate results.
That process is underway, but is far from
completed. Until that research is mature, it is
prudent to listen to all ideas and arguments
regarding the merits of watershed initiatives and
other collaborative groups.
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Arguing About Consensus
Examining the Case Against Western Watershed Initiatives and Other
Collaborative Groups Active in Natural Resources Management

the realm of natural resources governance,
including the emergence of “community forestry”
efforts (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 1994) and the
diversity of programs organized under the
moniker of ecosystem management (Yaffee et al.,
1996).
At a somewhat larger scale are
collaborative efforts for basin-level ecosystem
restoration, such as the CALFED process, the
Everglades remediation, and the South Platte
restoration.
Proponents typically see these loosely
related innovations as satisfying the long unmet
need for effective and democratic mechanisms of
governance and problem-solving at the local
level. In such efforts, citizens, stakeholders, and
government officials can join to collaboratively
design and implement pragmatic solutions to
problems of environmental and community
sustainability. To date, most investigations of
these phenomena have focused on describing case
studies, in part for the purpose of identifying
lessons and keys to success, and in part to
generate greater enthusiasm and support—
political, financial, and popular—for these
efforts. Clearly, this is working. For example, a
conservative estimate is that the number of
watershed initiatives, and similar groups, has
grown 10-fold during the 1990s.4 Watershed
initiative participants number in the thousands,

Introduction
In recent years, problem-solving approaches
in the natural resources realm have increasingly
featured a “community/-collaborative” model of
governance. One of the best examples of this
phenomenon has been the 1990s-era proliferation
of “watershed initiatives”3 in the western United
States (NRLC, 1996; Kenney, 1997). Although
highly variable from case to case, these efforts
typically take the form of working groups of both
public (i.e., federal, state, and local agencies) and
private (e.g., citizens, water users) interests,
organized in largely ad hoc associations to
address natural resources problems of mutual
concern. The self-defined mandates of these
efforts typically recognize the legitimacy of both
environmental and economic aspirations, and
support the design and/or implementation of onthe-ground problem-solving strategies at the
watershed (or similar) scale. These efforts have
been a primary focus of research conducted by
the Natural Resources Law Center, and are
consequently the most frequently referenced
phenomena in this report. However, many other
prominent
modern
examples
of
the
community/collaborative model permeate through
3

Watershed initiatives are also frequently known as
watershed partnerships, watershed councils, or
watershed groups. Whatever the name, these efforts
are one example of a type of organizational structure
known herein and elsewhere as a collaborative
group. These groups typically feature both public
and private (citizen) participants, usually operating
in a largely ad hoc and self-guided manner to
address natural resource problems of common
concern at a physically relevant geographic scale,
such as a watershed.

4

This estimate is based on several years of research
at the Natural Resources Law Center. Note that it is
very difficult to provide firm numerical estimates of
watershed initiatives and other collaborative groups
simply due to the definitional issues involved. Using
the criteria utilized in The Watershed Source Book,
watershed initiatives in the West probably number
over 400, however, only a slightly more liberal
definition could potentially double this number.
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and many agencies are committing time and
resources to these efforts at staggering rates.
Many parties, however, are skeptical.
These collaborative efforts, they suggest, are
largely unproven experiments, bolstered more by
desperate enthusiasm and unsubstantiated
generalizations than by real and documented
results. Were these comments arising from a
lunatic fringe, they would not be so
disconcerting, but that is typically not the case.
These observations are primarily coming from
veterans of the environmental protection wars—
from organizations committed to protecting
resources, minimizing pollution, and providing a
strong public voice in natural resources decisionmaking.
Many academics are increasingly
joining in this questioning, asking both practical
and philosophical questions pertaining to the
effectiveness of these arrangements, and to the
merits of deviating from proven, although
imperfect, mechanisms of decision-making and
problem-solving.
These are serious questions, the answers to
which are of interest to both proponents and
opponents of watershed initiatives and related
efforts. To ignore these questions would do the
dual disservice of pushing proponents forward in
a cloud of ignorance, perhaps never realizing the
full potential of these mechanisms, and of turning
a honest line of questioning and healthy
skepticism into a full-fledged backlash. If it is
true we fear what we do not understand, then
proponents of collaborative efforts should not try
to silence the skeptics, but should embrace this
challenge by gathering and distributing more
detailed information on the functioning of these
efforts. Failure to do so could be a disastrous
strategic mistake, potentially fracturing an
environmental community that should be unified
by common enemies and the goals of ecological
restoration and protection.
The purpose of this report is to help identify
the lines of inquiry and debate regarding the
merits of watershed initiatives and similar
collaborative groups. The report begins by
describing the modern enthusiasm behind
collaborative approaches to problem-solving,
part of a still larger trend reshaping natural
resource institutions in a variety of ways. This

discussion leads into a review of issues
associated with defining and measuring success
of watershed initiatives and similar efforts, and a
summary of major arguments and assumptions,
both pro and con, that speak to the issue of
effectiveness. A preliminary review of literature
and data follows. This review is broadly-focused
and highly strategic (rather than exhaustive),
straining for insights both from narrowly-focused
empirical studies and broad, philosophical
essays. Given the focus of this report, emphasis
is on the skeptical/critical sources. While
questions significantly out-number answers at
this point in time, there is much to be learned
from earlier research. Few definitive conclusions
are reached, but themes and tentative findings do
emerge that are likely to encourage further
research, debate, and ultimately, understanding.

Resource Management and ProblemSolving in a New Era
Several well documented demographic
trends have converged in recent decades to
dramatically reshape western landscapes. In
their recent report to the Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission, Case and Alward
(1997) paint a disconcerting picture of a region
struggling to simultaneously accommodate
accelerated population growth, demographic
change, and socioeconomic transformation. Over
the last 25 years, the population of the West has
grown by approximately 32 percent, far
exceeding predictions and the national growth
rate of 19 percent. This should continue: the
U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 9 of the 10
fastest growing states from 1995 to 2025 will be
in the West. Spurred on largely by opportunities
in advanced technology industries (e.g.,
telecommunications and computing), outdoor
recreation opportunities and careers, a robust
service economy, and plentiful environmental
amenities, a rapidly expanding network of “urban
archipelagos” have brought pockets of
urbanization to regions previously featuring low
population densities and extractive natural
resource industries.
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Equally important, but much less obvious to
the causal observer, has been a parallel
transformation of the institutional landscape
pertaining to arrangements for resources policymaking, program administration, and field-level
management. These new trends in “governance”
are most notable for featuring a strong reliance
on positive incentives (i.e., the carrot rather than
the stick); partnership arrangements (both
intergovernmental and public/private) providing
an enhanced decision-making role for local
stakeholders; enhanced substantive, geographic,
and intergovernmental integration and/or
coordination; and a more explicit commitment to
ad hoc and collaborative decision-making
processes based on field-level experimentation
and learning. In the context of decision-making
and problem-solving activities, these trends are
described by Kenney and Lord (1999) as
comprising the “era of alternative problem
solving.” Prominent tools of this era include
ADR (alternative dispute resolution) techniques
and negotiated rule-making processes, the use of
market mechanisms to establish or implement
policy, and the use of “collaborative groups” as
vehicles for situation-specific exercises in
decision-making and, ultimately, problemsolving. Watershed initiatives are among the
most obvious expressions of the communitybased environmental protection (CBEP)5
movement,
although
other
examples—
particularly community forestry—are also
enjoying a newfound popularity. These efforts
are based on a community/collaborative model of
action that is fundamentally different than many
of the “traditional” modes of decision-making,
particularly regulatory and litigation-oriented
approaches to policy design and implementation.
In the natural resources and environmental
realm, no agency has been more vocal in
embracing these new trends in governance than
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Relatively few of the reform ideas espoused by
the agency’s leadership have been fully or

successfully translated into new modes of on-theground behavior; regulation is still the bread and
butter of the agency. However, an environment
of reform has been established by the current
leadership (EPA:1996a:1), spurred on in part by
the “reinventing government” ideals of the
National Performance Review:
Over the last several years, an
important change has been taking place
in our national strategy for protecting
the environment. Through an array of
partnership
programs
that
we
collectively refer to as Partners for the
Environment,6 EPA is demon-strating
that voluntary goals and commitments
achieve real environmental results in a
timely and cost-effective way.
In
addition to traditional approaches to
environmental protection, EPA is
building cooperative partnerships with
a variety of groups, including small and
large businesses, citizen groups, state
and local governments, universities and
trade associations. ... These partners
6

Twenty-eight programs were developed between
1991 and 1996. These programs are primarily
aimed at one of three related goals: (1) reducing
toxic emissions and other pollutants (33/50,
Common Sense Initiative, Design for the
Environment, Environmental Accounting, Green
Chemistry Program, Pesticide Environmental
Stewardship Program, Project XL, State and Local
Outreach Program, Voluntary Standards Network,
and the Waste Minimization National Plan); (2)
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (AgSTAR,
Climate Wise, Coalbed Methane Outreach Program,
Landfill Methane Outreach Program, Natural Gas
Star Program, Ruminant Livestock Methane
Program, Transportation Partners, U.S. Initiative on
Joint Implementation, and the Voluntary Aluminum
Industrial Program); and/or (3) promoting energy
conservation and resource conservation (Energy Star
Buildings, Energy Star Office Equipment, Energy
Star Residential Programs, Energy Star Transformer
Program, Green Lights, WasteWi$e Program, and
the Water Alliances for Voluntary Efficiency).
Other typical goals include improving compliance
(Environmental Leadership Program) and public
health (Indoor Environments Program).

5

Note that many documents utilize the generally
analogous term of community-based environmental
management (CBEM) as implemented by
community-based collaboratives (CBCs).
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are
achieving
measurable
environmental results often more
quickly and with lower costs than
would be the case with regulatory
approaches.
EPA views these
partnership efforts as key to the future
success of environmental protection.

One recent articulation of the federal
commitment to watershed initiatives is found in
the Clean Water Action Plan, the core element in
the Clinton Administration’s “Clean Water
Initiative,” developed by ten federal interagency
workgroups:
The Vice President called for the Clean
Water Action Plan to be developed
within 120 days [of October 18, 1997,
the 25th anniversary of enactment of the
Clean Water Act] and that it be based
on three principles.
First, federal
agencies are to develop cooperative
approaches that promote coordination
and reduce duplication among federal,
state, and local agencies and tribal
governments
wherever
possible.
Second, agencies are to maximize the
participation of community groups and
the public, placing particular emphasis
on ensuring community and public
access to information about water
quality issues. Finally, agencies are to
emphasize innovative approaches to
pollution control, including incentives,
market-based
mechanisms,
and
cooperative
partner-ships
with
landowners and other private parties.
(EPA and USDA, 1998:x-xi).

Of particular relevance in this study has
been the agency’s adoption of the “watershed
approach framework.” The western watershed
movement is of high interest to the agency, which
is an active participant and supporter of many
efforts:
Many public and private organizations
are joining forces and creating multidisciplinary and multi-jurisdictional
partnerships to focus on [water quality]
problems, community by community
and watershed by watershed. These
watershed approaches are likely to
result in significant restoration,
maintenance and protection of water
resources in the United States.
Supporting them is a high priority for
EPA’s national water program. (EPA,
1996b:2).
Many other federal agencies are also active
participants in supporting watershed initiatives.
The Natural Resources Conservation Service
(formerly the Soil Conservation Service) merits
particular attention, given the agency’s well
established links to the national network of
approximately 3,000 conservation districts
established nationwide largely in response to
Great Depression dust bowl conditions (NRCS,
1996). Major federal land managers (e.g., the
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management)
and the Bureau of Reclamation are also among
those federal agencies demonstrating a growing
commitment to community-based environmental
protection. The final report of the Western
Water Policy Review Advisory Commission
(1998) is also very supportive of the
community/collaborative model of watershedbased management.

Support for watershed initiatives at the state
level in the West is also considerable and
growing, especially in the Pacific Northwest
(NRLC, 1998; WSWC, 1998; Craig, 1999).
The situation in Oregon is particularly notable.
Beginning in 1987 with establishment of a
Governor’s Watershed Enhancement Board and
buoyed by creation of the Watershed Health
Program in 1993, state funding has been
provided to assist community-based watershed
initiatives throughout Oregon (GWEB, 1999).
This effort continues, now under the control of an
independent commission known as the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board. Several other
western states have closely watched the Oregon
experience, and a few—specifically, Washington,
California, and Montana—have experimented
with several formal mechanisms for providing
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state support and coordination to watershed
efforts (NRLC, 1998). The watershed approach
to water quality management has also been
formally embraced in many other western states,
including Alaska, Arizona, Utah, Colorado,
Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming, and New Mexico.
Providing further state support is an idea
with considerable political momentum in the
West, a sentiment easily distilled from statements
of the Western Governors’ Association (WGA)
calling for natural resource and environmental
decisions to emerge “through balanced, open and
inclusive approaches at the ground level, where
interested public and private stakeholders work
together to formulate critical issue statements and
develop locally based solutions to those issues”
(WGA, 1998). Along similar lines, earlier WGA
publications called for the use of policy
frameworks “based upon improving the way we
establish environmental priorities, creating better
price signals, encouraging voluntary initiatives,
working within ecosystems, and resolving
disputes without litigation” (WGA, 1993:I,
remarks of WGA Chairman Fife Symington).
The most recent articulation of this philosophy is
the so-called doctrine of Enlibra, a term coined
by the governors to describe an approach to
environmental management emphasizing balance
and stewardship:

solutions; and meaningful incentives to
complement existing laws.7
Perhaps the best example of Enlibra in
action is the Oregon Plan for Salmon and
Watersheds, a state effort to restore imperiled
salmon and trout populations “through locallydriven, voluntary cooperative efforts.”8 The
Oregon Plan is an alternative to the federal
regulatory model embodied by the Endangered
Species Act (ESA), which is a prominent
institutional feature of watershed governance
throughout the Pacific Northwest. At the heart
of the Plan initially was a Memorandum of
Agreement (April, 1997) between the State and
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
which called for the State to take actions to
restore coho salmon along the Oregon Coast,
with the understanding that NMFS would
consider these actions in deciding if these species
merited listing under the ESA. While NMFS
initially agreed to this arrangement and did not
list the population in question, a subsequent
District Court opinion9 (of June 1, 1998) held
that the agency should not have taken into
account those parts of the Oregon Plan and MOA
that are not "current regulatory measures,” a
decision that prompted the agency to
subsequently list the species (on October 2,
1998).10 Timber interests that had agreed to
financially support the Plan, presumably as a
cost-effective means of avoiding federal ESA
regulations, while disappointed by the District
Court decision and ESA listing by NFMS, have
decided to remain partners in the effort, which

The doctrine speaks to greater
participation and collaboration in
decision making, focuses on outcomes
rather than just programs, and
recognizes the need for a variety of
tools beyond regulation that will
improve environmental and natural
resources management. … The
Governors recognize that to succeed at
environmental management people need
to be empowered to do the right thing.
This requires good information;
inclusive processes that respect
different values and provide individuals
a role in designing and implementing

7

http://www.westgov.org/Enlibra/. The Enlibra
principles were primarily crafted by Governors
Leavitt (Utah) and Kitzhaber (Oregon). In addition
to encouraging collaborative problem-solving and a
greater use of incentive-based management tools,
Enlibra stresses the need to address problems from a
regional perspective guided by good science.
Additionally, Enlibra recognizes a need for
continuing regulatory programs as a balance against
processes reliant on voluntary action and incentives.
8
http://www.oregon-plan.org/.
9
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley, 6
F.Supp. 2d, 1139 (OR 1998).
10
Additional listings occurred in March of 1999.
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enjoys the strong support of Enlibra architect
Governor John Kitzhaber.11

11

See Governor Kitzhaber’s Executive Order 99-01,
January 8, 1999; <http://www.oregonplan.org/Eo99-01.htm>. While it is much too early
to assess the effectiveness of the approach, the Plan
does boast of many on-the-ground habitat restoration
efforts. For example, in 1996-1997, watershed
councils (i.e., watershed initiatives) and conservation
districts completed 138 stream fencing projects
(involving at least 301 miles of streambank), 196
riparian area planting projects (involving at least
111 miles of streams), and 458 instream habitat
improvement projects. Some observers remain
skeptical about the long-term effectiveness of the
approach, in part due to a perception that the
industry “partners” are attempting to sabotage the
effort from within.
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The Issue of Defining and Measuring Success
were created to solve (NAPA, 1997). This
philosophy is known as “performance-based
management” (PBM), an outcome-based
administrative approach that, in the natural
resources realm, has been most aggressively
promoted as an alternative to the activity-based
approach traditionally employed by EPA and
other agencies utilizing regulatory tools:

Given the widespread (and growing)
popularity of watershed initiatives and related
approaches, it is surprising, and more than a little
disturbing, that the advocates of alternative
problem-solving approaches rarely offer hard
evidence to support claims of effectiveness.
Countless “success stories” can be found, but
upon closer examination, many appear to be
exaggerations, and others are of limited universal
applicability.
For example, the review by
Hockenstein et al. (1997) of market-based
strategies for pollution control show a level of
progress often significantly below what was
expected or commonly assumed. Similarly,
studies by Coglianese (1997, 1999) on negotiated
rule-making and collaborative decision-making
approaches raise serious doubts about the
claimed efficiency of these alternative efforts
regarding the time and cost of decision-making,
and the frequency of judicial challenges, and of
equal importance, suggest that claims of
inefficiency regarding “traditional” processes
may also be overstated.
Related concerns
regarding the effectiveness of environmental
dispute resolution techniques are identified by
Amy (1990), Daniels (1993) and Sipe (1998).
On the other hand, it seems highly unlikely that
the wealth of anecdotal evidence in support of
alternative problem-solving is without some basis
in fact, and the widespread (and growing)
popularity of these processes undoubtedly
reflects that some real benefits are arising to
participants. These are all issues worthy of
further examination.

EPA’s present system for evaluating
the successfulness of its enforcement
work is based on a set of numerical
indicators. EPA officials keep a record
of the number of administrative orders,
civil referrals, and criminal referrals
issued or made by the agency over the
course of a fiscal year, as well as the
total amounts of administrative and
civil penalties it has assessed against
environmental violators. These figures,
which play a role in EPA internal
allocation of resources, are then made
available to the Congress and interested
members of the public. This system,
which has been widely referred to as
“bean counting,” has been subject to
extensive and sometimes heated
criticism, both within the agency and
from outside it. (Mintz, 1995:119120).
Critics have also found much to criticize in
the failure in the Endangered Species Act to
accomplish the stated goal of restoring threatened
and endangered species (Wilcove, 1998). As of
September, 1999, the federal endangered species
list contained 1,197 threatened or endangered
species in the United States, with dozens more
being added each year.12 Despite the existence of
525 approved (and 361 unapproved) recovery

The Challenge of Performance-Based
Management (PBM)
One of the major features of the era of
alternative problem-solving is the belief that
management approaches should primarily be
evaluated with respect to their actual on-theground impact in addressing the problems they

12

Updated statistics are available at the Endangered
Species Home Page of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (http://endangered.fws.gov/).
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plans, about the only way off the list has been
through extinction, an embarrassing statistic that
prompted the Interior Department in recent years
to consider delisting several well-known species,
including the bald eagle. Furthermore, critics
contend that this lack of results has come at the
expense of significant public and private costs,
including the diminution of private property
rights and values (Pendley, 1995; Kirchheim,
1999). Several other programs dealing with
environmental protection, resource management,
and ecological restoration attract similar
criticisms of poor performance and intrusiveness.
These and related criticisms of ineffective
government have proven to be highly resonant
with a broad cross-section of the American
people, as has the obvious logic of PBM.
Consequently, many agencies—such as EPA—
have recently implemented a variety of PBM
strategies (NAPA, 1997), with more efforts
forthcoming due to legislation in 1993 calling for
PBM in all federal agencies and programs. The
Government Performance and Results Act
(GPRA)13 (or “Results Act”) requires all federal
agencies by 2000 to submit “performance
reports” showing how their programs are
performing with respect to stated evaluation
criteria. Initial implementation of the Results Act
has been conducted using a series of pilot
programs, which according to a 1997 General
Accounting Office (GAO) report, has not been
highly successful (GAO, 1997). Most (93
percent)
resource
managers/administrators
contacted by the GAO identified at least one
“great” or “very great” challenge impeding
progress. Many of those challenges occur at the
beginning of the process, including defining
annual performance standards for achieving
otherwise long-term goals.
Most problems
associated with data collection were considered
less fundamental or serious, while problems in
data analysis primarily concerned separating
impacts of the program from exogenous factors.
It is easy to see how challenges of this
nature can impede PBM. For example, how can
the success of EPA programs be precisely

assessed given that many parties, programs, and
processes play a role in creating and abating
pollution (Mintz, 1995)? As the GAO observed:
[T]he outcomes of many federal
programs are the result of the interplay
of several factors, and only some of
these are within the program’s control.
…. More importantly, many programs
consist of efforts to influence highly
complex systems or phenomena outside
government control. In such cases, one
cannot confidently attribute a causal
connection between the program and its
outcomes. (GAO, 1997:16-17).
In lieu of obvious one-to-one relationships
between actions and outcomes, perhaps activity
measures such as administrative orders, civil
referrals, and criminal referrals are, at least in
part, appropriate measures of success. Similarly,
the recovery of endangered species is often, for
biological reasons, an inherently long-term
challenge. Many listed species are now stable or
improving, and those listed for the longest time
are making the most progress.14 Perhaps that is
proof of incremental success, even if the longterm goal of delisting remains elusive? And even
if these methodological challenges can be
overcome, PBM analyses say little about the
equity or legitimacy of the processes utilized—
i.e., the means rather than the ends. These
observations suggest that PBM mandates, despite
their obvious theoretical appeal, are likely to only
be a partial remedy to problems of evaluating the
performance of various problem-solving
strategies.

14

For example, 58 percent of species listed between
1968 and 1973 are stable or improving, compared to
just 22 percent of those listed between 1989 and
1993 (FWS, 1994:12).

13

P.L. 103-62; 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (codified in
various sections of 5 and 31 U.S.C.).
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standpoint, that can be an extremely difficult
determination, due to factors such as the relative
youth of many efforts, and to concerns over
translating highly case-specific outcomes into
generalized conclusions. Additionally, even in
the absence of this cause-and-effect data, it can
be argued that collaborative, bottom-up
processes have an intrinsic value regardless of
their outcomes. Values attributed to process
rather than outcomes are difficult to capture in a
PBM approach, but should not be
underestimated.16
Issues and arguments of this nature have
stymied more than one effort to measure the
success of watershed initiatives, including a
forum of the Northwest Water Law and Policy
Project (Water Project).17 Commenting on the
fall-out of that process, organizer Michael Fife
concludes:

The Special Case of Watershed Initiatives
Measuring the “success” (or “performance”)
of watershed initiatives is extremely difficult for
many reasons.15 First and foremost is the
definition of success. Clearly, two different
measuring scales are currently in widespread use.
The first states that success is achievement of a
specific on-the-ground goal described in terms of
improved environmental health.
Using this
classic PBM definition, a group organized to
restore salmon populations is successful only if
and when sampling data shows real, quantitative
population increases. Given that this is the
primary definition utilized by critics to measure
the performance of well-established governmental
programs and entities, it seems fair and
reasonable to apply this standard as well to
“alternative” means of problem-solving and
management.
On the other hand, many
environmental problems are the result of decades
of abuse or ignorance, and tangible, measurable
progress probably cannot realistically be
expected in many cases for decades.
Consequently, imposing this definition of success
on a community-based watershed restoration
effort can be unfairly burdensome.
That argument leads to the second definition
of success, which is more forgiving. This
definition states that success can be measured by
“organizational” criteria, such as changes in the
level of trust (and/or satisfaction) among
stakeholders and resource managers, the degree
to which management efforts better recognize
systemic and transboundary qualities of natural
resources, and the enhanced involvement of local
actors in decision-making. Determining if this
type of criteria should be used to measure
success is dependent, in part, upon whether or
not it can be shown that organizational
achievements are a prerequisite to achieving the
more fundamental, on-the-ground form of
success that results in measurable improvements
in resource health. From a methodological

I find myself drifting at a steady rate
toward the position that community
processes are worth supporting whether
or not we can judge them as successful
according to some objective standard of
success. There is something organic
about community groups that make
them good in themselves; we just know
they are a good thing whether or not we
are able to articulate why.18
While the perspective of Fife is widely held
and is compelling on many levels, the fact
remains that many modern policy initiatives are
moving forward under the assumption that the
community/collaborative model offers more than
intrinsic, procedural benefits, but also promises
to satisfy the nearly universal demand for greater
efficiency and pragmatism in resource
management and problem-solving. If these onthe-ground benefits are not realized, this does not
mean that the “procedural gains” are irrelevant or
16

This idea was well articulated by Winston
Churchill when he remarked that democracy is the
worst form of government, except for all the rest.
17
“Watershed Council Success Forum,” August 31,
1998.
18
E-mail communication of January 24, 1999.
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This discussion is largely taken from the article,
“Are Community-Based Watershed Groups Really
Effective? Confronting the Thorny Issue of
Measuring Success,” published in Chronicle of
Community (Kenney, 1999a).

9

not worthy of pursuit, but does call into question
the fervor with which many alternative problemsolving strategies are being pursued—often at the
expense of other methods. Some effort, however
incomplete, is needed to address these thorny
issues of success currently attracting more
rhetoric than real analysis. One product of this
research would be advice to policy-makers
considering a greater use of watershed initiatives.
Equally important, however, would be additional
insights identifying those structural, functional,
and “contextual” qualities that most contribute to
(or impede) success in a collaborative watershed
effort.19 This information would be useful to
both proponents and opponents of watershed
initiatives.

than an absolute defendable standard upon which
to structure empirical research. For example, the
“on-the-ground orientation” typical of PBM is
featured, but there is the acknowledgement that
progress of this nature may only be a practical
long-term success criterion. The definition also
implicitly acknowledges that watershed initiatives
and similar efforts are established to play
different roles, ranging from field-level action
(e.g., planting trees) at one extreme to public
education at another. For the purposes of
defining success, the role played by the
watershed initiative is not the primary concern;
the primary concern is determining if that role
helps to create or contribute to processes leading
to on-the-ground problem-solving.
Also
significant is the idea that the effort must pursue
goals consistent with prevailing social norms and
laws, otherwise it is not an effort in improving
management, but is more akin to an interest
group seeking special benefits or, at worst, a
criminal effort. This qualifier can also be
interpreted as interjecting the idea of fair and
balanced representation, which again, is offered
to distinguish collaborative groups from interest
groups.
Finally and most importantly, the
definition suggests that performance of watershed
initiatives and similar efforts are best measured
when compared to the level of problem-solving
that would have occurred in their absence, a
criterion with obvious logic and practical value
but defying easy measurement. Initiatives not
meeting the standards contained within the
definition are not necessarily “failures,” but
simply do not meet the highly pragmatic standard
of success necessary to satisfy the skeptics of
these efforts.

A Working Definition of Success
This report provides a general overview of
many of these questions, based on new research
and literature reviews. For the purposes of
discussion, the following definition of success is
offered:
A collaborative group (e.g., watershed
initiative) is successful if it contributes
(or can be reasonably expected to
eventually contribute), in whole or in
part, to the achievement of current or
future on-the-ground natural resource
objectives, defined in accordance with
prevailing societal norms and laws,
beyond what would have occurred (or
will likely occur) in the absence of the
collaborative group.
This
definition
features
several
compromises, caveats and qualifications that
render it a “general working definition” rather
19

Some organizations and publication outlets have
begun to fill this void. Of particular note are efforts
sponsored by River Network (including the
Innovators Report and the 4 Corners Initiative),
many recent graduate theses (e.g., Coughlin et al.,
1999), several thoughtful essays published through
the Chronicle of Community and Ecology Law
Quarterly, and ongoing studies by the Natural
Resources Law Center.
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are a frequent point of contention. For example,
what one party sees as a factual, “positive”
statement, another may view as “speculative.”
While these distinctions may be unimportant in
informal conversation, they take on particular
importance to the analyst asked to independently
assess the credibility of such opinions.
Presumably, the analyst can be expected to offer
a more solid critique of the positive opinions than
the speculative opinions, although both are
amenable to formal scientific scrutiny.
Conversely, the analyst can be expected to
contribute less to the normative debate except to
better
identify
underlying
values
and
assumptions. For this reason, the positive and
speculative arguments are grouped together in the
following discussions, while the normative
opinions are presented separately.
These
arguments are also summarized at the end of this
discussion in Table 1.

Positive, Speculative, and Normative
Opinions Regarding Collaborative
Groups
Any discussion of success regarding
collaborative groups yields many strong opinions
from both proponents and skeptics. In order to
critically evaluate these opinions, it is necessary
to identify the underlying assumptions and
assertions upon which they are founded. Some
opinions refer to matters of fact, and presumably
can—at least in theory—be tested for accuracy
against empirical data. In most cases, these
opinions are what scholars refer to as “positivist”
(or positive), in that they presume to describe an
existing situation. A closely related set of
opinions are those that are somewhat more
“speculative” in nature, in that they refer to
situations that may or may not arise in the future.
While these speculative opinions cannot be tested
in the present with absolute certainty, it is often
possible to evaluate the “reasonableness” of these
views by comparing them to trends and findings
distilled from existing data. This is a common
task in scientific inquiries, taking on its most
formal incarnation in the world of predictive
statistics and probability theory.
A
fundamentally different class of opinions are
“normative,” which do not necessarily refer to a
current or the expected future situation, but
rather describe an “ideal” or “correct” condition
based on personal values more so than objective
facts. While normative opinions have a much
greater philosophical content than the positive or
speculative opinions, they also typically include
assumptions
about
the
cause-and-effect
relationship between particular types of
institutional arrangements and eventual on-theground results.
Both the proponents and skeptics of
collaborative groups in the natural resources and
environmental realm offer opinions of the
“positive” (i.e., the way things are), “speculative”
(i.e., the way things are expected to become), and
“normative” (i.e., the ways things should be)
variety. The distinctions between these classes of
opinions are not always clear, as disputes over
the availability and credibility of supporting data

Positive and Speculative Arguments:
and Con20

Pro

Pro. Perhaps the most prevalent “positive”
opinion articulated by the proponents of
collaborative groups is to assert that traditional
means of management and problem-solving do
not work. Existing mechanisms are often said to
feature procedural inefficiencies and inequities,
while failing to achieve on-the-ground
performance measures.
The speculative
corollary to this argument is that traditional
means of management and problem-solving will
not work in the future. These arguments are
frequently used in a roundabout manner to
support the use of collaborative groups based on
the reasoning that, even if they are largely
unproven experiments in resources management
and problem-solving, collaborative groups are
not likely to be any worse than existing
processes and have a real potential to be
notable improvements.
Another significant argument of the
proponents is that many collaborative groups
20

This discussion provides only a brief listing of
major opinions, arguments, and assumptions.
Additional details, including examples and citations,
are provided throughout the report.
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already meet the pragmatic definition of success
presented earlier. In actuality, this argument is
best articulated as two distinct opinions: first,
that many collaborative groups have already
achieved significant organizational objectives;
and second, that many collaborative groups have
already achieved significant on-the-ground
improvements in natural resource conditions.
The reason it is useful to make this distinction is
that the first of these opinions is typically
married to the speculative idea that
organizational achievements will lead to on-theground success, and/or the normative idea that
organizational gains are of intrinsic value
regardless of any on-the-ground consequences.
The speculative opinion is of particular relevance
to the definition of success provided earlier, as it
introduces
the
implied
cause-and-effect
relationship (between organizational and on-theground achievements) that is at the heart of most
pro-collaborative group arguments.
The
normative opinion, like the other normative
opinions identified in this report, is not readily
accommodated by the aforementioned definition
of success. This does not mean that the
normative opinion is unimportant or invalid, but
is simply a question that is not well suited to
formal scientific testing.21
The positive arguments of the
Con.
collaborative group skeptics often begin with the
notion that existing processes of decisionmaking and problem-solving, while admittedly
far from perfect, are not fundamentally flawed.
To the contrary, many notable gains have been
achieved through existing programs, and to
deviate from those proven tools entails an
inherent risk.
Additionally, without the
regulatory framework provided by the frequently
maligned programs deriving from legislation

such as the Clean Water Act and Endangered
Species Act, it would likely be impossible to
even attempt collaborative approaches, much as
it is difficult to pursue a negotiated settlement
without a viable threat of litigation. This line of
reasoning highlights what is a fundamental and
potentially divisive issue within the community of
collaborative group proponents: To what extent
should tools such as collaborative groups be
viewed as a substitute for more traditional
processes, rather than as a supplement.22
Presumably, the answer to this question lies in
the evaluation of the other opinions and
assumptions regarding the efficacy of the
collaborative group approach.
The most general (and damning) argument
made by the skeptics of collaborative groups is
the assertion that most collaborative group
processes have not been effective in solving onthe-ground problems (the positive argument)
and are not likely to be so in the future (the
speculative argument). Additionally, in those
cases where some success is difficult to deny, the
so-called “low hanging fruit” argument is
frequently offered to dampen any enthusiasm.
This line of reasoning asserts that collaborative
groups may experience some successes
immediately after formation by concentrating on
those problems that have obvious solutions
amenable to efficient implementation, but longterm effectiveness cannot be maintained once
these opportunities are quickly exhausted.
Issues of representation and decisionmaking are also frequently raised to support the
viewpoint that collaborative groups are not
effective problem-solving vehicles, as well as to
support normative criticisms. Specific criticisms
22

Interestingly, parties most directly involved with
watershed initiatives appear to be generally united in
their belief that these processes are best viewed as
supplements rather than replacements, a conclusion
distilled from comments urging that formal authority
not be transferred to watershed initiatives (Kenney,
1997). It is policy-makers and analysts, more so
than actual participants, that most commonly argue
in favor of greater authority and formality (e.g.,
WWPRAC, 1998). Efforts like the Quincy Library
Group best highlight this emerging debate about the
proper role for community groups in policy-making.

21

Austrian philosopher Karl Popper is well known
for making the distinction between scientific and
non-scientific arguments, claiming that only the
former category is capable of testing that could
potentially find it false. A non-scientific
argument—such as a normative argument—cannot
be disproven. The distinction between positive and
normative arguments has a long history, going back
at least to Machiavelli’s writings in the sixteenth
century.
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in turn, improves the quality of life for all
residents, and improves the ability of a
community to achieve social, economic and
environmental goals.
Both of these normative opinions are
founded upon positive and speculative
assumptions that may be difficult to substantiate.
For example, do collaborative processes really
provide local residents with a measurably greater
influence on policy outcomes than do other
processes of decision-making? Similarly, do
collaborative processes really help to build an
enhanced level of trust and cooperation among
parties, and what are the consequences of that
modified relationship? Presumably, these are
questions that can be addressed, at least partially,
through scholarly research. Whether or not the
outcomes of such research are influential in
modifying normative opinions, however, is a
separate issue, as values rarely are modified by
providing factual data.
Con. Both types of normative opinions
described above are matched in the public policy
arena with strong counter opinions. Some
parties, for example, argue that most natural
resources are, at least to some degree, public
resources, and should managed in accordance
with the values held by the nation and society at
large—not just a local constituency. A related
argument is that public policy-making is a
function of government, and it is inappropriate
to subordinate these decisions to ad hoc,
public/private groups that may not satisfy
democratic norms regarding representation,
process, professional expertise, and related
considerations. It is also argued that conflictoriented processes are a legitimate and
important approach to decision-making, and
that venerating consensus can promote an
inappropriate social pressure to compromise.
Again, each of these normative opinions is
largely based on positive/speculative assumptions
that may or may not survive critical
examination—e.g., the premise that the values of
local constituencies will frequently deviate from
those held nationally, and the idea that existing
governmental processes can produce reasonable
outcomes.

include the assertion that environmental
viewpoints are not adequately represented in
collaborative group processes, or conversely,
that commodity interests are over-represented.
Presumably, in some cases this is seen as an
inherent function of the incentive structure
involved or the demographics of the region, while
in other cases, it is attributed to a deliberate
policy of exclusion. Additionally, to the extent
that environmental interests are represented,
they are likely to be at a strategic disadvantage
given the greater financial resources and
training
of
their
“anti-environmental”
counterparts. Also common is the opinion that
the typical decision-rule of consensus does not
lead to efficient or productive decision-making
exercises. Given that proponents of collaborative
processes are often quick to cite the pragmatism
and effectiveness of these efforts, these
criticisms, if accurate, are devastating to any
party utilizing a performance-based measure of
success.

Normative Arguments: Pro and Con
Pro. Many parties see the movement in
favor of community-oriented, collaborative
processes as having intrinsic values irrespective
of their long-term contribution to problemsolving. Two types of supporting arguments are
frequently mentioned. The first is that local
residents should be involved in making
decisions with local impacts. It is frequently
argued that collaborative groups are desirable in
that they often provide a vehicle for local
stakeholders and governments to be more
involved in making the decisions that affect their
lives than they might otherwise be if the decisions
were made by distant governments. This concern
is especially prevalent in communities that live
within or adjacent to public lands, which are
largely managed in accordance with national
policy directives and regional planning processes.
The second major normative argument is that
cooperative approaches to decision-making are
inherently preferable to conflict oriented
approaches (e.g., litigation). Closely tied to this
argument is the idea that cooperative
interactions within a specified locale help to
build a sense of community and of place, which
13

Table 1. Summary of Arguments Raised to Defend and Challenge the Use of Collaborative
Groups in Natural Resources Management and Problem-Solving
ARGUMENTS OF THE PROPONENTS

ARGUMENTS OF THE SKEPTICS

Positive Arguments (i.e., arguments presumably based on facts) and Speculative
Arguments (i.e., those based on expected future outcomes).
Existing processes of decision-making and
Traditional means of management and
problem-solving do not work now, and/or problem-solving, while imperfect, are not
will not work in the future. Collaborative fundamentally flawed, and create the
context within which collaboration can be
approaches offer greater future problemattempted.
solving potential.
Due to problems of inadequate
Even if collaborative groups are not
successful, they are (and will be) no worse representation, unequal resources, and the
limits of consensus, collaborative groups
than existing mechanisms.
may exacerbate unfair concentrations of
power and have a coercive affect on
minority viewpoints.
Many collaborative groups have already
Organizational achievements may not lead
achieved significant organizational
to on-the-ground results—the only valid
objectives. Some have also already
measure of effectiveness. Many “success
achieved significant on-the-ground results. stories” lack empirical proof, and involve
implementing obvious solutions to easy
problems—not a real test of success.
Consensus processes help to overcome
A reliance on consensus discredits value
historic animosities, encourage learning
differences, ensures that zero-sum problems
and compromise, and facilitate problemcannot be addressed, encourages “lowest
solving in a way that adversarial and highly common denominator” decisions, and
formalized processes cannot.
provides few due process protections.
Collaborative processes offer advantages
The costs of participating in collaborative
in time, money, and “durability” of
processes are significant, and are usually in
outcomes.
addition to—rather than instead of—costs
of other traditional processes.
Normative Arguments (i.e., arguments based on personal notions of right and wrong,
and based on desired—rather than actual or predicted—conditions).
Local residents should be more involved in The views of distant stakeholders should
decisions that have local consequences.
have equal weight in decisions involving
The role of citizens in decision-making
public resources. Public officials should
should be enhanced.
make decisions about public resources.
Collaborative processes are inherently
Conflict oriented processes—namely
preferable to those based on conflict.
litigation—provide a healthy mechanism for
Consensus-building activities build
expressing, rather than suppressing,
cohesive communities more capable of
divergent opinions. Managed conflict,
pursuing appropriate social, economic and rather than suppressed conflict, is the real
measure of a healthy democracy.
environmental goals.
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the quality of decisions and decisionmaking exercises?

Salient Research Questions
This set of positive, speculative, and
normative opinions, summarized in Table 1, is
based on a variety of assumptions, some of which
can be substantiated by the appropriate
literatures and some which cannot. It is an
appropriate task for researchers to identify and
critically analyze these assumptions, and to the
extent that these efforts are fruitful, to then
comment upon the credibility and strength of the
expressed opinions. Admittedly, this is an
inexact science—especially with respect to the
normative opinions—but is an activity that is
needed to provide guidance to policy-makers and
other activists concerned with issues of natural
resources
governance
and
institutional
arrangements.
As a practical matter, it is impossible herein
to identify and address all relevant research
questions deriving from this set of opinions and
assumptions. Consequently, this report focuses
primarily on the two following research areas of
particular salience:

(1) Merits of the Existing System
•

•

Are traditional means of management
and
problem-solving
reasonably
effective, or is the existing system
broken?
Will traditional means of management
and problem-solving work in the future?

(2) Collaborative Groups in Context
•
•

•

What is the relationship between the
traditional and alternative mechanisms of
problem-solving?
Is there a cause-and-effect relationship
between organizational achievements and
subsequent
on-the-ground success?
Stated more generally, does the
community/collaborative
model
of
interaction and decision-making produce
benefits that increase the ability of
society to achieve social, economic and
environmental goals?
How does the consensus decision-rule
typical of collaborative groups influence

15

A Preliminary Review of Literature and Data
solving is often a negative one; i.e., it is more of
an attack on traditional mechanisms than a
reasoned endorsement of the merits of alternative
approaches.23 Certainly there is no shortage of
criticisms directed at existing natural resource
and environmental management programs.
Rosenbaum (1995:253), for example, calls
Superfund24 “a legislative Titanic that only the
most ardent environ-mentalists still believe is
viable”; Pendley (1995:85) derides the
Endangered Species Act as the “bit pull of
environmental laws”; and Davies and Mazurek
(1997:48) describe the pollution control
regulatory system as having “deep and
fundamental flaws.”
Many similarly harsh
criticisms are directed at the implementing
agencies, as evidenced by the comments of
Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Chairman of
the Senate Appropriations Committee: “No
sector of the government is more rife with
wasteful
duplication,
fragmentation
and
undependable service than the agencies that are
involved in environmental and natural resource
issues” (Senate Hearing, 1996:1). While some
arguments are of dubious merit, many are based
on disturbing evidence, such as estimates that
less than 3 percent of Bureau of Land
Management rangelands are in excellent
condition (NWF and NRDC, 1989), or that per

The following pages address many of these
difficult questions, drawing upon a tremendous
diversity of literatures and disciplines. Given the
breath of the subject matter under investigation,
an effort is made throughout to distinguish
between the positive/speculative and the
normative elements of those “salient research
questions” listed earlier. To the extent possible,
this report is primarily focused on the
positive/speculative opinions, and especially
those for which we have some hard data and/or
experience.
This does not mean that the
normative opinions are somehow inferior or less
important than the other opinions, nor does this
mean that normative issues are neglected entirely
in the following pages. To the contrary, several
normative issues are identified in the discussion
of the salient research questions, and it is not
difficult to find a strong normative content in
many of the arguments and quotes presented.
Additionally, a few observations regarding
normative arguments associated with the concept
of “democracy” are presented in a separate
discussion, an acknowledgement that watershed
initiatives provide an excellent context for
debating prevailing notions about what
constitutes good government—an issue several
orders of magnitude more complex than the
already difficult subject matters addressed herein.

23

For example, political scientist Douglas Amy
(1987:17-18) makes the following observation about
environmental mediation: “As one listens to
proponents of [environmental mediation], it becomes
evident that much of their case is a negative one—
one based on criticisms of the legislative,
administrative, and judicial institutions that we have
traditionally relied upon to resolve these
controversies. … It is this perceived institutional
failure that has motivated the interest in alternative
forms of dispute resolution.”
24
Superfund is the nickname given to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (1980); 94 Stat.
2767 (codified as amended at 42 §§ U.S.C. 96019675 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).

A Closer Look at the Salient Research
Questions
Merits of the Existing System
Question:
Are traditional means of
management
and
problem-solving
reasonably effective, or is the existing
system fundamentally broken?
As many scholars have observed, the case in
favor of many forms of alternative problem-
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capita generation of solid waste has doubled
since the 1960s (Davies and Mazurek, 1997). As
repeatedly documented by the national
community of activists, significant problems
exist in the health of environmental resources.25
On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect
that an undertaking as massive as managing
natural resources and environmental systems can
be accomplished without some debate and
criticism, especially given the inability of
American society to agree on the appropriate
balance between resource development and
protection, between private rights and public
interests, between short-term aspirations and
long-term objectives, and between a host of other
differing objectives so characteristic of our
modern pluralist society.
Additionally, there are many success stories
in natural resources and environmental
management, something readily acknowledged in
the report by Davies and Mazurek (1997) entitled
Regulating Pollution: Does the U.S. System
Work? Given the quantitative nature of pollution
prevention outcomes and the obvious objective
function (i.e., less pollution is better), programs
for pollution control are well suited to empirical
studies. While concluding that “fundamental
flaws” exist in U.S. systems for pollution control,
Davies and Mazurek (1997) nonetheless
acknowledge several notable accomplishments.
For example, in the realm of air quality

management, four of the six “criteria air
pollutants” (sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide,
lead, and particulates) have shown significant
improvements in recent decades, with the 78
percent reduction in lead being the most dramatic
accomplishment. The other two criteria, ozone
and nitrogen dioxide, have also improved,
although only at modest levels. Similarly, many
water quality trends of the past quarter century
are positive, especially as related to the treatment
of sewage. Improvements in drinking water
quality are also generally acknowledged.26 Thus,
the news from the field is not all bad.
An
on-the-ground,
performance-based
assessment of natural resource (as distinct from
environmental) management is considerably more
difficult to apply, given that objectives are often
not so easily defined.
Additionally, many
agencies, such as the Forest Service and National
Park Service, have mandates that require
agencies to pursue multiple objectives that are, to
various degrees, competitive rather than
complementary, ensuring that some parties will
be unhappy with the trade-offs selected.
Reductions in federal timber harvests of oldgrowth in the Northwest in the name of
environmental protection, for example, are
difficult to classify as a success or failure
without relying on normative criteria specifying
the proper balance between timber harvesting and
resource preservation (Carroll, 1995). Congress,
for obvious political reasons, rarely provides
agencies with detailed criteria for making these
trade-offs, ensuring that “success” is a fiercely
debated and highly qualitative concept.
This is not to say that there is a dearth of
relevant facts or statistics about the status of
natural resources management efforts. Much is
known. For example, on the federal public lands,
consumptive uses such as timber harvesting,

25

Recent years have seen the emergence of a socalled “brownlash” of works questioning the
conclusion that serious environmental problems exist
in the United States, a conclusion strongly refuted by
Anne Ehrlich (1996) in Betrayal of Science and
Reason. Some examples of brownlash literature
include Gregg Easterbrook’s 1995 work, A Moment
on the Earth, in which he generally concludes that
environmental protection programs have worked and
the problems are solved; Mann and Plummer’s 1995
critique of the Endangered Species Act (Noah’s
Choice: The Future of Endangered Species) which
concludes that the program is overly biased in favor
of preservation at the expense of reasonable
development and use; and Ray and Guzzo’s (1990)
Thrashing the Planet and its conclusions that human
impacts on the environmental are relatively minor
and easily amenable to technology-based solutions.

26

Even the General Accounting Office has found
reason to praise the U.S. system of pollution control
as administered by the EPA: “EPA has
accomplished much to protect human health and the
environment since its inception in 1970. It has put
in place a comprehensive regulatory structure and
has made notable progress in identifying and
combating many of the major causes of pollution”
(GAO, 1988:216).
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grazing, and mining are generally declining,
while recreational uses and urbanization
accelerate rapidly (Kenney, 1998).
Water
withdrawals in the West have grown to 179
million acre-feet as of 1990 (Solley, 1997),
offering at least a partial explanation for reports
suggesting that, in the past quarter century, over
20 native fish species have become extinct, while
approximately 100 more species, or 70 percent of
all species in the region, are endangered,
threatened, or otherwise of special concern
(WWPRAC, 1998).27 Clearly, some of these
trends—such as the fish declines—are widely
acknowledged as negative, however, the solution
to such problems is often highly debatable, and
many additional trends cannot easily be classified
as positive or negative in the court of public
opinion due to different normative assumptions.
Given the mixed track record of most
environmental and natural resource programs,
why are so many authors, like Davies and
Mazurek, so strongly convinced that the existing
system is in need of fundamental reforms rather
than more modest adjustments? In many cases,
the answer has as much to do with failures to
meet
preferred
procedural
norms
and
administrative criteria pertaining to program
design, administrative and compliance costs, and
decision-making
mechanisms,
than
with
dissatisfaction with program objectives or even
outcomes.28 Perhaps the most pervasive
criticisms are those of program inefficiency. One

line of criticism contends that fiscal and temporal
inefficiencies
plague
decision-making
mechanisms, including planning processes under
National Forest Management Act (NFMA),
Federal Lands Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA), and the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), the issuance of
administrative rules for pollution control, and a
host of other procedures falling largely within the
domain of federal and, presumably to a lesser
extent, state agencies.29 Presumably, as Kagan
(1999:720) observes, these problems are more
pervasive in the United States than in other
developed countries:
Notwithstanding much-publicized EPA
initiatives to make environmental
regulation less legalistic, the case studies
found that for regulated companies with
cross-national experience American
environmental regulatory processes are
more detailed, prescriptive, complex,
unpredictable, and costly to comply with
than are comparable regulatory regimes
in
other
economically
advanced
democracies.
American regulatory
regimes are experienced as quicker to
impose legal penalties for violations, and
their legal sanctions tend to be much
more severe.
These "procedural”
differences, moreover, generally are far
more salient to the regulated companies
than differences in substantive regulatory
norms, which usually differed, if at all,
only slightly.30

27

An excellent assessment of the nation’s biological
resources has recently been published by the United
States Geological Survey (1999).
28
For example, Davies and Mazurek (1997) criticize
the U.S. systems for pollution control for being
overly fragmented, poorly integrated (ignoring the
linkages between air, land and water), based on poor
data, and frequently inefficient (e.g., spending
priorities typically do not match risk factors). Along
somewhat similar lines, a 1994 conference of the
American Society of Civil Engineers criticized water
quality programs as featuring too many inflexible
mandates, an inadequate policy-making role for state
and local governments, questionable science, poor
coordination among programs, inadequate use of
benefit-cost analyses, high permitting costs, and
excessive litigation (Holme, 1994).

29

Complaints of inefficiency have many other
dimensions. One of the more substantive arguments
is that most natural resource activities and sectors
are highly subsidized, a situation challenged by an
awkward alliance of fiscal conservatives and
environmental critics of extractive industries
(Anderson, 1994).
30
Higher costs in the U.S. system are primarily
attributed to three causes: (1) legal services; (2)
“accountability” measures, such as reporting
requirements; and (3) high opportunity costs, largely
associated with permitting delays. On the other
hand, these qualities are judged by Kagan
(1999:721) as providing “stronger rights of public

18

long, costly, and arduous; yet, reformers argue
for the scope of decision-making to be broadened,
with more parties playing an active role in policy
deliberations. For example, while Davies and
Mazurek (1997) lament the inefficiency of
pollution control programs that involve
“thousands of interested groups,” they join with
many others in calling for decision-making
mechanisms which are more participatory.
Neither historians of democracy nor students of
comparative politics have much to offer in
support of this idea that broadening participation
is a precursor to greater efficiency; if anything,
the contrary opinion is usually regarded as fact.32
Very similar are calls for decision-making
mechanisms that are more flexible and
informal—and presumably more efficient—than
traditional mechanisms, married to concerns that
explicit standards and requirements must exist in
decision-making processes to ensure broad
representation of interests and due process.33
Also significant is the widely held notion
that the source of the perceived inadequacies lies
with the natural resource agencies in charge of
planning processes, rule-making, and program
implementation.
That perspective, however,
ignores the fact that agencies frequently have
little real discretion in the design or
implementation of programs, and that many of
the problems encountered in implementation
derive from legislative mandates that are
incomplete or inconsistent, a reflection not only
of the reluctance of most congressional leaders to
tackle divisive issues, but also a result of
scientific uncertainties and the existence of
fundamental value conflicts among the spectrum
of parties involved in drafting and enacting
legislation. Agencies are also tightly constrained
by the courts. As Goodsell (1985:175) has

Similar observations can be found in the
book Jurismania by law professor Paul Campos
(1998), who argues that America has evolved
into a culture of legal excesses. This “vice of
legal gluttony” (page x) is manifest in many
ways, but is perhaps most evident by the rapid
distillation of all controversies into legal terms,
and by our insistence on solving all disputes with
legal remedies—including those situations in
which we have considerable evidence suggesting
that those remedies do not work. Our faith in
law, according to Campos, is an unreasonable
enthusiasm—by definition, a mania. Arguably,
this mania is in few instances stronger than in the
natural resources and environmental realm.
Many other complaints about decisionmaking processes focus on the fragmented focus
presumably attributable to litigation, specialized
legislation, narrow agency mandates, and more
generally, the historic failure of policy and law to
recognize the systemic quality of resources.
Equally controversial is the belief that the
“decide-announce-defend” model of public
participation is inadequate, especially in regards
to providing for meaningful local input and the
sharing of expertise.31 The inadequacy (or
inadequate use) of scientific information, and the
reactionary nature of many policies, are
additional criticisms focused more on the means
of natural resource and environmental decisionmaking than the ends.
Addressed independently, strong evidence
can be found to support each of these criticisms.
However, when viewed as a single line of
criticism, several significant conclusions emerge.
First, several of the problems identified, and the
implied solutions, are not mutually consistent.
Most important in the context of this paper is the
notion that decision-making processes are too

32

Traditionally, full participation is argued for on
equity, not efficiency, grounds.
33
As Dan Luecke (1999:6), Director of the Rocky
Mountain office of the Environmental Defense Fund,
has observed, “Collaborative forums for ecosystem
restoration are tailor-made for each process, thus
there are rarely, if ever, standard operating rules, a
situation which always puts minority interests
(where environmentalists find themselves) at
disadvantage.”

participation, broader access to information
concerning regulatory compliance, and easier access
to the courts.”
31
For example, research by Lyden, Twight, and
Tuchmann (1990) on Forest Service planning
processes showed that most participants, whether
pro-industry or environmentalists, judged such
efforts to be dismal failures.
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observed, the power of bureaucrats in the United
States is “probably more inhibited than in any
other country on earth” due to chronic judicial
intervention in agency decision-making. And on
an even more pragmatic level, some
shortcomings—such as the frequent lack of
adequate scientific data for decision-making—are
simply the result of budgetary shortfalls, a
problem not easily rectified by resource
managers.
Perhaps most significant to this study
examining the merits of collaborative processes
are the arguments directed at decision-making
processes dominated by litigation. These attacks
on litigation are frequently more than simply a
critique of a single type of process, but are a
challenge to the philosophy that disputes should
be handled though formal and adversarial
mechanisms featuring specialized actors, ideas
that run counter to most notions of collaboration
and, more generally, alternative problem-solving.
Common arguments against litigation are that it
is time-consuming, costly, zero-sum (often
featuring the win/lose outcomes typical of
adversarial conflicts), substantively narrow
(often focusing on procedural issues rather than
substance), and subordinating to many concerned
parties (including the general public and local
interests) at the expense of promoting technical
elites (Amy, 1990). Each of those arguments has
a strong basis in fact, and understandably fuel a
formidable desire among reformers to find
something better. Also true is that people are, in
fact, increasingly looking to other mechanisms of
dispute resolution. After a sharp rise in the early
1970s, the amount of environmental litigation
leveled off in the mid 1970s and then began to
decline (Amy, 1990). This decline has been
offset by a sharp rise in “collaborative” decisionmaking approaches, namely environmental
dispute resolution (EDR), negotiated rulemaking,
and more recently, the use of ad hoc
collaborative groups such as watershed initiatives
(Bingham, 1997; NRLC, 1996).
There is reason to believe, however, that
collaborative approaches often do not address
many of the complaints lodged against litigation,
and can create new concerns. For example,
Bingham’s (1986) empirical research on EDR

finds there is little evidence to support the claim
that EDR is faster than litigation, a finding
echoed by empirical studies by Coglianese (1997)
on negotiated rule-making.34 Similarly, there is
little to suggest that these processes are cheaper.
In fact, Amy (1990:222) is among those
concluding that “there is reason to believe that it
could often prove more expensive,” in part since
many collaborative decision-making efforts are
typically conducted against a backdrop of
ongoing litigation,35 and in part due to the
tremendous time demands of multi-party, multiissue negotiations. Alleged cost savings to the
resource agencies using collaborative processes
are difficult to substantiate.
For example,
research by Manring (1998) focusing on the use
of alternative dispute resolution tools in the
Forest Service found that such approaches do
reduce the administrative appeals workload at the
national headquarters, but that these “gains” are
offset by dramatic (and largely unbudgeted and
unrecognized) workload increases at the local
level.
Also of questionable merit is the assumption
that collaborative processes can overcome the
win-lose quality so typical of litigation. This
assumption is perhaps most ingrained in
proponents of the so-called “hot tub” school of
mediation, which assumes that most conflicts are
correctable mis-communications or negotiable
interest conflicts, an assumption that is
undoubtedly true in many circumstances, but is
of dubious merit when the subject matter features
elements of value conflict—a frequent component
of environmental disputes. As Amy (1990:227)
34

Research by Kerwin and Furlong (1992) suggests
that negotiated rule-making takes only about threefourths as long as rules reached through traditional
processes (778 days versus 1,108 days). This
research is frequently utilized as evidence in reports,
such as those of the National Performance Review,
supporting the idea that negotiation-based processes
are more efficient. However, Coglianese (1997)
shows that if a larger sample set is included, pending
negotiated rule-making exercises are considered, and
different strategies of time measurement are utilized,
then no time savings can be shown.
35
The overwhelming majority of lawsuits, after all,
are settled out of court.
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has observed, the practical implications of this
working assumption are of concern to many
environmentalists:

watershed’s conditions, implement and
monitor proven management practices
and test new management practices that
are designed to support environmental
integrity and economic stability for the
communities
of
the
Coquille
Watershed.38

This vision of environmental issues as
revolving around matters of principle,
moral
or
otherwise,
causes
environmentalists to question another
assumption of EDR [environmental
dispute resolution]: that compromise is
always a desirable approach to
resolving these disputes. … As one
environmental lawyer has argued, there
are simply some issues where if one
agrees to negotiate and compromise
over them at the very beginning, one
has already lost much of the battle.36

The lack of such broadly-focused
mechanisms or forums for public policy
discourse has been a glaring omission in natural
resource institutions for several decades, a void
filled partially through processes such as
environmental impact statement preparation and
national forest planning efforts. However, as
discussed later, experience with watershed
initiatives and similar mechanisms highly reliant
on consensus decision-making suggest that many
important issues are still frequently off-the-table
in these processes, especially issues dealing with
externalities and other “asymmetrical” situations
(Kenney and Lord, 1999; Nickelsburg, 1998).39
The remaining argument against litigation is
that it can subordinate the potential contributions
of many concerned parties, including the general
public and local interests, to technical elites such
as lawyers, expert witnesses, and national
interest groups. Similar arguments are leveled at
traditional processes of agency rule-making.
Despite modern reforms requiring public
participation processes and imposing broadened
rules of standing, this complaint also appears to
have considerable merit. To conclude that this
situation is inappropriate, however, goes beyond
a factual statement to a more normative assertion
that local interests should have a greater role in
natural resources policy-making than wellorganized national interests—an assumption
many parties are unwilling to accept
(McCloskey, 1999). These negative critiques of
litigation also can be challenged on the grounds
that they overlook the extent to which legal
remedies have been a source of empowerment for
many parties, including those representing public
and local concerns (Sax, 1970; Holland, 1996).

Much stronger arguments can be made
challenging the other alleged weaknesses of
litigation and related processes of decisionmaking featuring formal and largely adversarial
interactions.
Of particular strength is the
argument
that
natural
resources
and
environmental litigation is normally substantively
narrow, even though many conflicts involve
issues featuring complex ecological and
socioeconomic systems. This appears to be one
of the most significant contributions of tools such
as watershed initiatives, which frequently provide
a vehicle for addressing issues that are broadly
framed.37
The self-defined mandate of the
Coquille Watershed Association (Oregon) is
typical and illustrative:
[The purpose of the Association is] to
provide an organizational framework to
coordinate the assessment of the
36

Arguably, the rise of militant and aggressive
environmental organizations such as Earth First! in
the 1980s is evidence that many environmentalists
are unhappy with the acceptance of principles such
as EDR by many mainstream environmental
organizations.
37
Many authors, such as Born and Genskow (1999),
argue that the primary future challenge in resource
management is the coordination of land and water
management, an activity that is well-suited to the
watershed approach.

38

Cited in NRLC (1996:2-62), and attributed to the
Coquille Association’s Articles of Incorporation.
39
The concept of symmetry is defined later.

21

Additionally, the idea that formal processes such
as litigation are biased in favor of a specialized
network of legal experts is hard to reconcile with
the argument that the judiciary provides a
valuable balance to inappropriate technocratic
autonomy. As Wenner (1990:189) observes,
commenting on the controversial nature of
litigation in natural resources and environmental
management:

decision-making systems for natural resources
and environmental management are “broken” or
“fundamentally flawed” without calling in
question many of the elemental concepts of the
American system of governance, including
dispersed power with multiple checks and
balances, competing forums of decision-making,
interest group activity, federalism, and several
related qualities. To the extent that these features
are viewed as deficiencies to be overcome, then
dramatic reforms are in fact called for—not only
in natural resource institutions, but in broader
arrangements in American governance.
If,
instead, these qualities are viewed as reasonable
constraints to work within, then the challenge is
to more selectively and strategically implement
substantive reforms within that framework that
promise to more efficiently achieve agreed-upon
goals, and procedural reforms that promise to
better reconcile or balance competing objectives.
Collaborative efforts can play a role under either
scenario—viewed in the first as a replacement
for existing processes and, in the second, as a
supplement. Resolving this larger issue will
likely be a key to addressing other concerns
about collaborative efforts.

[S]ome analysts argue that judges are
singularly unsuited to make broad
policy decisions because of their lack
of expertise and the necessity for them
to answer individual questions about
particular cases.
Others caution
against the dominance of technical
experts and urge the continued use of
lay judges to counterbalance the
inequities that are certain to arise when
there is an unrestrained technocracy
controlling policy.
There exists
constant tension between Americans’
desire for substantively “correct”
decisions reached by technical experts
and for democratic decisions made
through public participation and
facilitated by the courts’ insistence on
due process.
These comments again reinforce the
observation that many of the presumably positive
assertions are really normative in nature, and are
based on cause-and-effect assumptions that are
often not clearly specified or easily defended—a
conclusion that is equally applicable to both the
proponents and opponents of collaborative
processes. This observation is not intended to
suggest that the criticisms of existing
mechanisms of management and problem-solving
are inaccurate, unfounded, or otherwise
inappropriate, but they do suggest that many
critics misunderstand (or misrepresent) the root
cause of the problems identified, and
subsequently, prescribe solutions of questionable
utility. Poor assumptions about the means of
natural resources and environmental decisionmaking portend future disappointments in the
ends. Ultimately, it is difficult to assert that our
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Question:
Will traditional means of
management and problem-solving work
in the future?

The traditional approach to natural
resource management, captured in the
phrase “command-and-control,” may
have worked well during a simpler, less
confrontational era.
With the
emergence of new and involved, and
more, stakeholders on our public lands,
and the realization that public and
private lands are contiguous and
function as holistic ecosystems,
agencies can no longer hope to
accomplish their missions following the
traditional approach.
Ecosystem
management calls for more open,
participatory practices that emphasize
partnerships, shared visions of the land,
and decentralized agencies; in this
model agencies promote risk-taking,
shared initiatives, and adaptive
management.
Because societal,
institutional, and ecological approaches
have become more complex with an
ever-increasing human population,
there is no going back to traditional
methods.41
While many authors talking of a new era
focus on issues of resources planning and
management, especially as they involve public
lands, others extend their reasoning to include the

The answer to this question is largely
dependent upon one’s perspective on the previous
question, and neither question can be answered
with any certainty, as both contain a strong
normative element. It is fair to say, however,
that natural resource and environmental issues
tend to change over time, and that different types
of problems lend themselves to different types of
solution strategies. If some assumptions are
made about the likely future shape of natural
resource and environmental problems, then,
presumably, it is possible to make some
inferences about the solution strategies that will
be most useful in future decades. With few
exceptions, most authors suggest that natural
resource problems will only increase in scale and
complexity, placing a premium on regional—
even global—problem-solving tools, and a new
type of science capable of dealing with complex
systems and cumulative impacts.
Several researchers have observed that
emerging natural resource problems demand
action that is more integrated, experimental, and
collaborative than ever before. For example, in
an editorial written to shape the agenda of the
journal Conservation Ecology, C.S. Holling
(1998) observes that the ecological sciences are
in transition, moving from an “analytical”
tradition to an “integrative” approach. The
analytical approach is essentially experimental,
reductionist, and disciplinary, while the
integrative approach is largely interdisciplinary,
recognizing that most phenomenon are the result
of many different interacting factors often at
multiple scales. By asking the big questions with
an immediate on-the-ground relevance, the
integrative approach seeks to bridge the gap
between science and resources management and
problem-solving, an approach best implemented
through adaptive management strategies.
A similar line of reasoning is offered by
Knight and Meffe (1997:678), using the
terminology of ecosystem management40:

terms are used in a variety of ways in the relevant
literature. The former emphasizes the iterative
nature of new problem-solving strategies, with
experimental on-the-ground actions being closely
monitored and adjusted over time as research and
problem-solving evolve together. The latter term
emphasizes the regional and systemic nature of
environmental resources, promoting an integrated
management philosophy often best implemented
using adaptive management tools.
41
Weber (1998:xvii) also sees the adoption of new
administrative approaches as inevitable: “When it is
considered that the pressures on government
agencies to cope with adaptability, decentralization,
and interdependence are only likely to increase over
the next several decades, the expectation is that
successful governance will more and more become
associated with a robust assortment of alternative
administrative arrangements.”

40

No effort is made here to define “adaptive
management” or “ecosystem management,” as both
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arena of environmental management and
pollution control. For example, the Western
Governors’ Association (1998) is among the
entities concluding that the “nature of
environmental and natural resource problems is
changing” and that strategies must adapt
accordingly. Specifically, the Governors argue
for future strategies replacing command-andcontrol regulatory tools with incentive-based
systems and featuring a heavy reliance on
collaborative processes of decision-making.
Using terminology developed by Hawkins and
Thomas (1984), the Governors appear to be
advocating, at a minimum, for an evolution in
regulatory strategies from a deterrence to a
compliance system. In a compliance system, the
main goal of the agency is to achieve the broad
goals of the regulatory statute by preventing
violations and remedying underlying problems
through the use of close and cooperative
relationships with the regulated community, and
through the joint promotion of creative, sitespecific solutions.
In contrast, deterrence
systems maintain a more distant, adversarial, and
inflexible relationship between the regulator and
regulatee, with litigation and punishment taking
precedence over collaboration and incentives.
Most EPA programs can be classified as
deterrence systems, but is that best? Is the
community/collaborative model of decisionmaking the vehicle to more efficient and effective
environmental protection, or is it simply a Trojan
Horse being used by some unscrupulous parties
to promote lax enforcement and lowered
standards?42 Perhaps neither or both are true.
Research by Kagan and Scholz (1984) support
the seemingly obvious conclusion that a
deterrence system is best if the regulated
community cannot be trusted to obey the law; a
compliance system is best when parties are
cooperative.
Should we assume that the regulated
community will become more cooperative and

supportive of environmental protection programs
in the future? While likely an interesting debate,
some scholars suggest that this is a moot
question. The more salient issue is whether or
not future environmental problems will, by their
unique nature, preclude the coercive policies of
deterrence systems, thus encouraging by default
the cooperative stance of compliance systems.
To some extent, this assumption has surfaced in
the emerging battle against nonpoint-source
pollution, the widely acknowledged future of
water pollution control activities (EPA and
USDA, 1998). Given that controlling nonpointsource pollution could require modifying the
behavior of thousands of individuals, rather than
dozens of discrete point source emitters, perhaps
the more cooperative and flexible approach of a
compliance system is warranted. Clearly, this
philosophy permeates the Clean Water Action
Plan (EPA and USDA, 1998), and is routinely a
component of discussions about ecosystem-scale
environ-mental
protection
and
global
environmental issues. As Paehlke (1990:363)
observes:
It would appear that several of the
newer environmental issues will require
solutions that are less “regulatory” in
character. The new forms of change
will require both organizational and
behavioral changes, rather than the
regulatory coercion of a few economic
actors.
…. Behavioral changes
involving whole communities are less
effectively monitored and enforced than
promoted and encouraged.
…
Democracy itself must be enhanced to
effectively deal with environmental
problems as they exist today and as
they may exist in the future.
These arguments support the cautious
recommendations
of
Mintz
(1995:106)
encouraging EPA to “expand its outreach to the
regulated community as a supplement to its
enforcement activities.”
A reliance on regulatory approaches for
resource protection is also of questionable merit
in areas completely or largely in private

42

For example, Roush (1995) suggests that the
rhetoric of community involvement has been
appropriated by the Wise Use movement as a means
of promoting the goals of the corporate, extractive
industries.
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ownership. As Breckenridge (1999:698-699) has
observed:

In some cases, market-based approaches are
resisted on philosophical grounds by those who
claim that they “legitimize” pollution, unduly
discount non-market values, make some
disadvantaged third parties vulnerable to
inequitable situations, and inappropriately
transfer public responsibilities to private hands
(Hockenstein et al., 1997). Other criticisms are
more pragmatic, based on a fear of returning to
the market failure conditions that were the
original genesis of many environmental problems,
or the observation that many market-based
systems require a level of administrative
oversight and control that may be prohibitive,
much in the same way that deterrence systems
are argued by some (such as Paehlke above) to
be impractical. For example, Hoffman (1996:10)
offers a cautionary critique of those advocating
the use of watershed-based permit trading
programs in future water quality management
programs—largely driven by TMDL (total
maximum daily load) concerns—as a means of
overcoming inefficiencies associated with
program fragmentation and command-andcontrol regulation:

The
federal
government
faces
important
legal
and
practical
limitations on its ability to achieve
environmental goals unilaterally. Even
though federal inquiry and concern may
focus on problems of nonpoint source
pollution, loss of biodiversity, and
reductions in instream flows, federal
agencies lack the coercive powers and
funding necessary to revamp local uses
of lands and waters through unilateral
regulation or purchase. State agencies
also face legal and political obstacles to
the
effective
management
of
environmental problems that arise on
private lands or within the traditional
gambit of local zoning controls. In
short, the ability of government
agencies to identify and understand
ecological problems has far exceeded
governmental capacity to formulate and
impose solutions through the exercise
of coercive authority.

Because the watershed concept looks at
the ecosystem as a whole, including all
of its pollutant inputs, assimilative
capacities,
and
biological
and
geophysical features, it has the
potential to be more equitable in that,
in theory, the most critical or most
easily (or cost-effectively) controlled
sources of a pollutant would be
targeted for reduction. However, in
practice, the scientific and enforcement
tools needed to make watershed
permitting function as envisioned are
absent. For example, there are few
effective means of enforcing nonpoint
source controls of rural discharges; and
urban and suburban stormwater flows
are hard to define and quantify. The
pitfalls, then, may include resorting to
imposing more controls on readily
identified and quantified point sources,
while the real culprits continue to
discharge unabated.

Evolving into a “kinder-and-gentler” form of
regulation, featuring an expanded use of
collaborative decision-making, is only a partial
solution or intermediate step in the minds of some
observers, who instead call for a more
fundamental move to true incentive-based
systems reliant upon market mechanisms.
Organizations such as the Political Economy
Research Center (PERC) see a tremendous
potential for market mechanisms in a wide
variety of natural resource and environmental
settings, based largely on the correct observation
that most natural resource sectors and uses
feature subsidies of questionable merit and
bureaucratic inefficiencies. However, market
mechanisms, like collaborative processes, are not
without limitations. For example, Hockenstein et
al. (1997) report that experimentation with
market-based mechanisms for pollution control
and resource conservation have often not
achieved the successes promised.
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markets would foster innovation,
competitive pricing, and economic
growth. Two hundred years later,
Garrett Hardin showed how the
invisible hand could also produce the
“tragedy of the commons,” the
depletion of shared resources absent a
collective decision to manage them for
the public good.

Many related concerns pertaining to the
administrative and political demands of marketbased strategies are described in the economics
and public administration literatures (e.g.,
Baumol and Oates, 1988; Hockenstein et al.,
1997; NAPA, 1997). Some of these additional
administrative considerations pertain to the
different mix of skills needed as part of this
transition to incentive systems (i.e., economists
and administrators replacing lawyers and
technicians), and the difficulty in overcoming the
inertia of existing programs that, although
imperfect, are a known entity for both
environmental groups and the regulated
community. Perhaps most importantly, high
transaction costs (primarily administrative costs)
have ensured that market-based strategies rarely
approach the cost savings expected in theory, an
outcome that can undermine enthusiasm for these
strategies while simultaneously increasing agency
workloads and the internal strife of fundamental
personnel transformations. These observations
suggest that regulatory agencies are increasingly
placed in a paradoxical situation, facing calls for
more
market-oriented,
site-specific,
and
performance-based management strategies on the
one hand, but limited by administrative
constraints and concerns over market failures on
the other. This situation has been aptly described
by the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA, 1997:xii):

This discussion about the pros and cons of
different types of future regulatory strategies can
quickly lead to more than a “simple” paradox,
but can become a quagmire. For example, if
traditional regulatory tools are shown to be
impractical given the inefficiency of uniform
standards, if free market approaches cannot be
trusted given the history of market failures and
the prevalence of self-interest behavior, and if
“regulated markets” (such as permit-trading
programs) are too administratively demanding to
be practical, then what is the appropriate
strategy? Again, collaborative problem-solving
approaches may appear to rise to the top, not so
much due to their documented ability to resolve
problems, but to acknowledged deficiencies in
other strategies.
Lessons gleaned from our experience with
market mechanisms not only suggest that
modifying regulatory regimes should be done
with some caution, but suggest that a similar
examination of the limits of collaboration should
guide reform efforts aimed at institutionalizing
consensus-based modes of decision-making and
problem-solving. After all, the two types of
management and problem-solving approaches
share much more than current popularity as the
twin cornerstones of proposals such as Enlibra,
but are based on similar structural tenets. Those
tenets include decentralization, local flexibility,
and incentive-based management, stressing
cooperation over conflict, and public and
frequently ad hoc forums of decision-making
over formal, bureaucratic mechanisms (Kenney
and Lord, 1999). Some of the lessons learned
from the experience with market systems are
clearly transferable, such as the finding that the
community/collaborative model of decisionmaking raises many normative issues while

EPA’s paradox is that it must maintain
national programs and seek national
consistency
while
simultaneously
attempting to make its programs and
standards fit an incredibly diverse and
dynamic nation.
Environmental
conditions, problems, and trends vary
from place to place and no “one-sizefits-all” approach to regulation can
accommodate such variety.
No
laissez-faire approach will work,
either. The need for environmental
protection arises from a failure of the
marketplace.
Adam Smith, an
eighteen-century economist, showed
how “the invisible hand” of free
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addressing others. As discussed in detail later,
the equity features of these seemingly
“democratic” processes are not always well
understood by all proponents.
Similarly,
collaborative processes raise many administrative
demands that are often poorly understood—such
as the finding described earlier by Manring
(1998) that these efforts often reduce workloads
of some agency personnel only at the expense of
placing increased demands on others. This
conclusion is consistent with much of the
anecdotal evidence.
Also of concern is the observation that the
community/collaborative model is better suited to
certain types of settings and problems than
others, an issue attracting only modest scholarly
attention spread across a variety of loosely
related, but relevant, contexts. For example,
research by Bingham (1997:45) regarding the use
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in water
conflicts concludes that these approaches work
best under specific circumstances:

and behavioral patterns is harmful to all parties,
costs and benefits (of both existing and proposed
rules) are distributed in a fairly equal manner,
enforcement and compliance costs of new rules
are relatively low, and when group members trust
each other.
Nickelsburg (1998) is among those who
have made the observation that some of these
prerequisites are not entirely consistent; namely,
the idea that meaningful collaborative processes
need to be inclusive (e.g., Bingham’s remarks),
yet decision-making is best accomplished through
forums featuring small, homogeneous groups
(e.g., Ostrom’s remarks). Nickelsburg sees this
dichotomy as posing a real impediment to EPA’s
construction of community-based environmental
protection (CBEP), which is based on the
assumption that sound ecosystem management
requires action at scales sufficient to encompass
all contributing factors, activities and individuals
associated with a given problem, an approach
certain to violate any notions of small,
homogeneous working groups.43 Thus, while he
concludes that the trust-building and educational
functions of collaborative efforts will likely
produce some benefits and can potentially help to
remove some of the long-term obstacles to
improved local decision-making, he cautions
against the EPA’s seemingly excessive faith in
CBEP methods, arguing that if the agency’s
“mission is to address diffuse, crossjurisdictional, arguably national problems such
as mobile source emissions and nonpoint-source
runoff, it will need to employ not haphazard local
encouragement, but more powerful statutory
tools” (page 1409). Clearly, many parties within
EPA agree, as the support for CBEP methods
appears far weaker at the agency’s lower levels,
where traditional tools still dominate on-theground action.44
To
some
extent,
Nickelsburg’s
recommendation is similar to the philosophy
articulated in the landmark works of Hardin

ADR, particularly, mediation, has
demonstrated positive results for
resolving water resources disputes—
when objectives are clear and mutually
agreed upon, when the process is
voluntary and inclusive, when there are
incentives to settle, when there are
adequate resources for participation
and for information collection, when
parties keep their constituencies
informed, and when reasonable
deadlines exist.
Kenney and Lord (1999) suggest that
collaborative means of problem-solving are best
suited to situations in which significant value
conflicts have been resolved and when all
involved parties have strong incentives for
problem-solving, factors that are often tied to the
physical qualities of the on-the-ground problem.
Additional insights are provided by Ostrom’s
(1990) well-known work on common pool
resources, which suggest that collaborative
problem-solving approaches are best suited to
situations when the group is relatively small and
homogeneous, the existing framework of rules

43

This observation can be useful in helping to
highlight differences between “communities of
interest” and “communities of place.”
44
This observation is largely based on several offthe-record conversations with EPA personnel.
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(1968), Ophuls (1977), and Heilbroner (1980),
who argued that future environmental problems
will require more centralized governmental
control. This “centralist” school of thought
spawned a counter, “decentralist,” school—
anchored by authors such as Passmore (1974),
Sale (1991), Orr (1992), and Taylor (1992)—
suggesting that future problems instead call for
transferring power to local, democratic
communities practicing a “think globally, act
locally” philosophy (Press, 1994). Often, the key
distinction in thinking between these two
perspectives is that the centralists conclude that
individual self-interest, rather than community
well-being (as argued by the decentralists),
predominate during environmental crises in the
absence of strong centralized control. Which
viewpoint is correct? Unfortunately, empirical
studies do not exist to conclusively support either
perspective, and even if they did, the
centralist/decentralist debate is likely too narrow
and dogmatic to support useful scholarly inquiry
(Press, 1994). What is clear is that in the
modern era, authors advocating decentralist
models—similar to the “unitary democracy”
advocated by Mansbridge (1980) or the
“democratic wish” described by Morone
(1991)—predominate (Press, 1994).
As
described later, this is largely a normative
phenomenon, based on assumptions and ideas
that are only partially amenable to formal testing.

Collaborative Groups in Context
Question:
What is the relationship
between the traditional and alternative
mechanisms of problem-solving?
When debating the merits of collaborative
efforts and other forms of alternative problemsolving, a key normative issue is often whether
these new approaches should be viewed as
alternatives to traditional mechanisms, or as
supplements. Most reformers are quick to
specify that alternative approaches should be
supplementary, at least initially. For example,
the Enlibra principles articulated by the Western
Governors Association contain language that
explicitly describe desired reforms as
supplemental
to
existing
mechanisms.45
Similarly, watershed initiative participants
interviewed by the Natural Resources Law
Center consistently articulate a desire to retain
existing regulatory structures within which
collaborative efforts occur (Kenney, 1997). This
apparent agreement, however, can obscure a
lively debate, as there is considerable room for
disagreement among reformers promoting only a
few isolated experiments to those urging a much
more ambitious agenda of reform presumably
leading to the eventual replacement of traditional
mechanisms.46
Additionally, many reform
proposals contain qualifiers on this subject that
are often vague or are not reflected in other
statements and elements of reform proposals.
45

A brochure developed to answer questions about
Enlibra list three things that Enlibra is not: “1.
Enlibra does not represent a rejection of the goals
and objectives of Federal environmental laws such as
the Endangered Species Act or Clean Water Act; 2.
It is not a rejection of the need for national
environmental standards; 3. This shared doctrine
does not represent a rejection of the legitimate role of
the federal government in regulation and
enforcement.” (Enlibra: A New Shared Doctrine for
Environmental Management, Questions and
Answers. Western Governors’ Association.)
46
Few parties categorically reject collaboration
proposals. The debate is at the margins; i.e., over
issues about when and how collaborative approaches
should be used, and what “fall-back” arrangements
should exist.
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motives of the reformers.47 Underlying many of
the specific arguments of the skeptics identified
earlier is a concern that is more visceral than
empirical: i.e., the belief that pro-business (and
presumably anti-environmental forces) are behind
the push for more collaborative mechanisms of
decision-making and problem-solving, exploiting
the powerful symbolism associated with
democracy and community involvement to
maintain or expand industry control.
This concern is not new. As Amy (1987:98)
observed in 1987 when writing about
environmental mediation, “Part of what makes
environmentalists nervous about mediation is the
enthusiasm with which industry has embraced
it.”48 Similar distrust of business and commodity
interests—seemingly a timeless prerequisite to
environmental activism—surrounds current
resource management experiments using the
community/collaborative model. For example,
noted natural resources attorney George
Cameron Coggins (1998:31) suspects some
collaborative efforts to be an “insincere rearguard holding action” orchestrated by declining
commodity industries.49 Similar sentiments have
been recorded by Burgess and Burgess (1997:1):

For example, the Enlibra authors endorse
processes such as the Quincy Library Group and
the Oregon Plan (for salmon recovery) as
successful models, even though these approaches
were largely designed to bypass existing planning
mechanisms (National Forest Management Act)
and regulatory programs (Endangered Species
Act), respectively (WGA, 1998).
Less common, but perhaps most alarming to
the skeptics, are those proposals that image a
balance between traditional and alternative
approaches that is heavily biased in favor of the
alternative strategies. Perhaps the best example
is found in the final report of the Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Commission (1998),
which calls for watershed groups to be
empowered to make and implement water
management policies unless such actions are
specifically (and promptly) deemed invalid by a
relevant federal agency presumably acting in
consort with some kind of river basin
organization and plan.
Benson (1998:284)
suggests that this approach would create a strong
political impediment to the resource protection
mandates of federal agencies:
… the proposed governance approach
would find watershed council actions
consistent with all relevant laws unless
a responsible agency declared them
inconsistent within 60 days. …. By
allowing such projects to proceed
unless vetoed within 60 days, the
proposal would effectively support
locally-favored development proposals
at the expense of resource protection.
And the proposed approach would
ratchet up the already fierce political
pressure faced by federal agencies.
Once a proposed action has been
blessed by a watershed council, any
agency that would dare to block it risks
a seriously damaging political bashing.

… many traditionally disempowered
groups believe that conflict resolution
professionals have been coopted by
powerful interests, and thus use this
47

It also suggests that many of the strongest
proponents for expanding application of the
community/collaborative model are not listening to
many of the practitioners, who typically suggest a
more modest expansion and application of this
approach (Kenney, 1997).
48
Environmental organizations receptive to this set
of tools, namely the National Wildlife Federation
and the Conservation Foundation, were shown to be
unusually conservative among environmental
organizations, and in the case of the Conservation
Foundation, maintained unusually close contact with
the business community (Amy, 1987).
49
Coggins (1998:31) goes on to observe that “The
industry and agency passion to find consensus
evidently coincides with the degree to which the
noneconomic interests have been successful in
asserting newer and broader management priorities.”

Ambiguities and uncertainties of this nature
generate mistrust and skepticism from many
parties, especially environmentalists, about the
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negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.50
Negotiated settlements are also seen in natural
resources and environmental conflicts, however,
judicial decision-making still appears to hold a
prominent place in resolving these types of
issues.
Many parties suggest that additional efforts
should be made to aggressively promote the use
of collaboration and consensus-based tools in
natural resources and environmental issues. This
effort has been underway since the mid-1980s,
resulting in legislation such as the Negotiated
Rule-Making Act (NMRA) of 1990 and the
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA)
of 1990 and 1996.51
NRMA provides a
framework and procedural requirements within
which agencies are encouraged to assemble
diverse stakeholder groups for purposes of
administrative rule-making; ADRA calls upon
agencies to investigate opportunities of ADR in a
variety of decision-making settings, including
rule-making, issuing/revoking licenses and
permits, contract administration, and litigation.
Similarly, Executive Order 12,866 of September
30, 1993, calls on federal agencies “to explore,

process as a mechanism for “sugarcoating” the continued domination of
the disempowered groups. Thus, many
of these groups tend to distrust
mediation and other conflict resolution
processes, preferring to wage their
battles in the courts or through direct
action.
Still others have questioned the lack of
environmental group involvement in drafting the
Enlibra principles of the Western Governors’
Association—a group rarely categorized as
environmentally sensitive.
As long as the
motives of the reformers remain in question, it is
unlikely that an honest debate will evolve to
examine the substantive merits of the emerging
new tools.
Instead of speculating herein about the
motives of reform proponents, it is perhaps more
useful to acknowledge that many experiments in
alternative problem-solving are already occurring
on the ground, and that these efforts provide an
opportunity for drawing some substantiated
conclusions about the usefulness of various
decision-making and problem-solving tools.
Whether viewed as supplements or eventual
replacements, alternative mechanisms of
decision-making and problem-solving currently
coexist in many forms with traditional
mechanisms. This is perhaps best illustrated by
the relationship between litigation and less
adversarial
decision-making
techniques
emphasizing negotiation and bargaining. Using
the term BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated
agreement), Fisher and Ury (1981) make the
observation that parties can be expected to
vacillate between different decision-making forms
and forums based on strategic criteria. This
clearly happens to a degree that is often
unappreciated by the critics of traditional
mechanisms.
For example, some estimates
suggest that as few as 4 percent of criminal cases
and 5 to 10 percent of civil cases are ultimately
resolved through judicial determination (Kleiner,
1999). The others are dropped or settled out of
court, largely through ADR strategies such as

50

Note that when discussing ADR techniques, it is
important to acknowledge the distinction between
arbitration and techniques such as mediation and
facilitation. Arbitration effectively blurs the lines
between traditional, adversarial decision-making
processes and the alternative, cooperative strategies
(such as mediation and facilitation), in that
arbitrators are often empowered to make binding
decisions. Mediation and facilitation are good
representatives of the voluntary and consensus-based
tenets of “alternative problem-solving,” while
arbitration retains many elements of adversarial
competition. It is also worthwhile to note that
attorneys are increasingly involved in using both
litigation and ADR techniques in their practices,
moving strategically between traditional and
alternative decision-making modes. As of 1997, 714
law schools offer courses in ADR, compared to just
47 in 1984—a more than 15 fold increase (Kleiner,
1999).
51
Negotiated Rule-Making Act of 1990, P.L. 101648, 104 Stat. 4969; Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1990, P.L. 101-552, 104 Stat.
2736; Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of
1996, P.L. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870.
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and where appropriate, use consensual
mechanisms for developing regulations.”52
Mechanisms for stakeholder-based collaborative
resource planning mechanisms are also advocated
in many circles, as evidenced by EPA support of
watershed initiatives (as discussed earlier), the
use of resource advisory councils by the Bureau
of Land Management (Olinger, 1998), the rise of
community forest groups nationally (Wondolleck
and Yaffee, 1994), by efforts to promote
collaboration as a tool for implementing the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),53
and by suggestions to create more opportunities
for ADR through amendments to the Clean
Water Act, Endangered Species Act, and NEPA
(Bingham, 1997).
One of the more intriguing experiments has
involved EPA’s usage of negotiated rule-making,
a subject studied in depth by Harvard Professor
Cary Coglianese (1997). According to statute
(NMRA), processes of negotiated rule-making
are to be utilized “for the purpose of reaching a
consensus in the development of a proposed
rule,” with consensus meaning the “unanimous
concurrence” or any lesser concurrence if agreed
to unanimously by the committee.54 Negotiated
rule-making has its origins in the New Deal, but
did not receive its first large-scale application
until the mid-1970s when Secretary of Labor
John Dunlap chaired the National Coal Policy
Project, which utilized negotiated rule-making to
make decisions regarding hundreds of proposals
(Coglianese, 1997). Most proposals were never
implemented, but the process was viewed by
many as successful. By the early 1980s, the
Federal Aviation Administration and then the
EPA began use of the tool.
Coglianese’s
assessment of the EPA’s recent experience with

negotiated rule-making shows that, much like
earlier attempts, the rate of success has been
overstated, with no compelling evidence to
suggest this consensus-based process is quicker,
cheaper, or otherwise preferable than the
litigation it was designed to replace.55
It can be argued that negotiated rule-making
provides an excellent example of myth over
substance. In addition to questionable claims of
greater efficiency in rule-making, proponents of
negotiated rule-making—such as the leaders of
the National Performance Review—often cite an
80 percent litigation rate for EPA rules made
through traditional mechanisms compared to 20
percent for negotiated rule-making.56 Empirical
research on the EPA, the agency that uses
negotiated rule-making most frequently, however,
shows the appeal rate for traditional rule-making
to actually be about 26 percent compared to an
appeal rate for negotiated rule-making decisions
of 50 percent.57
55

Coglianese (1997:1308) provides the following
summary: “For years, proponents of negotiated
rulemaking have touted it as the solution to a
perceived problem of excessive litigation challenging
federal regulations. Yet the prevailing perception of
this problem has been overdrawn. The actual level
of litigation over EPA rules is dramatically lower
than has been widely believed, and litigation itself
often provides a forum for continued negotiation in
the rulemaking process. Just as the extent of the
supposed problem of litigation has been overstated,
so too has the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking
as a means of reducing litigation over federal
regulations. The experience so far has been that
legal challenges persist, and at a noticeably higher
rate at the EPA, even after the agency has employed
the negotiated rulemaking procedure. As a means of
reducing litigation, negotiated rulemaking has yet to
show any demonstrable success.”
56
For example, see Improving Regulatory Systems,
Accompanying Report of the National Performance
Review. Office of the Vice President, 1993.
57
This statistic is based on Coglianese’s (1997)
review of the EPA litigation docket from 1987 to
1991 using Federal Register data. If data from OMB
is used instead, the litigation rate is approximately
19 percent. The litigation rate for two of the
agency’s most controversial statutes—the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water
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Executive Order No. 12,866, ' 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 638,
645 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. ' 601 (1994).
53
This was the premise behind a recent workshop
organized jointly by the Institute for Environment
and Natural Resources (University of Wyoming) and
the Center for the Rocky Mountain West (University
of Montana) entitled Communication and
Consensus: Strategies for Fulfilling the Nation’s
Environmental Policy, held in Florissant, Colorado
on March 20-23, 1999.
54
5 U.S.C. ' 562, 1994 & Supp I. 1995.
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Additionally, a closer look at some of the
“success stories” can dampen enthusiasm. For
example, probably the most celebrated success
story of negotiated rule-making (although not
technically conducted under the NRMA
framework) produced new visibility rules for
Grand Canyon National Park.
The effort
featured an innovative and productive dialogue
among many competing interests, and established
a mechanism of problem-solving that is credited
as the genesis of the Enlibra principles.58 What
is frequently not reported is that the process was
long and arduous, and the rules were later
challenged in court—not by participants to the
negotiations, but by interests that were outside
the negotiation.59 Another of the well-known
success stories, the rules for reformulated
gasoline, also generated a flurry of litigation, and
earned a degree of infamy for becoming the first
U.S. regulation ever struck down by the World
Trade Organization.60 While it is unlikely that
traditional rule-making processes would have
faired any better in these difficult disputes and
the existence of a legal challenge does not

necessarily indicate that the rules are poor or the
decision-making process inappropriate, it is fair
to conclude that the consensus-based tenet of
negotiated rule-making is not a panacea for
resolving divisive conflict or replacing litigation.
To understand the implications of the
negotiated rule-making experience for more ad
hoc processes such as watershed initiatives
requires a little digging, but at least two relevant
conclusions emerge.
First, negotiated rulemaking does not introduce negotiation and
bargaining into the rule-making process, but
simply codifies and formalizes the process. In
traditional rule-making exercises, agencies are
typically in contact with many concerned parties,
engaging in a certain degree of bargaining and
deal-making as part of “independent” agency
rule-making. However, in processes conducted
under NRMA, these interactions occur in a much
more formalized process. Thus, one of the real
conclusions of Coglianese’s research, as the
author readily acknowledges, appears to be that
the informal give-and-take between agencies and
interest groups in support of agency decisionmaking is perhaps more productive in most cases
than producing decisions through formally
sanctioned stakeholder negotiations. This is a
strong argument in favor of keeping watershed
initiatives largely ad hoc and informal, and not
an argument for formally codifying the multistakeholder and consensus-based elements of
watershed initiatives into new forms of
governance.
Secondly, the experience with
negotiated rule-making again raises the persistent
issue of adequate representation in decisionmaking, a concern that is magnified considerably
when these multi-stakeholder negotiating groups
are empowered, either formally through
legislation or informally through custom or
pressure, to serve as decision-making bodies.
Another line of research to explore in
assessing the relationship between traditional and
alternative modes of decision-making and
problem-solving center around the idea that
different types of problems, just like different
types of decision-making mechanisms, feature
different sets of incentives. As articulated in
research by the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA, 1997:37), effective

Act—is considerably higher, about 35 percent, but
still does not remotely approach the 80 percent
estimate that is widely circulated. Data on appeal
rates for negotiated rules should be used cautiously,
given the small sample size. As of 1997, only 12
rules had been completed at EPA through negotiated
rule-making, with 6 being appealed.
58
Remarks of Jim Souby, Executive Director of the
Western Governors’ Association, at the workshop
entitled Communication and Consensus: Strategies
for Fulfilling the Nation’s Environmental Policy,
organized jointly by the Institute for Environment
and Natural Resources (University of Wyoming) and
the Center for the Rocky Mountain West (University
of Montana). Florissant, Colorado; March 21, 1999.
59
Central Arizona Water Conservancy District v.
United States, 990 F.2d 1531 (9thy Cir. 1993). The
rules were eventually upheld on appeal.
60
Challenges came from a wide array of petroleum,
fuel, and transportation interests. International
challenges were offered by Brazil and Venezuela,
claiming discriminatory trade practices. For
additional information and citations, see
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Standards,
59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
80) (EPA).
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programs of resource governance and
management are those that correctly match
problem types to appropriate solution strategies:

adequate to voluntarily bring parties together in
problem-solving
groups
(Ostrom,
1990;
Bromley, 1992). However, in many other cases,
CPR and public good problems are not resolved
through spontaneous group action, as group
solutions cannot be implemented absent some
means of ensuring compliance among all relevant
parties.62 Consequently, a variety of allocation
mechanisms (including property rights systems)
and regulatory regimes exist to limit access to
(and use of) resources, and taxation and other
“coercive” systems exist to encourage uniform
(at least in principle) public contributions to
provide and protect public goods.
What many local watershed initiatives and
similar collaborative efforts are demonstrating is
that the coercive power of the state is not always
needed to ensure that individual behavior
conforms to community interests. Instead, social
and cultural tools—implemented through
approaches such as trust-building, peer pressure,
and appeals to good citizenship—can sometimes
be effectively used in many situations to affect
positive change. As discussed later and in the
following remarks by Nickelsburg (1998:1393),
watershed initiatives can utilize social
mechanisms to achieve productive interactions:

The simple phrase “environmental
problems” may mask the diversity and
complexity of the many different
problems to which it refers, and hence
falsely suggest there is a single best
tool to address all problems. The
opposite is the case, making the task of
selecting and implementing the most
appropriate management tool a
significant technical and political
challenge.
As mentioned briefly earlier, Kenney and
Lord (1999) and Nickelsburg (1998), in
unrelated studies, both focus on the concept of
symmetry as a key determinant of problemsolving incentives. It is easiest to think of
symmetrical problems as those that present
similar incentives to all parties involved in
creating and/or solving problems. For example,
all ranchers using the shared rangeland in
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” share the
burden, as well as the responsibility, for the
degraded resource. Consequently, each can be
expected to have an incentive for problem
resolution, a fact mentioned earlier in the review
of Ostrom’s (1990) research identifying
situations in which “common pool resource”
(CPR) regimes are stable. So-called “public
good” situations can also share somewhat similar
incentive structures in that all involved parties
have the potential to benefit from a proposed
action.61
These incentives are sometimes

Parties who anticipate interacting in the
future, rather than in a one-shot deal,
no longer need assume that their
asymmetrical situations occur when parties have
fundamentally different incentives. The best
example is externality situations. For example, the
challenge of pollution control is that the generators
have incentives to pollute while those parties
suffering from the pollution have an incentive to end
the pollution (Kenney and Lord, 1999).
62
For example, in Hardin’s overgrazed commons
example, if only some farmers agreed to reduce
consumption while others continued unabated, the
conservation program would likely fail due to the
overuse by the renegade users and by the
disillusionment and likely defection of original
cooperators. Similarly, in a public goods situation,
often some parties will not contribute to the group
effort knowing that most others will, and that
benefits will accrue equally to both the participants
and the “free riders.”

61

A public good is usually defined by two key
characteristics: first, it is a benefit that, once
provided to one party, is automatically made
available to all parties; and second, the use of the
benefit by one party does not diminish the
availability of the benefit for other parties. The
classic example is national defense, but in the
natural resources realm, examples can include clean
air, biodiversity protection (and preservation of the
associated existence values), and protection from
hazards. In contrast to the symmetrical incentives
often provided by CPR and public good situations,
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bargaining partners will defect.
Continuing interaction allows parties to
build credibility, trust, and respect, or
“social capital,” by dealing fairly, by
performing their obligations, and by
punishing defections.

and those qualities are not entirely inherent, but
are shaped by the interaction of physical
phenomena and institutional rules.
By
manipulating rules, problem-solving incentives
can change, thereby opening (or closing) the door
to different problem solving strategies (Kenney
and Lord, 1999). For example, a common
stimulus behind the formation of many western
watershed initiatives is the specter of regulatory
intervention under the Endangered Species Act
and/or Clean Water Act.65 This phenomenon
illustrates a clear symbiosis between the
traditional and alternative problem-solving
approaches that has significant implications for
policy reformers. For example, the opinion
expressed by Schecter (1998:10) is illustrative of
the larger debate surrounding alternative
problem-solving:

Case study data suggests that this social/cultural
strategy is normally much more viable when
dealing with symmetrical situations than
asymmetrical situations (such as externalities),
given that in the former, parties are not being
asked to act in an altruistic manner, but instead
are being asked to take actions that promise
benefits to both the community and themselves.63
The prevalence of western watershed groups
dealing with broad “public” concerns such as
ecological restoration and species protection,
compared to the dearth of groups actively dealing
with issues such as water supply, provide
anecdotal support of this idea with a rich
theoretical basis (Kenney and Lord, 1999).
Issues such as water supply are probably not so
readily amenable to resolution through western
watershed initiatives in most situations since any
group action that increases supply is likely to
produce benefits accruing exclusively to the next
appropriator in line.64 In contrast, group efforts
to improve ecosystem health promise benefits for
all, given the greater symmetry of the situation,
and are presumably well suited to collaborative
problem-solving strategies.
Of course, the qualities of the problem itself
are not the only source of behavioral incentives,

… contrary to Al Capone’s famous
saying, “You can get more with a kind
word and a gun than with a kind word
alone,” evolving conditions indicate
that maybe we can begin relaxing (but
not giving up altogether!) our
mandatory regulations that provide a
credible threat of penalties, and rely
more on voluntary self-regulation,
guided by “self-interest” economic
motives.
The degree to which alternative problem-solving
strategies should supplement or replace
traditional mechanisms is largely shaped by
whether or not you find the opinion of Capone or
Schecter more compelling. Certainly, the advice
of Al Capone seems more apt when describing
asymmetrical than symmetrical situations, and
the “social pressure” asserted through watershed
initiatives is undoubtedly augmented by the threat
of federal regulatory hammers; but on both
points, there remains plenty of room for learning
and debate.
A second conclusion emerging from the
research of Kenney and Lord (1999), Amy
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This observation is similar to other conclusions
noting the necessity in collaborative efforts of
finding positive-sum (or more accurately, Pareto
optimal) solutions. A Pareto optimal solution—also
known as a win-win solution—is one that makes all
involved parties better off, or at the least, none worse
off. Pareto optimal solutions are always positivesum, meaning that the benefits to all parties exceed
the costs to all parties. Conversely, many, but not
all, positive-sum solutions are Pareto optimal, as
benefits to many parties may hide a cost to another
party.
64
Note that this is a function of western water law.
Consequently, this observation is not applicable to
the East.
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For example, 81 of the 105 studies of cooperative
ecosystem management featured in the Yaffee et al.
(1996) book involved an ESA listed species.
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(1987), Burgess and Burgess (1995), and
countless other scholars involves the importance
of resolving “value conflicts” prior to making
progress on complex issues through collaborative
modes of decision-making.
Lord (1979)
identifies three major classes of conflict: value
conflicts, which tend to focus on questions of
principle, philosophy or morals at the heart of a
proposed action; interest conflicts, which
normally focus on distributional features of
specific policies (e.g., allocation of costs and
benefits), rather than questioning the overall
scope or objective of a proposed action; and
cognitive conflicts, which occur in situations
where data or knowledge is considered
inadequate. Interest and cognitive conflicts are
often readily amenable to ADR-type processes,
but value conflicts normally cannot (and
presumably should not) be negotiated away.66
While this is an important limitation of
consensus-based processes, what makes these
efforts so intriguing is that in the hands of a
skilled facilitator, an apparently intractable value
conflict may be revealed as simply a
miscommunication or a problem for which a
compromise is available that satisfies competing
needs without resolving the underlying value
conflict. If these approaches are not fruitful,
however, then few effective decision-making
options may exist outside of traditional forums,
and specifically, the judicial arena where
consensus is not a prerequisite to decisionmaking.
The salience of the consensus
requirement is explored further in later
discussions.

Question: Is there a cause-and-effect
relationship
between
organizational
achievements and subsequent on-theground success? Stated more generally,
does the community/collaborative model
of interaction and decision-making
produce benefits that increase the ability
of society to achieve social, economic and
environmental goals?
In order to answer this question, several
years of monitoring and study of collaborative
groups will be necessary. This work is partially
underway at many locations, including at the
Natural Resources Law Center where western
watershed initiatives are currently being studied
as part of efforts to update The Watershed
Source Book (NRLC, 1996). Even upon
completion of that work, however, it will likely
be difficult in the short-term to reach strong
conclusions about the strength, of any, of the
cause-and-effect
relationship
between
organizational achievements and on-the-ground
impacts. Certainly, many of the case studies
presented in the Source Book and subsequent
research provide examples of watershed
initiatives moving beyond “organizational
achievements” (such as group formation, mission
statement development, plan preparation, and
related accomplishments) to have an on-theground impact (NRLC, 1996; Kenney, 1997).
Generating credible statistics about the expected
frequency of such achievements by watershed
initiatives throughout the West, however, will
require additional effort, as watershed initiatives
need time to experiment, and researchers need
time to observe and analyze. What may be more
productive at this time is to think more broadly
about questions of process and outcome, and in
particular, how the “social environment”
characteristic of the community/collaborative
model of interaction can be expected to result in
on-the-ground benefits.
The belief that cooperative and collaborative
interactions are likely to lead to stronger
communities, better societies, and various types
of on-the-ground benefits is perhaps best
captured by the concept of “social capital.”
Social capital is defined in many different ways
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For example, the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance (1994) observes that “Consensus works only
when there is some basis of agreement to begin with;
it does not work if participants are coming from
diametrically opposing viewpoints. A consensus can
be reached, for instance, if participants agree a road
should be built, but need to decide the best route. A
consensus cannot be reached when some participants
want to clearcut, and others want to protect, a tract
of forest.”
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(Newton, 1997). In its most general usage, the
theory of social capital rests on the assumption
that trust and reciprocity are essential elements
for social stability and political cooperation
(Simmel, 1950). Viewed from this perspective,
“social capital is important because it constitutes
a force that helps to bind society together by
transforming individuals from self-seeking and
egocentric calculators, with little social
conscience or sense of mutual obligation, into
members of a community with shared interests,
shared assumptions about social relations, and a
sense of the common good” (Newton, 1997:576).
Slightly different perspectives on social capital
focus on the networks through which various
parties can interact, building trust and
encouraging cooperation (Tocqueville, 1968;
Mill, 1910), or upon the more practical outputs
(or consequences) that individuals can expect
through such cooperative arrangements (Putnam,
1993; Ostrom, 1990).
While each perspective on social capital
shares the assumption that benefits can be
associated with actions and mechanisms that
promote greater social collaboration, questions
arise about cause-and-effect relationships, about
the benefits of formal versus informal
associations, about the importance and frequency
of intangible and tangible benefits, and about the
relationship between local associations (such as
watershed initiatives) and national institutional
structures within which local entities reside
(Newton, 1997).
Much of the literature
addressing such topics is not supported by (or is
not readily amenable to) detailed empirical
studies nor features precise definitions and/or
explicitly identified assumptions, but rather is
based on a wealth of anecdotal and hermeneutic
evidence and nested within normative
assumptions espousing the benefits of
participatory processes.67 In the world of natural

resources and the environment, this information
is most commonly found in the literature of
community-based ecosystem management, which
as Cortner et al. (in press:2) observe, is
“premised on the belief that healthy democracies
and sustainable ecosystems are both intertwined
and interdependent.”68 At the core of this line of
reasoning are two important assumptions: first is
the belief that human well-being is largely
dependent upon maintaining environmental
health; and second is the assumption that certain
types of processes—usually defined as those
based on the community/collaborative model—
are most conducive to recognizing, respecting,
and achieving this relationship. While it is the
second assumption that is most relevant to this
discussion, both points deserve some attention
given their close relationship.
The first of these ideas—i.e., that human
well-being is tied to ecological health—has long
been
obvious
to
conservationists
and
environmentalists and, undoubtedly, to many
other individuals maintaining a close connection
with the environment. However, many of the
behavioral patterns typical of the modern
industrialized world seem oblivious to this
relationship. For example, Thomas Malthus
(1798) generated a degree of lasting fame in
environmental circles for his simple observation
that many species embark on population booms
that overwhelm those natural systems on which
the species depend, leading often to precipitous
population declines in the species. Beginning
largely in the 1960s, this “limits to growth” idea
was widely applied to human society, becoming
one of the cornerstones of the modern
environmental movement. Similar concerns over
human “nest-fouling” also became more widely
acknowledged in this era thanks largely to
phenomenon such as the Cuyahoga River
(draining in Lake Erie) fires and Rachael
Carson’s (1962) frightening study showing how
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Interestingly, social capital is an idea expressed
much more frequently in international (especially
third world) contexts. Some parties, such as Brick
(1998:36), find this troubling: “In international
conservation efforts, the need to work with local
communities and indigenous peoples is axiomatic.
But in this country the environmental movement

often ignores this wisdom, preferring instead the
hammer of national environmental legislation to
accomplish its goals.”
68
The philosophy of community-based
environmental protection, as interpreted by the EPA,
can be found at http://www.epa.gov/region5/cbep.
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bioaccumulation can concentrate toxics in
species near the top of food chains—including
humans.
These concerns over resource
consumption and ecological degradation are also
joined by more metaphysical considerations, such
as the preservationist argument of Henry David
Thoreau who once remarked, “In wilderness is
the preservation of the world.”
Collectively, research and writings of this
nature have helped to create an environment in
the United States where the relationship between
human well-being and ecological health is better
appreciated than ever before.69 Yet, the policy
response to issues such as growth (and
consumption), climate change, biodiversity
declines, and other pressing problems is generally
considered by environmentalists to be
disappointing (Ehrlich, 1996). Making further
progress will likely require better communicating
this message about the connection between
human and environmental health, and perhaps
more significantly, in devising mechanisms that
can achieve this desired balance on-the-ground.
This again brings us back to the tenets of social
capital
and
the
merits
of
the
community/collaborative model of decisionmaking, which presumably provide a mechanism
for achieving these objectives.
One of the functions for which watershed
initiatives (and similar tools) are best suited is
public education.70 In fact, many organizations,
such as the Verde Watershed Association,
consider this educational function to be their
primary role.71 The collaborative environment of
a watershed initiative can be ideal for fostering
communication among interests and disciplines,
between experts and laymen, between resource
managers and stakeholders, and more generally,

between the community of resource users and
managers and the public.72 Many groups pursue
these goals through their broad memberships,
through events such as conferences and planning
exercises, and through the use of newsletters and
web sites (NRLC, 1996). This approach has the
potential to not only increase the quantity of
information flow, but to also improve the quality
of the discussion, by framing issues in a broad
and integrated manner, and with a degree of
foresight often not afforded to management
agencies burdened by immediate crises or by the
demands of day-to-day program administration.
While it is difficult to precisely measure the
value of public education and involvement in
improving resource management and health, it
seems apparent that it is unrealistic to expect
people to care about those things they do not
understand, to combat problems they do not
recognize, or to implement solutions they have
not considered. Education, defined broadly to
include almost any exchange of ideas, is an
essential piece of the problem-solving puzzle, and
is a cornerstone in the development of social
capital. It is erroneous, however, to suggest that
this educational function can only occur through
watershed
initiatives
using
the
community/collaborative model, or through ADR
processes (Coglianese, 1997).
Tremendous
amounts of data and insights are garnered
through formal planning processes, through the
discovery phase of litigation, through reporting
and documentation requirements of permitting
processes, and a host of related, “traditional”
means of resource management and problemsolving. Where “alternative” approaches likely
excel is in promoting a more extensive and honest
disclosure of information (in part since the
consensus requirement and non-adversarial
nature create a safe environment for open
discussion), and in pursuing a more holistic or
integrated approach to defining problems and
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Internationally, one of the better known
discussions of this relationship is provided in the socalled Brundtland Commission report (WCED,
1987), which is often credited with pioneering the
term “sustainable development.”
70
The educational value of collaborative processes
has been identified by a tremendous diversity of
authors, including Sabatier (1988), Pateman (1970),
and Blackburn and Bruce (1995).
71
For more information on the Association, see
http://www.verde.org/.
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Duane (1999:778) argues that “horizontal”
interactions (i.e., those in which all parties are
viewed as equal participants) are key to building
social capital, unfortunate given that “most land and
resource agencies are structured around vertical
networks of control.”
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solutions.
Obviously, this ideal is not
accomplished in all settings, but it occurs with
sufficient frequency within watershed initiatives
to be a source of considerable excitement.
Returning to the underlying assumptions of
community-based ecosystem management and
Newton’s (1997) definition of social capital
provided earlier, the next issue to address is
whether or not interaction through the
community/collaborative model is likely to
change human behavioral motives from shortterm, individual self-interest, to longer-term,
community interest.
Clearly, increased
interaction among parties in a given
“community” is likely to create forces that
modify individual thinking and behavior.
Utilizing terms such as socialization, bounded
rationality, and embeddedness, many researchers
have observed that individuals with decisionmaking responsibilities are likely to modify their
decision heuristics (or means of reasoning) to
produce decisions that have broad acceptance to
the group (Simon, 1982; Gregg et al., 1991). As
discussed earlier, Ostrom (1990) is among those
authors who have found that social pressure can
be a powerful force in encouraging people to act
in a manner respectful of community interests.
Nickelsburg (1998) and Kenney (1997), and
countless other authors, have made similar
observations, noting that frequent interactions
within collaborative groups can generate a degree
of social responsibility and obligation that is of
practical value in addressing environmental
issues.
On the other hand, “community interests”
are defined differently by different communities,
many of whom believe that problems with
resource management are problems of overregulation (and/or the subordination of private
rights) and excessive restrictions on resource use,
consumption, and/or degradation. These groups
do not show up in the Source Book (and many
similar publications) simply because they were
selected out; the Source Book is a reference for
watershed initiatives pursuing environmentally
friendly goals, a normative criterion adopted by
the authors. Thus, while many of the cases
featured as representative of the western
watershed movement can be cited as evidence

that these groups promote social capital and the
pursuit of community objectives, it is naï ve to
assume that the goals of all such associations are
environmentally beneficial or benign, or that the
interests of local communities always correspond
to those of larger communities of interests
(Berman, 1997).
In fact, the counter argument is wellestablished in the environmental community, and
largely explains why activists have historically
fought to move the locus of decision-making
from local communities presumably tied to
commodity industries to more national
“communities of interest.”73 Similarly, the fear
of co-optation in collaborative processes is
strong, and is not without historical precedent—
the control of federal rangelands by 1950s era
grazing boards being the classic example (Foss,
1960; Culhane, 1981).
“Socialization” of
resource managers in consensus-based and
collaborative processes can be viewed as highly
unprofessional by fellow managers; there is much
anecdotal evidence to suggest that managers
participating in these processes often do so at the
risk of losing status within the agency. Manring’s
(1998:288) research on consensus building in the
Forest Service is illustrative:
73

As described by Coggins (1999:604) in the context
of federal devolution: “The notion of devolving
decisionmaking authority over federal resources
down to local citizens' groups is anything but novel.
From the birth of the Nation, local citizens have
banded together, usually at the expense of the
general public and often with the connivance of
federal and local officials. ‘Claims clubs’ were
formed locally to dissuade outsiders, usually by
illegal means, from bidding on lands the members
wanted for themselves. Similarly, local citizens
assisted one another in stealing federal timber and
lead mines in the Midwest. Local collaboration has
been a favored technique in this century as well.
Irrigators have organized to cheat the government
out of reclamation subsidies. Logging companies,
loggers' unions, and timber dependent communities
long have agreed on how the Forest Service should
subsidize them. The most egregious example are the
grazing advisory councils composed of ranchers who
dictated the winners and losers in federal forage
allocation. They won; small ranchers, nomadic
sheepherders, and rangeland health lost.”
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and operational attributes of the various
approaches. Unfortunately, this type of analysis
is rarely seen—buried too deep below
unquestioned normative assumptions and
dogmatic prose.
Finally, it is important to remember that
educational and social capital building activities
may be valued even if they cannot be shown to
translate to achieving on-the-ground objectives.
Nickelsburg (1998) is among those distinguishing
between “extrarational” and “rational” benefits,
the former entailing benefits such as trust,
respect, friendship, and similar benefits possible
through collective interaction; and the latter
focusing more on achievement of on-the-ground
objectives.74 Note that these two perspectives
correspond to the earlier discussion about
definitions of success. Interview data by Press
(1994:96) suggests that many environmentalists
are less concerned with the “building
community” (extrarational) definition of success
than with the more pragmatic “on-the-ground
results” characterization:

A survey by Cheng, White, Hacker,
and Ellefson (1993) found that
“National Forest managers rank
conflict and how to deal with it at the
top of all forest management issues” (p.
ii). Yet, according to a survey by
Kennedy et al. (1992), only 31% of the
respondents believed that consensus
building is a value that should be
rewarded by the agency.
A related issue involves the expanded use of
market mechanisms in natural resources and
environmental management.
As described
earlier, the community/collaborative model of
governance and the expanded use of market
mechanisms are the twin pillars of many modern
reform proposals, including those of the National
Performance Review and the Western Governors’
Association (NPR, 1996; WGA, 1998). Both of
these tenets of the “era of alternative problemsolving” are tied to normative ideas advocating
voluntary incentives (rather than penalties), and
promoting flexibility and creativity in decisionmaking and problem-solving (Kenney and Lord,
1999).
While these are powerful unifying
principles, these two types of problem-solving
strategies are quite different in their underlying
assumptions about social capital—and quite
possibly, according to Foley and Edwards
(1996), work at cross-purposes.
Proponents of the community/collaborative
model argue that through increasing contact and
communication among concerned individuals,
social capital is created, resulting in joint
decision-making efforts in which parties
increasingly subordinate individual desires to
community objectives. Market proponents, in
contrast, do not assume that any type of
coordinated action or interaction among decisionmakers is necessary or even desirable, but rather
conclude than individual self-interest can,
through the “invisible hand” of markets, fulfill
community objectives. Both perspectives can be
correct, but only to the extent that each problemsolving strategy is correctly matched to particular
types of problem situations, a prerequisite
requiring an analysis of the strengths, limitations,

[Environmentalists] wanted nothing
less than substantial changes in the
physical environment, even if they had
to rely on “power brokers” or the
courts to get their way. Instead of
“more democracy,” these respondents
were looking for very specific physical
outcomes …
Interestingly, similar sentiments about the
overriding importance of on-the-ground success
were also expressed in interviews with the “antienvironmental” activists, suggesting that those
most passionate about resources may be least
likely to engage in social capital building
activities without some compelling argument that
this will, in fact, lead to achievement of on-theground objectives.
None of these observations, as expected,
provide a precise answer to the question of
whether or not organizational achievements lead
to on-the-ground success. Obviously, stake74

The classic text on this subject is provided by
Mancur Olson (1965).
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holders would not volunteer their time, and
agency’s would not allocate scarce resources to
collaborative processes, if they did not assume
that this cause-and-effect relationship existed.75
The proliferation of these groups, many with
broad memberships, suggests a strong and
growing demand that is either based on real
benefits or a strong expectation of future
benefits. The Source Book contains many cases
where
on-the-ground
achievements
have
occurred. Thus, the “social capital” concept
underlying the community/collaborative model of
problem-solving undoubtedly probably has at
least some validity—do we really need empirical
data to confirm this for us?—and it is a
reasonable working assumption to conclude that
this cause-and-effect relationship may be
achievable in many situations. The much more
relevant question, then, is to determine which
factors are likely to encourage or discourage this
cause-and-effect relationship in a given case, an
issue now discussed in several contexts and most
likely linked to the types of incentive structures
resulting from various problem types and
solution strategies. Of course, this task is greatly
complicated by challenges in defining and
measuring success, and must always be pursued
with respect to lingering “governance issues”
such as inadequate representation, co-optation,
power imbalances, and so on. If “healthy
democracies” are indeed a prerequisite to
environmental sustainability, then these issues of
governance cannot be understated; to the
contrary, they must be at the heart of our
thinking. The inherent limits of the “consensus”
decision-rule are also an important consideration.
Many of these issues are addressed further in the
remaining pages.

Question:
How does the consensus
decision-rule typical of collaborative
groups influence the quality of decisions
and decision-making exercises?
The majority of mechanisms reliant upon the
community/collaboration model of governance
can be categorized as “consensus-based”
processes. Consensus is one of several poorly
defined terms used to describe modern
governance arrangements.76 In the context of this
report, the term is recognized as having two
related meanings. The first is to describe an
approach to decision-making that emphasizes
cooperation, learning, and accommodation of
diverse interests. The second meaning is to
describe a decision rule—i.e., a mechanism by
which individual preferences are combined into a
joint decision.77 As a practical matter, consensus
as a decision-rule is usually synonymous with
unanimity, meaning that all involved parties must
agree—or agree not to disagree—on all
decisions, although the former term can suggest
that this level of agreement is, at least in part, a
reflection of individuals giving in to group
interests, while unanimity typically has no
altruistic implications.78
76

Other terms defying easy definition are ecosystem
management, sustainability, and as discussed later,
democracy.
77
The meaning of “consensus” in the context of
collaborative groups is discussed in some detail by
Cestero (1999:14).
78
Misunderstandings about the decision-rule
dictated by the “consensus” requirement have been a
complicating factor in several collective processes
for natural resources management. For example,
the interstate river basin commissions established
pursuant to Title II of the Water Resources Planning
Act of 1965 devised several different decision rules,
although each was governed by the same statutory
mandate to use consensus (ACIR, 1972). The
practical similarity between consensus and
unanimity—and the lingering confusion between the
two terms—is perhaps best illustrated by the
definition of consensus provided in the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 1990, which states “consensus
means unanimous concurrence among the interests
represented” unless the committee “agrees to define
[consensus] to mean a general but not unanimous
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Note that the vast literature pertaining to social
capital building in third world environmental
problem-solving is not reviewed here since the
transferability of those findings is limited given the
lack in those countries of strong governmental
systems of resources management, property rights,
markets, and other institutional features that can
structure human relations and manage the
human/nature interface.
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A similar point of confusion is associated
with the term decision-making. While groups
that adopt formal policy positions are universally
recognized as engaging in decision-making
activities, some parties are hesitant to
acknowledge that activities such as education,
planning, and on-the-ground remediation also
involve collective decision-making—even if a
structured voting process does not occur or
Robert’s Rules of Order are not invoked. For
example, the simple crafting of a group mission
statement can involve making decisions about the
definition of problems (often the most important
stage in a problem-solving exercise), the selection
of general preferences in solution strategies, and
the adoption of procedural tenets to be used in
guiding future actions. To the extent that these
issues may not be controversial in a particular
group, the act of decision-making may be largely
invisible—but decisions are nonetheless being
made, and if the process is consensus-based, then
those decisions are probably being made through
unanimity.
This characteristic of many
collaborative groups, including most watershed
initiatives, can be highly salient in determining
what these efforts can and cannot be expected to
accomplish.
A strong mythology surrounds the
phenomenon of consensus-based decisionmaking. A few of these assumptions have
already been discussed; namely, the belief that
consensus-based processes can produce decisions
quicker, at lower cost, and of higher stability
(measured by reduced legal challenges) than
other processes. Undoubtedly, this is true in
many occasions, but it is often false in others—a
conclusion evident in many scholarly works,
including Coglianese’s (1997) review of
negotiated rulemaking and Amy’s (1987) review
of environmental dispute resolution. The value
of these findings is not to invalidate the claims of
one side or the other, but to highlight the
practical importance of understanding those
situations and qualities that are likely to favor
one decision-making approach other another.

The mythology of consensus transcends
these “practical” considerations of speed, cost,
and durability to include more normative notions
of truth and social value. This component of the
consensus mythology has a long history, as
shown by Rescher (1993:1):
For much of the history of Western
philosophy, consensus—uniformity of
belief and evaluation—has been viewed
as a desideratum whose ultimate
realization can be taken as assured.
Aquinas, in the Middle Ages, regarded
consensus on fundamentals as a
condition assured by God; Kant, in the
eighteenth century, considered it as
something rooted in the very nature of
Reason; Hegel, in the nineteenth
century, saw it as guaranteed by the
spirit of cultivation working through
the march of history ever enlarging its
hold on human Society; Habermas in
the twentieth century sees it as inherent
in the very nature of Communication
as an indispensable social praxis.
Throughout much of the tradition
consensus was viewed not just as
something to be desired, but as
something whose eventual actualization
is effectively assured by some principle
deep-rooted in the nature of things as
we humans confront them in this world.
Consensus, we are told, is not merely a
logical and inevitable product of the search for
truth, but is something with a strong social value.
This idea, especially strong in the tradition of
German social thought extending from Hegel to
Marx and to the Frankfurt School and beyond,
assumes that maintaining social order requires a
strong commitment to consensus in all public
matters (Rescher, 1993).
Accepting this
assumption could have tremendous ramifications
for American society, in that it can provide a
formidable
bias
against
diversity
and
individualism, and can promote an intolerance of
disagreement and those processes used in
democratic societies to manage, rather than

concurrence” or “agrees upon another specified
definition” (5 U.S.C. ' 562, 1994 & Supp I. 1995.)
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suppress, social conflict.79 Equally troubling is
the assumption that consensus is always possible
given sufficient communication, education, and
learning.80 While many success stories in ADR
demonstrate that consensus is frequently
achievable81, the assumption that this is always
the case can only be considered as naï ve. In the
context of watershed initiatives, one component
of this naivete is identified by Coggins (1998:29),
who questions the assumption that all parties to
natural resource and environmental disputes are
reasonable and, ultimately, share similar values:

The other dominant idea at the root of the
consensus mythology is that consensus-based
processes are more likely to lead to the “correct”
answer than are other processes of decisionmaking. Many accepted tools from the decision
sciences—particularly, the Delphi Method—are
based on the idea that decision processes which
are iterative and learning-oriented can lead to
more technically accurate group decisions, a
conclusion based on considerable research
(Helmer, 1983). The strength of consensusbased processes in managing and synthesizing
data-intensive issues is also well established in
practice (Bingham, 1986). Thus, there is likely
merit to this assumption in many situations;
however, as Rescher (1993:29) observes, one
should not confuse opinion and fact, even if that
opinion is the product of group deliberation:
The problem, of course, is that
consensus does not bridge over the
truth-opinion divide that has been on
the agenda of philosophy ever since the
days of Parmenides. A consensus as
such is still no more than a consensual
opinion that reflects the beliefs of the
group.
There may be safety in
numbers, but they afford no
guarantees.

The first assumption underlying most
proposals to devolve authority to local
collaboratives is that, at bottom, we are
all reasonable people who will see both
sides of the issue and reach appropriate
compromises.
This assumption is
demonstrably untrue.82
79

Reschner (1993:158) rejects the tradition of
German social thought stressing social order through
consensus, and instead calls for “a benevolent (or at
any rate resigned) acceptance of the disagreement of
others with respect to beliefs and values. Such an
approach envisions a posture of diversity conjoined
with ‘live-and-let-live’, taking the line that a healthy
democratic social order can not only tolerate, but
even—within limits—welcome dissensus
(disagreement, discord), provided that the conflicts
involved are kept within ‘reasonable bounds’.”
80
Forest activist Jim Britell suggests that this idea is
a cornerstone of the Neo-Liberalism movement
gaining ground internationally. This philosophy
asserts that value conflicts are not at the heart of
disputes, and that through better management and
consensus-building processes, win-win solutions can
always be found. This idea is articulated at
www.britell.com/text/tuse11c.html.
81
For examples from the world of environmental
dispute resolution, see Bingham (1985), Blackburn
and Bruce (1995), and Bacow and Wheeler (1984).
82
Other assumptions challenged by Coggins include:
“negotiated plans and agreements will leave all
participants and the public interest better off” (page
30); “the issues on which collaboration is needed are
local problems better solved by local people with
knowledge of local conditions” (page 30); and “the
federal government is the bad guy” (page 30).
Coggins concludes that “some of the assumptions on
which the case for collaboration are premised are

Bridging the gap between issues of the
“social value” of consensus and its likelihood to
lead to correct decisions is the work of some
social psychologists who have examined the
types of decisions that emerge from consensus
processes dealing with issues heavily steeped in
opinion. Many researchers have observed that
when groups comprised of individuals with
diverse opinions are organized to make collective
decisions, the resulting decisions tend not to be
the “average” of various positions, but rather an
contrary to human nature and human experience.
Our legal system and our history recognize the
inevitability of disputes and controversies not
amenable to resolution by consensus building, and
we have established an intentionally inefficient
tripartite representative machine to resolve those
disputes without bloodshed through law” (page 30).
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extreme position. This finding reflects common
experience that suggests that individuals are
bolder when acting within groups than in acting
alone.
This phenomenon, termed “group
polarization” by Moscovici and Zavalloni
(1969), has been shown empirically under
laboratory conditions. Similar results are found
in the work of Davis and Hinsz (1982), who
observe that “moderating sessions” designed to
calm protests often result in more extreme
positions. Presumably, these outcomes are most
likely to occur when the level of participation is
high, the opinions expressed are widely divergent,
and when the stakes are perceived as high
(Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Moscovici and
Doise, 1994). This finding presents a further
challenge to the mythology of consensus, and
especially the idea that consensus-based
processes promote social order by moderating
extreme viewpoints. As Moscovici and Doise
(1994:14) observe:

Our history from the revolution
forward provides abundant examples
that justice and liberty are sometimes
best achieved by absolutely refusing to
sit down and find “common ground”
and “win-win” solutions. In fact, it is
arguable that of most turning points in
history where great issues of human
freedom were at stake, in-your-face
confrontation saved the day. On the
other hand, when key turning points
were resolved with “win-win” solutions
like Chamberlain used at Munich on
the eve of World War II, the greatest
human calamities have ensued.
Thus, while scholars such as Rescher
(1993) worry that an over-reliance on consensus
processes may unduly squelch or discredit
diverse opinions, some of the findings of the
social psychologists warn that consensus
processes may exaggerate extreme positions—
likely reflecting the norms of the dominant
personality, rather than a balanced spectrum of
participant viewpoints. Still others argue that the
best processes are often those that deliberately
avoid any attempt at reaching a mutually
acceptable agreement, and instead celebrate
conflict as legitimate and useful. These findings
are somewhat difficult to integrate, both on
practical and normative grounds, but do suggest
that it may be inappropriate to assume that a
“consensus opinion” will approximate the
“common good,” although generalizations on this
subject are difficult to substantiate (Berman,
1997).
Determining which behavioral
phenomena might prevail in a given consensusbased process is obviously extremely difficult,
but it is worth observing that none of the
outcomes described above by Rescher, the social
psychologists, or the environmental activist
(Britell), probably satisfy the idealistic image of
consensus as promoting truth, harmony, and
social stability.
Interviews with watershed
initiative participants indicate that these ideals
have been achieved in many cases, but not in
many others. To blindly assume that positive
outcomes are an inherent component of
consensus-based processes is to ignore a vast

The importance of such results resides
partly in the fact that one might expect
group discussion to cause individuals
to round off the rough edges, smooth
out their attitudes, moderate their
choices, and so on. Now it appears, on
the contrary, that the outcome is to
make them more extreme.
Of course, much of this debate is rendered
moot if you challenge that assumption that
pursuing agreement is an inherently worthwhile
endeavor. Many parties take exception to the
Neo-Liberal idea that conflict is inherently bad or
socially destructive. McCloskey (1996), for
example, fears that in embracing collaboration,
conflict is being “de-legitimized.” Such ideas are
not accepted by those embracing the tradition of
social activism so central to many movements,
including environmentalism, often with good
reason. The observations of Britell83 are typical
of this line of thought:

83

Taken from the article, “The Myth of ‘Win-Win’,”
accessed June 3, 1999 at
www.britell.com/text/tuse11c.html.
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body of literature, thought, and experimentation
suggesting that these processes are highly
complex on many levels, and that significant
deviations can occur from case to case due to
factors that are not easily understood.
Of course, many of the concerns raised to
challenge the merits of consensus-based
processes have relatively little to do with broad
theoretical issues or ongoing academic debates,
or even the practical efficiency issues of time,
cost, and stability identified earlier. Strategic
considerations are also of note. One of the most
salient issues of this nature involves the social
pressure to compromise. This phenomenon is
discussed by Blackburn (1988:569) in the
context of environmental mediation versus
litigation, but is presumably applicable to a wide
range
of
consensus-based
processes:

at least in part, a function of experience and
training. Although many natural resources and
environmental conflicts are much more complex
than the classic characterization of the developer
versus the environmentalist, it is certainly not
uncommon for disputes to pit those with a clear
economic interest against parties seeking noneconomic and/or broadly dispersed benefits. In
such cases, it is typical that the disputants will
have very different skills in regards to dispute
resolution, with the representatives of the
economic interests normally possessing greater
training and experience in the craft of negotiation
(Amy, 1987, 1990). Perhaps more importantly,
environmental representatives in these efforts are
frequently volunteers, resulting in a situation in
which paid, professional negotiators are sitting
across the table from volunteers. As mentioned
earlier, many parties believe this fact is behind
the generally higher level of support in the
business community than the environmental
community for negotiated problem-solving.85
The frustration expressed by environmentalist
Michal Black is typical:

The internal dynamics of environmental mediation are completely
different [from] the courtroom context.
Participants in mediation often develop
bonds of trust, understanding and even
affection, toward their opponents. The
climate of understanding and progress
in
working
toward
mutually
satisfactory solutions creates subtle
pressures to be reasonable and
conciliatory. These dynamics may
undermine the determination of
unsophisticated parties to stand their
ground on issues. . . . The parties with
less experience and sophistication may
walk away with an agreement which
favors their perspective much less than
would have been possible in a more
public, adversarial context.84

It is extremely difficult for citizens to
take the time and money to participate.
… Personally I become frustrated
when I take the time and effort to
attend these meetings, and look around
the room and realize I am the only
person present not getting paid to
85

The observations of Nickelsburg (1998:13911392) are illuminating: “Bargaining is expensive.
Although each step in the bargaining process may be
less costly than the action required for a single, allencompassing solution, the complete effort may
involve hours of meetings and information-gathering
and may last for years. Voluntary participation in a
bargaining regime is itself a collective action
problem subject to its own structural barriers.
Community members may lack the time to devote to
an exhausting, collaborative effort. Moreover,
professional and scientific assistance may not be
available or may be prohibitively expensive. The
probability that citizens will undertake such longterm collective action varies widely from community
to community, most likely in correlation with the
economic prosperity of the inhabitants.”

As Blackburn suggests, the susceptibility of
a person to the social pressure to compromise is,
84

Similar sentiments are expressed by McCloskey
(1996): “It is also troubling that [collaborative]
processes tend to de-legitimize conflict as a way of
dealing with issues and of mobilizing support. It is
psychologically difficult to simultaneously negotiate
and publicly attack bad proposals from the other
side. This tends to be seen as acting in bad faith.”
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attend. Volunteer resources can only
go so far.86

efforts. Questions remain as to how
national and regional interests can be
fairly represented in an exclusively
local process? Who speaks for the
environment?
One particular local
environmentalist does not necessarily
speak for other local or national
environmental interests. Who speaks
for the land and future generations?
Achieving a full range of stakeholders
is quite difficult, especially when the
land under debate is all public lands.

Another strategic concern is one of
inadequate representation. This is a chronic
issue to the environmental activist, as many
modes of public policy-making are biased in
favor of economic interests (e.g., the pluralism
model described by Lowi, 1979). In the context
of collaborative groups such as watershed
initiatives, concerns over environmental group
under-representation are inexorably tied to the
larger issue of local versus national decisionmaking.87 As Michael McCloskey (1996:7),
chairman of the Sierra Club, has observed:

If greater involvement of “local” interests is
achieved only at the expense of a reduced
presence of national environmental interests, then
the
assumed
problem
of
inadequate
representation in natural resources management
has not been resolved, but only modified.
Ultimately,
issues
of
skills
and
representation in consensus-based processes are
components of the larger issue of power, an issue
closely tied to the qualities of the decision-rule of
unanimity.
Forums utilizing unanimity are
widely assumed to be a low risk arena for
discussing problems and solutions, given that no
group actions can take place in the absence of
agreement by all parties—including minority
interests (i.e., those advocating positions that are
not widely held). While that is true, the practical
ramifications of unanimity are not always so
obvious. Falk (1982) is among those researchers
who have studied the relationship between
decision-rules and power. In a comparison of
three situations—one where no decision rule
existed, one where unanimity was utilized, and
one where majority-rule was featured—Falk
found that it was the majority-rule framework
that most increased the power of minority (i.e.,
underrepresented)
interests,
such
as
environmentalists, to achieve desired outcomes.88

Few of the proposals for stakeholder
collaboration provide any way for
distant stakeholders to be effectively
represented.
While we may have
activists in some nearby communities,
we don’t have them in all of the small
towns involved. It is curious that these
ideas would have the effect of
transferring influence to the very
communities where we are least
organized and potent. They would
maximize the influence of those who
are least attracted to the environmental
cause and most alienated from it.
Similar concerns over inadequate representation
have also been articulated in congressional
testimony by The Wilderness Society’s Louis
Blumberg (1997:6):
The fundamental problem of adequate
representation remains a significant
obstacle to successful collaborative
86

This comment was one of many similar opinions
expressed in a Sierra Club listserve discussion of
collaborative groups (RMC-CONS-WATER)
occurring primarily in late October, 1998.
87
Reflecting on his experiences mostly in the Pacific
Northwest, Oregon WaterWatch’s Reed Benson
(1998:284) asserts that “Today’s watershed councils
tend to be heavily weighted in favor of local
economic interests, to the disadvantage of resource
protection.”

88

Falk’s (1982) empirical research shows that in the
no-rule situation, powerful parties dominate by
virtue of their greater resources and expertise;
minority interests have no mechanism to be heard or
to exercise influence. In a unanimity situation, two
outcomes are possible, neither of which help
minority interests. First, minority interests may veto
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This result should not come as a surprise to
environmental activists, who have found their
greatest victories in Congress and the courts,
arenas where the consent of their “antienvironmental” counterparts is not a prerequisite
to successful decision-making.
From the standpoint of parties advocating
minority positions, the real benefit of consensusbased processes is often best described as the
ability to prevent further defeats (or action of any
kind), rather than the ability to formulate victory
(Press, 1994). Of course, this “benefit” is not
useful to environmental interests participating in
ecological restoration programs, where the
impetus is on taking action rather than preventing
action. As Luecke (1999:8) observes:

interests, with extreme interests being
systematically excluded. As Nickelsburg (1998),
McCloskey (1996), and many others have
observed, this strategy can be devastating to any
minority interest—the typical situation for
environmental and public interest activists.89 A
much more positive strategy is to foster an
exchange of information and ideas, synthesize
this data in a creative way, and craft a solution
that satisfies the needs of all parties. It is this
potential that is at the heart of the profession of
alternative dispute resolution, and as discussed
earlier, is often a realistic option in situations
featuring symmetrical incentives, positive-sum
solutions, and/or relatively low (or avoidable)
value conflicts.
The third strategy is simply to avoid issues
where strong dissenting opinions exist. This may
not be a significant impediment, at least initially,
in many collaborative groups if a sufficient
supply of easily resolved problems and readily
available solutions exist to facilitate problemsolving (i.e., the “low hanging fruit” argument).
However, difficult issues eventually must either
be faced, leading to the prospect of gridlock, or
they must be sidestepped.
According to
Coglianese (1999), this phenomenon was aptly
demonstrated by the Enterprise for the
Environment experience. Enterprise for the
Environment (a.k.a., E4E) was a multistakeholder consensus-based effort led by former
EPA Administrator William Ruckelhaus—in
cooperation with the National Academy of Public
Administration, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and the Keystone Center—
to reform environmental policy. The goal of the
effort was to use a consensus-based process to
develop new environmental policies/programs,
which would presumably also likely feature
consensus processes. In drafting the E4E report,
however, the group was unable to reach

In a multi-party process, the efficacy
and weight of one interest (even more
so for a minority party) is often
imperceptible. Its influence is thin and
diffuse. At best, one party can usually
do little more than form a coalition (or
voting block) to stop an action it does
not support.
It cannot move the
process in a direction it thinks it should
go.
It may be able to create a
stalemate, but not progress.
This is somewhat ironic, given that
collaborative efforts are often described as a
solution to gridlock. Of the three apparent
strategies for dealing with gridlock in consensusbased processes, two are of dubious merit. The
first is to ensure decision-making by limiting
representation to only a sub-set of all relevant
a given action, resulting in a situation of gridlock
that harms all interests with an interest in problemsolving. Second, the veto may have the practical
result of stymieing the collective decision-making
process, encouraging the powerful party to result
back to the no-rule situation where winners and
losers are largely dependent on other power sources,
such as economic might. However, in the majorityrule situation, an opportunity exists for minority
interests to impact the final decision through
bargaining, or to perhaps dominate the final outcome
through coalition-building with other low-power
entities.

89

Research on interest group politics suggests that
environmental and public interest advocates will
likely always remain as minority interests in public
policy debates, given that the system of rewards in
public policy systems is strongly biased in favor of
narrow, economic interests. This is a fundamental
quality of pluralism (Olson, 1965; Lowi, 1979).
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agreement on most significant issues. Thus,
when the group issued their report (The
Environmental
Protection
System
in
Transition90) in 1998, it went nowhere—in part
because many important parties (e.g., the Natural
Resources Defense Council) refused to sign.
Coglianese (1999:4) suggests this reflects an
inherent weakness of consensus-based efforts to
reach conclusions on divisive issues, thereby
encouraging vague and weak statements that
overestimate the progress reached:

of the needed direction, lies in the
details.
Presumably, what is needed are decisionmaking mechanisms that allow problems to be
addressed in the absence of consensus, and in a
manner that is broadly-focused and creative. It is
this first criterion that can limit the use of
collaborative groups, while the second criterion is
most troublesome for approaches reliant on
judicial action, some market mechanisms91, and
legislative tools (which at least partially fail both
criteria due to the political requirements of
pluralism). Again, this limitation on watershed
initiatives and similar efforts should not be
interpreted as a reason to abandon or discredit
the use of this tool, but rather to use it more
realistically and strategically.
As Born and
Genskow (1999:58) observe:

The report recommends that the U.S.
“adapt and adjust policies, strategies,
and systems based on experience and
new information,” that it “generate,
disseminate, and rely on the bestavailable scientific and economic
information,” and that it “place
authority,
responsibility,
and
accountability at the appropriate level
of government.” Yet no one seriously
argues government to place authority at
inappropriate levels, generate shaky
data, or ignore the lessons of
experience. The E4E report does not
tell us what specifically are the
appropriate levels of government, or
even what “appropriate” means. It
does not discuss the accuracy of certain
kinds of information or how to resolve
the tradeoff between the desire to
gather additional information and the
desire to take action. Finally, the
report does not explain how to interpret
experience in order to make policy
changes.
The E4E members
themselves, recall, could not agree on
the lessons to be drawn from the past
thirty
years
of
environmental
regulation. The devil, as well as much

[I]t is critical to note that some of the
major issues that must be dealt with in
watershed protection and restoration
not only have huge distributional
consequences (i.e., there are winners
and losers), but for any number of
reasons may be intractable and
impossible to resolve via “win-win”
consensual solutions.
Experienced
mediators can help diagnose those
issues and circumstances where
consensus approaches have little
likelihood of success, and help avoid
protracted watershed processes that are
either doomed to fail or can at best
produce
inefficacious
“lowestcommon-denominator” results. We say
this not to diminish the potential of
collaborative watershed approaches,
but to straightforwardly note that much
of watershed planning, decision-making

90
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Note that the E4E report contains an excellent
review (and endorsement) of many key features of
modern reform proposals: e.g., performance-based
management, market incentives, place-based
strategies, consensus. Yet, these ideas are expressed
in a highly abstract and general way, since reaching
consensus on the details proved impossible.

The ability of market regimes to promote creative
and innovative solutions is not questioned. The
limitations of markets in this context pertains to the
fact that, unless cleverly nested within an innovative
institutional structure, markets cannot be expected to
promote integrated goals serving public, rather than
private (consumer), interests.

47

trends in governance is well beyond the scope of
this report, the following pages do provide some
discussion about changing norms regarding
democratic institutions and competing modes of
decision-making. The current popularity of the
community/collaborative model of decisionmaking, after all, is a product of centuries of
experimentation and learning, and is undoubtedly
a step to a yet unknown preferred future form of
governance and problem-solving. As always,
normative ideas about democracy will have a
strong influence in guiding this ongoing process
of institutional evolution.
Democracy, it turns out, is a term that
means many things to many people (Graham,
1986). Virtually all meanings of the term are
faithful to the original Greek term demos in that
democracy is seen as a system of governance that
allows for participation of the populace—i.e.,
government of the people, by the people, and for
the people. But who are the people, and how are
they to govern? Two centuries ago, the demos in
the United States was not presumed to include
those of African descent; similarly, less than a
century ago, woman were also systematically
excluded from a public policy role. When
Gifford Pinchot was building a national forest
bureaucracy based on the premise of “the
greatest good for the greatest number,” half of
that number, the women, were still awaiting the
right to vote, something not secured until passage
of the 19th Amendment in 1920, long after the
creation of the Forest Service—and, incidentally,
the National Park Service, the Corps of
Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and many
other still-influential natural resource agencies
and the programs they implement. Even slower
has been the recognition in law and custom of
Native American rights and, more generally, the
rights of those parties who do not own land or
possess water rights, or who do not enjoy special
access to resources due to leases, contracts, or
other historic arrangements derivative of
extractive natural resource industries.92 The

and management involves conflict
resolution among competing interests.
General agreement among stakeholders
about such lofty aspirations such as
“clean water,” “healthy sustainable
ecosystems,” and a “healthy economy”
does not reconcile divisive issues.

Democratic Decision-Making:
Evolution of Normative Ideas

An

The preceding discussion summarizes much
of what is currently known or presumed
regarding the efficacy of western watershed
initiatives and similar strategies in communitybased environmental protection. Clearly, much
more empirical research is needed to test many of
the positive and speculative opinions identified in
this report. Yet, it would foolish to travel further
in that direction without acknowledging that
research alone will not guide activism and policymaking in this subject area, as it is an area
dominated by strong normative opinions only
partially amenable to formal testing.
The
pragmatic definition of success offered earlier
captures only part of the stimulus behind the
western watershed movement.
The other
dimension involves issues of what is, and is not,
an appropriate form of governance. Ultimately,
this is a philosophical debate that must be played
out on a political stage only indirectly influenced
by the academic community. As Cortner et al.
(in press:3) observe:
Issues surrounding the who, what,
where and how of governing are, by
their very nature, highly political.
They reach to the very core of the
nation’s democratic and federal system
of government and to the balances
struck among levels and branches of
government and between citizens and
their government.
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Thus, when noted western author Charles
Wilkinson (1992) speaks of the “lords of yesterday,”
he typically is not talking about an aristocracy of

While an extensive review of all the
potentially relevant normative ideas guiding
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“appropriate.”93 These questions are always
being debated in various forums and contexts,
following a sometimes peculiar path, and
frequently circling back to ideas abandoned in
earlier debates.94 In many respects, it is this
longer-term process, rather than the set of rules
or norms prevailing at any given time, that best
defines democracy.

rights of communities is also an issue of great
complexity and concern.
In addition to issues of “who” is involved,
any working definition of democracy must also
address issues of “how”—i.e., the processes of
decision-making and governance. Clearly, some
processes of public decision-making are viewed
as being more democratic than others, although
again, this is not an area with great consistency
or stability. This is perhaps best seen by
examining decision-rules, a particularly relevant
topic given the focus in this paper on consensus
processes.
Most systems of democracy
prominently utilize majority-rule; e.g., presidents
are elected and bills become law primarily
through majority-rule processes. But not all
majority-rule is created equal. In parliamentary
systems, for example, garnering 40 percent of the
vote typically entitles a party to select 40 percent
of the representatives; in the United States, 40
percent of the popular vote is no better than zero
(assuming the other candidate gets the remaining
60 percent). Which system is democratic?
Similarly, are processes reliant upon unanimity—
the typical decision-rule of consensus-based
processes—democratic? Graham (1986:17) is
among those that answer no:

Democracy and the American West
Underlying
the
debate
surrounding
watershed initiatives and related mechanisms of
decision-making heavily reliant on direct
stakeholder involvement are centuries of
scholarly debate regarding the merits of
democratic institutions.95 Among proponents of
democratic governance, a key area of debate is
often described as pitting the proponents of
“direct
democracy”—also
known
as
“participatory”
or
“pure”
democracy—
advocating direct citizen involvement and
deliberation in public policy decision-making,
against supporters of “representative democracy”
arguing for decision-making by elected public
officials in competitive forums only partially
subject to popular control (Cortner et al., in
press; Kemmis, 1990).
While undoubtedly
important, in the context of western collaborative
groups, this dichotomy can be overly simplistic,
obscuring the salient influence of two tangential
issues that have dramatically influenced
democratic institutions for natural resources
management: namely, the merits of utilizing an
elite and largely independent decision-making

The unanimity requirement …
effectively places a veto in the hands of
a single dissenter and therefore falls
foul of any principle of equality of
influence which may be embedded in
the notion of democracy.
If, as Graham suggests, “equality of
influence” is the key distinction of democratic
processes, then we must evaluate the democracy
of processes by the opportunities they present to
all recognized parties to participate and to affect
an outcome—but how much participation is
required, how should participants be selected,
through what means must this occur, and how
much impact on the final decision is required?
Ultimately, the answers to such questions are
normative, in that they speak to what we feel is
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To the extent that a process satisfies our norms, it
is labeled democratic. As Graham (1986:9) has
observed: “The concept of democracy has a strong
normative aspect: to call a system democratic is not
merely to describe it, in however imprecise a way; it
is generally to express a favourable attitude toward
it…”
94
The current debate over reforming Affirmative
Action programs is a good example.
95
Cortner and Moote (1999) provide a thoughtful
review of the relationship between democracy and
resource management in The Politics of Ecosystem
Management. Also useful is McKinney’s (1999)
analysis which focuses squarely on the management
of western natural resources.

heterogeneous values or ethnicity, nor is he talking
about ancient history.
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class—technocratic in this case rather than
aristocratic—and the forces supporting the
evolution of an interest-group mode of decisionmaking. These issues all have a long history.
While the merits of democratic decisionmaking have been debated in many nations over
several centuries, the United States has long been
viewed as the preeminent laboratory of
experimentation in democracy ever since the
colonies revolted against a tyrannical British
monocracy.
Upon completion of the
revolutionary war, the Constitutional Convention
of the United States capped a lengthy and spirited
period of debate between the proponents of
participatory democracy, such as Thomas
Jefferson, and those of representative democracy,
such as James Madison, both united in a common
adherence of aristocratic monarchies, but
harboring different opinions regarding the merits
of popular, majority-rule governance. While
Madison’s perspective generally prevailed in the
structuring of the U.S. Constitution, it is
Jefferson’s notions of direct citizen involvement
in policy-making that secured a special place in
American culture, and in subsequent nineteenth
century descriptions of the United States by
outside commentators such as Alexis de
Tocqueville (1968).
Western watershed initiatives reflect the
spirit of direct democracy described so
passionately by Jefferson, and put in context a
century later in the writings of John Wesley
Powell (1890:113) calling for “local selfgovernment by hydrographic basins” in the arid
and semi-arid regions of the American West:

It is a historical reality—many would say
mistake—that this vision of Powell was not
adopted, as a federal reclamation program
emerged in the West concentrating federal
technical and financial resources on the
development and management of shared
resources (Kenney, 1999b). With astounding
effectiveness, this new model of resource
development not only transformed the physical
landscapes of the West, but introduced the
region’s institutional landscape to decisionmaking processes featuring outside technical
elites and organized interest groups. Rather than
Jeffersonian self-determination or even elected
representation on the Madisonian model, the
“iron triangles”96 of federal water development
frequently cast local interests in an advocacy
role, supporting narrowly-focused interest groups
seeking to gain a share of federal investments in
resource development. The subsequent allocation
of developed water resources to private parties
further divorced resources from coordinated
public control.
It is more than a little ironic that the
fundamental argument aired during the
Constitutional Convention in favor of
representative, rather than direct, democracy,
was that a “tyranny of the majority” might occur
in a pure democracy, with majority-rule systems
providing no protection to minority opinions.97
This fear was widely held, although parties
disagreed over the significance of the issue and
the best mechanisms for dealing with the concern.
What was not envisioned was the “tyranny of the
minority” that has occurred in the natural
resources realm in at least two forms and eras.
The first expression occurred largely in the late
1800s, when western expansionism combined
with largely unregulated capitalism and a weak

… in the name of the men who labor I
demand that the laborers shall employ
themselves; that the enterprise shall be
controlled by the men who have the
genius to organize, and whose homes
are in the lands developed, and that the
money shall be furnished by the people;
and I say to the Government: Hands
off!
Furnish the people with
institutions of justice, and let them do
the work themselves.
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The term “iron triangles” is used by many authors
(e.g., McCool, 1987) to describe the political
subsystem through which much of western water
policy was fashioned by the joint action of three
groups with similar objectives: pro-development
interest groups (project beneficiaries), key
congressional committee members, and the federal
bureaucracy (i.e., the Bureau of Reclamation).
97
The classic source for this debate is The Federalist
Papers (see Fairfield, 1961).
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and compromise, to determine public policy.100
Unfortunately, much like unfettered capitalism,
the incentive structure of pluralism typically
favors narrow economic interests over broad
social goals and disadvantaged parties, issues of
particular concern in the realm of natural
resources and the environment.
As Amy
(1987:131-132) has observed:

federal government to result in strong private
monopolies and tremendous economic disparities.
Concerns over the social and environmental
consequences of unregulated capitalism were a
primary concern of the Progressives, the
dominant political party at the turn of the century
(Hays, 1959).
The so-called Progressive
Conservation movement (circa 1890-1920)
featured an emphasis on federal land retention
and preservation, and the corresponding
evolution of a cadre of federal technocratic
resource managers, perhaps best illustrated by
Pinchot’s Forest Service (Kaufman, 1967;
Pinchot, 1947).
Thus, bureaucratic control
through regulation, rather than private
entrepreneurialism
(often
buttressed
by
governmental subsidies and inattention), became
a dominant expression of natural resources
democracy during the early twentieth century.
The expansion of the federal natural
resources bureaucracy was given further stimulus
in the Great Depression era, when centralized
planning was in vogue, and federally orchestrated
natural resource development projects were
initiated to address problems of unemployment
and economic stagnation—the classic example
being the Hoover Dam project.98 As the nation
emerged from Depression and a second World
War, however, the fundamental quality of
American democratic institutions changed, giving
rise to a second variation on the tyranny of the
minority. In this era, the role of interest groups
in establishing public policy was sharply
elevated, leading to a form of democracy
described by Theodore Lowi (1979) as the
“Second Republic.”99 This is the era of pluralism
(also known as interest-group liberalism), which
is based on the normative idea that it is
appropriate and “democratic” for organized
interests, acting through a system of bargaining

Environmentalists’ concerns about
basic imbalances in political and
economic power have found support in
the work of a number of prominent
political scientists and political
theorists. Political thinkers as diverse
as E.E. Schattsschneider, Grant
McConnell, and Charles Lindblom
have taken issue with the pluralist
vision of power in American politics.
They have argued that there exists a
persistent inequality between interest
groups in American politics, with a
decided bias in favor of large business
and financial institutions.
Other
scholars, like Mancur Olson, have also
noted that environmentalists and other
public interest groups always face a
number of unique and substantial
obstacles in their efforts to balance out
the political power of concentrated
economic interests.
Pluralism, described in this way, certainly
does not satisfy the “equality of influence”
measure of democracy presented earlier by
British philosopher Keith Graham (1986:17). On
the other hand, authors such as Nicholas Rescher
(1993:158)—in arguing against consensus-based
processes—make the case that “a benign social
order can be unabashedly pluralistic,” in that this
form of governance accommodates the
expression of a wide diversity of opinions. In
fact, pluralism makes no assumptions about the
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By the mid 1930s, the four largest concrete dams
ever built were under construction: Hoover, Shasta,
Bonneville, and Grand Coulee, prompting Reisner
(1986) to refer to this era as the “Go-Go Years.”
99
The “First Republic” is the government described
in the Constitution, which calls for a weak federal
government and strong state (and presumably local)
governments (Lowi, 1979).
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Substantively, pluralism is without real normative
content, as policies are not judged to be good or bad,
but simply are either politically viable or not viable
(Lowi, 1979).
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possibility of, or value of, reaching consensus.101
How, then, do we accommodate a desire for full
access of people and ideas into the public policy
arena, while ensuring that once engaged, all
parties will have an equality of influence? How
can equality of influence be achieved or even
measured in systems that do not provide a
practical means for reaching decision? Further,
how do we achieve an equality of influence
without suffering the inequalities inherent to
systems that link influence to economic power
(either through owning resources privately or
through a competitive advantage in public policymaking systems), without abandoning the
efficiencies provided by market systems and the
equality of opportunity potentially achievable
through capitalism, or without disrespecting
investments and traditions highly reliant upon
maintaining private property systems?
If
democracy means that everyone participates and
every viewpoint prevails in the decision-making
process, then the very survival of democracy
depends upon our ability to reach consensus—a
wonderful vision when achievable, but clearly not
a realistic option in many situations. And even if
consensus can be reached, should we assume that
the consensus decision is technically sound?
This set of issues can become overwhelming
when applied to our natural resource agencies,
who are expected to blend “impartial” science,
public input, and considerations of the larger
public good, all nested within legislative and
administrative mandates, to produce sound policy
outcomes on issues presumably too complex and
specialized to handle through less formal means

of self-government, and too vulnerable to abuse
to be left to market approaches. The practical
logic of utilizing a technical elite has always been
difficult to reconcile with the philosophical
attraction of democracy, especially in subject
matters such as natural resources which feature
difficult issues with both technical and value
dimensions. John Stuart Mill, for example, while
a strong proponent of direct democracy,
identified representative democracy as a more
practical means of concentrating knowledge and
expertise in public policy-making, even arguing
for graduated voting systems that gave the most
enlightened parties the greatest voting strength
(Mill, 1861).102 This form of representative
democracy, a compromise between direct
democracy and reliance upon a technical elite,
would not likely have been persuasive with
Jefferson, who made the timeless argument in
favor of an educated populace:
I know of no safe depository of the
ultimate powers of the society but the
people themselves; and if we think
them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome
direction, the remedy is not to take it
from them, but to inform their
discretion by education.103
While the word “wholesome” probably
indicates that Jefferson’s words were more about
the potential for unjust rather than technically
102

Representative Government (1861). Note that
Mill does not advocate representative government
over direct democracy due to the tyranny of the
majority concern, but due to more practical
considerations: “But since all cannot, in a
community exceeding a single small town,
participate personally in any but some very minor
portions of the public business, it follows that the
ideal type of a perfect government must be
representative.” Furthermore, his review of
governance arrangements suggested that
bureaucratic governments are best are concentrating
technical skills on public problem-solving.
103
Quote attributed to Thomas Jefferson, in a letter
to William Charles Jarvis, 1821. Cited in Cortner et
al. (in press:34).
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Rescher (1993:4) argues that consensus is often
an unrealistic goal of questionable merit: “The fact
is we live in an imperfect world. The resources at
our disposal are limited—our own intellectual
resources included. We have to be prepared for the
fact that a consensus among people, be it global or
local in scope, international or familial, is in general
unattainable. In a world of pervasive disagreement
we must take recourse to damage control. We must
learn to live with dissensus—with pluralism in
matters of opinion. And we must and can bring to
realization frameworks of social inclination that
make collaboration possible despite diversity and
that facilitate co-operation in the face of dissensus.”
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deficient citizen decision-making, this second
issue deserves some attention, as it influences our
notions about what forms of governance are
democratic and which are not. The belated
recognition of the “social component” of
scientific decision-making is particularly
important, as the “reliance upon technical
expertise has helped obscure responsibility for
major social decisions, weakening the system of
checks and balances” (Nelkin, 1977:12). For
example, commenting upon the impact of
historical decisions on modern water institutions,
Feldman (1991:54) writes:

and ends. Ethics and politics are
concerned with values and ends. Bad
water management often occurs when
facts are confused with values, when
means are confused with ends, and
when technical judgments are made by
citizens and politicians while value
judgments are made by scientists and
professionals.
Further complicating the distinction between
technical decisions and broader policy issues has
been a growing distrust of science and technology
itself:

The failure of water law places
extraordinary
responsibility
for
implementing water policy in the hands
of engineers. Unfortunately, engineers
are inadequately trained to address
ethical issues in environmental
management. As a consequence, issues
of equity, feasibility, transactions costs,
noneconomic values, and public
participation have been insufficiently
incorporated in water policy. The
conferring of water rights upon a few
groups and the placement of authority
for policy in the hands of an
engineering elite have produced a water
policy
both
undemocratic
and
unresponsive
to
environmental
concerns. (Emphasis added.)

Decisions once defined as technical are
increasingly forced into the political
arena by people who are skeptical
about the value of technological
progress, who perceive a gap between
technological and human needs, or who
mistrust the concentration of authority
in bureaucracies responsible for
technological change.
Policies
concerning science and technology once
based on the assumption that
technology equals progress now involve
difficult social choices.
(Nelkin,
1977:10).
It is against this complex background—this
swirling maelstrom of issues regarding
democratic institutions of governance—that the
environmental movement of the 1960’s and
1970’s was nested, one element in a loose
amalgam of social movements challenging
fundamental issues of private rights, public
powers, and societal responsibilities (Paehlke,
1989).104 In the realm of natural resources and
the environment, emerging programs for
pollution control, species protection, project
review, and public land management all reflected

Deciding who should decide has never been
an easy determination in the design of natural
resource institutions. True, while it is clearly
inappropriate to concentrate value decisions in
the hands of technical experts, or conversely,
technical decisions in the hands of untrained
citizens, the distinction between the two types of
content is not always obvious.
As Lord
(1984:653) observes, confusion between values
and facts—i.e., between normative and positive
opinions—is a serious and frequently common
problem plaguing modern water resource
institutions:

104

Several ongoing social movements, generally
thought of as discrete phenomenon, shared many
similar tenets. Of particular note are the social
equity components of environmentalism, civil rights,
feminism, and pacifism (e.g., anti-Vietnam War
protests) (Paehlke, 1989).

Science and technology are concerned
with facts and means, not with values
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prevailing normative ideas of the era. Of
particular note was the expressed preference in
favor of regulatory, rather than market-based
processes; the desire to nest scientific expertise
within democratic decision-making processes
stressing citizen participation; the gradual
expansion of state and local governmental roles
in implementing programs with federal origins;
and the empowerment of disenfranchised interests
through litigation opportunities, arising in part
from relaxed rules of standing and the
proliferation of class action lawsuits. The result
has been heavily formalized procedures of
decision-making
and
conflict
resolution,
exhibiting qualities of both participatory and
representative democracy, as well as decisionmaking by interest groups and technical elites.
The result has also been gridlock, a situation
where the distribution of power is sufficiently
diverse and conflict sufficiently prevalent to
impede most decision-making.
A theme common to many of these
normative ideas is the idea that agencies cannot
be trusted to exercise discretion, a criticism
emerging in part from growing public
unwillingness in the Second Republic to tolerate
the frequent inability of technocratic decisionmakers to resist the influence of special interests
and the prostitution of scientific expertise. One
expression of this changing perception,
fundamentally different than that of the
Progressive Conservation era, has been to expect
more and more from our technical bureaucracies,
all while curtailing their independence through
judicial mechanisms. As Holland (1996:180)
observes:

what they regard as a legislature overly
sensitive to special interest lobbying
and administrative agencies captured
by the interests they were intended to
regulate, have turned to the federal
judiciary,
the
institution
least
responsive to special interests and
public participation.
In addition to reflecting a growing distrust
of technical decision-makers and science itself
(especially when nested within pluralist systems),
the rise of judicial involvement also reflects a
refocus on the value of public participation and
direct democracy. Many scholars over time have
tackled the difficult question of determining
which factors result in successful and vibrant
democracies (Berman, 1997). A generation ago,
much of the research focused on economic,
political, or institutional factors. In recent years,
however, societal and cultural variables are often
cited as most salient. These arguments are often
associated with the Neo-Tocquevillians, who
assert that civic activity (e.g., direct citizen
participation in the public arena) is the key to
strong democracies (Putnam, 1993).105 Many
scholars have argued in favor of greater citizen
involvement in the policy-making process using a
variety of rationales. Whether writing under the
auspices of modern political theory (Pateman,
1970; Thompson, 1970), critical theory
(Habermas, 1984), postpositivism (deLeon,
1997), or some other perspective, most
arguments in favor of greater citizen involvement
either rest on a normative belief that citizen
involvement is an inherently worthy component
of democratic process, and/or a belief that such
involvement is needed to achieve substantively
accurate or socially legitimate policies.
A fundamentally different, and troubling,
perspective is provided by Sheri Berman (1997),
who concludes that to understand whether or not
civic activity will have a positive or negative

To a greater extent than in any other
country, environmental policies in the
United States are shaped by the
judiciary. Beset by crowded calendars
and adverse to controversy, Congress
has delegated more and more legislative
power over the environment to
regulatory agencies. Administrators, in
turn, have found their discretion
hemmed in at every turn by the federal
courts. Members of public interest
advocacy groups, disillusioned with
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In many respects, the Neo-Tocquevillians are
retracing arguments used several decades ago by the
so-called “mass society” theorists concerned with
barbarism in Europe during the interwar years
(Berman, 1997).
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institutions,106 then civic environmentalism may
be better characterized as a symptom than a
cure—an embarrassing point of confusion with
potentially significant ramifications.
Ultimately, when faced with a competing
mix of ideas and philosophies about our
democratic institutions, it may be worth returning
to some of the general ideas of performancebased management (PBM) introduced earlier, and
the idea that good arrangements are simply those
which help us to achieve those outcomes we
deem as valuable. To ascribe a special social
value to consensus-based processes—to call them
democratic—is certainly merited when those
processes can provide both procedural and
substantive outcomes consistent with societal
norms. But what if achieving one of these goals
is only made possible by sacrificing the other?
Kraft (1990:105) sees this situation as a real
dilemma:

impact on strengthening democratic institutions
depends upon the political context in which the
civic activity occurs. If that activity occurs out
of frustration with existing institutional
arrangements for governance and problemsolving, then the impacts of “associationism”
may not be to strengthen or improve democratic
society, but to undermine it:
If a country’s political institutions are
capable of channeling and redressing
grievances, then associationism will
probably buttress political stability and
democracy by placing its resources and
beneficial effects in the service of the
status quo.
This is the pattern
Tocqueville ([1968]) described.
If, on the other hand, political
institutions are weak and/or the
existing political regime is perceived to
be ineffectual and illegitimate, then
civil society activity may become an
alternative to politics for dissatisfied
citizens, increasingly absorbing their
energies and satisfying their basic
needs.
In
such
situations,
associationism will probably undermine
political stability and have negative
consequences for democracy by
deepening
cleavages,
furthering
dissatisfaction, and providing rich soil
for oppositional movements.
A
flourishing civil society under these
circumstances signals governmental
and institutional failure and bodes ill
for political stability and democracy.
(Berman, 1997:569-570).

For environmental as well as other
issues, the policy dilemma associated
with gridlock derives from the tension
between two competing expectations
for the policy process. One emphasizes
prompt and rational problem solving;
the other stresses representation of
pertinent
interests
and
policy
legitimization.
For others, like Coglianese (1999:11-12), the
choice is clear, as evident in his warnings to
public resource managers about consensus-based
processes:
An additional risk with growing calls
for consensus-building is that public
managers will begin to pursue
consensus for its own sake. They may
commit themselves to time-consuming
processes on tractable issues when the
same resources would be better used
for outreach or analysis on less
tractable, but more important, issues.

Certainly, these ideas are not universally
held, and to extrapolate these conclusions to the
special situation of collaborative groups, or more
specifically, western watershed initiatives, is
clearly a reach. However, it is also clearly a
reach to assume that the recent popularity of the
community/collaborative model of resource
management and problem-solving is not without
potential limitations or even risks.
If the
proliferation of collaborative groups is more a
sign of sickness than health in our democratic
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Public confidence in American political
institutions has been steadily declining since the
1960s (Lipset, 1995).
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They may come to rely on stakeholder
processes as their sole measure of good
public policy, even though these
processes can almost never be fully
representative and can face constraints
from group dynamics. They may also
find themselves caught up in the inertia
of negotiations even when they doubt,
or should doubt, that the resulting
agreement will meet the proper legal
standards and serve the public interest.
Rather than conflict as the problem and
consensus as the solution, public
managers should instead focus squarely
on the substantive problems facing the
environment and regulated firms. They
should decide when and how to engage
in public dialogue based foremost on
what will serve the overall public
interest, not on what will lead to a
consensus among those inside the
policy loop.107

Reinventing Government paved the way for
comprehensive governmental reform programs
such as the National Performance Review. Thus,
it is not surprising that most of the dominant
features of the emerging “era of alternative
problem-solving” feature procedural reforms
presumably designed to increase decision-making
efficiency and pragmatism. Preferred strategies
in this era tend to be those that are ad hoc rather
than formal, collaborative rather than
confrontational, decentralized rather than
centralized, and that take advantage of market
efficiencies and private-sector involvement. The
value of “local knowledge” has been elevated;
similarly, the credibility of technocratic managers
and outside interest groups are both viewed with
skepticism. Jeffersonian democracy is again in
vogue—arguably more popular today than in
Jefferson’s time—a trend described by John
(1994) in the aptly named book Civic
Environmentalism.108
What is perhaps most interesting in this
review of changing democratic norms is how the
same issues keep resurfacing in different forms.
Of particular salience is the issue of “who
decides,” a question currently being played out in
the context of the word community. Drawing on
notions of fairness and respect, a convincing
argument has been made that communities should
be more involved in natural resources decisionmaking.109 But which communities are we
talking about? This is a deceptively complex

The Current Agenda for Democratic Reform
It is against this backdrop that our
institutions for governance evolve, with each era
of reform featuring a redefinition of democracy
prompted by the perceived deficiencies of the
preceding era. Currently, we appear to be
embarking on a refinement of norms adopted
during the modern environmental movement.
While many of the reforms of the environmental
movement addressed troubling equity issues,
others have emerged, and perhaps of more
political salience, concerns over decision-making
inefficiency have become increasingly common.
Many parties, as Cortner et al. (in press:35)
observe, see the modern form of natural
resources federalism as yielding only a “federal
behemoth, interest-group polarization, and
gridlock.” In a more general context, Howard
(1994) has lamented The Death of Common
Sense in American governance, while Osborne
and Gaebler’s (1992) seminal work on
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John (1994) is among those authors that have
documented this emerging transformation away from
a mode of "interest group governance" to one of
"civic governance," the former featuring a
substantively narrow and geographically uniform
focus compared to the substantively broad and
geographically situational focus of civic governance.
109
For example, reflecting on her tenure in the
Interior Department, Betsy Rieke (1997:39)
remarked: “I believe that it’s important to try to get
the consent of the governed to natural resource
decisions. That doesn’t mean that if you can’t do so
you don’t go forward. But it is very important to
strive to get the consent of the governed to important
decisions that have major impacts on their lifestyle,
on their occupation, on their ability to continue to
graze, or to farm, or to mine, or whatever.”
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Many authors argue that agencies embrace
collaborative processes primarily as a means of
“passing the buck” on difficult issues (e.g., Coggins,
1999).
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question,
observed:

as

Duane

(1999:772-773)

has

and promote social harmony, especially
in small, rural communities? Dialogue
is good, but that does not justify
replacing
the
existing
public
participation process with local control
of federal resources.

But what do we mean when we use the
term "community"? There are at least
three types of communities that must
be
considered
in
ecosystem
management, and they sometimes
overlap and/or conflict: 1) communities
of place, which are tied to a physical
space
through
geography;
2)
communities of identity, which are tied
to each other through social
characteristics but may transcend
place; and, 3) communities of interest,
which may have commonalties in how
they relate to a particular ecosystem or
resource as beneficiaries of that place
or contributors to its condition. … [A]
privileged position for communities of
place may conflict with existing
arrangements that may favor particular
communities of interest.
There is
consequently a need to reconcile
communities
of
interest
with
communities of place in ecosystem
management in order to address the full
range of human concerns. This is
fundamentally a political challenge for
democracy, not a technical challenge
for resource "managers," and we must
address it as such.

Also speaking about forest management,
McCloskey (1999:625) approaches the issue
from a somewhat different perspective,
suggesting that local empowerment is a poor
solution to a non-existent problem:
[L]ocal communities already have a
larger voice [than larger communities
of interest] in debates over national
forests. Lawmakers customarily defer
to the views of the Congressperson
from the district involved; and business
interests in such communities long ago
captured predominant influence over
the management of federal grazing
lands and state lands.
If this is true, why then is it nearly impossible to
take a breath of western air or a drink of western
water without hearing laments of federal
paternalism, and without being aware of the
stirrings of new “Sagebrush Rebellions” (e.g., the
Wise Use, County Supremacy, and privatization
movements) all purporting to return decisionmaking to local interests? Additionally, how can
we even claim to know what a further
empowerment of local interests would mean for
natural resources.110 Unlike previous eras, the
latest population boom in the West is not being

Typically, the reformers—as Duane
acknowledges—are talking about empowering
communities of place. But is this needed, and
does this help fulfill the promise of democracy?
Blumberg (1999:91) is among those who are
unconvinced:
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Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest
that efforts to empower local collaborative groups
may do so at the expense of disempowering local
governments. For example, Paulson and
Chamberlein’s (1998:9) survey of collaborative
groups yielded the following observation:
“Collaborative groups were perceived by some local
officials to be given more credence than local
government by important non-local policy-makers.
There was a perception among several local officials
that many of the issues dealt with in the
collaborative context were redundant of their
responsibility of the local governing board.”

Rather than the “timber wars,” the
current state of public lands policy
might be better characterized as “the
jargon wars.” Sure, everybody loves
the notion of more public involvement,
more responsive public agencies, and
adversaries
putting
aside
their
differences.
How can anyone not
praise processes that reduce tension
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driven by ranchers, miners, loggers, or other
members of the extractive industries; to the
contrary, environmental amenities such as
outdoor recreation opportunities, unspoiled
viewsheds, and low pollution are largely driving
the demographic transformation of the region
(Power, 1996).
These and related observations lead to only
one readily defendable conclusion: Whether or
not the currently evolving form of decisionmaking and problem-solving proves to be good or
bad for natural resources is still an open and
important research question. Also important is
whether or not it constitutes an “appropriate”
approach to federalism and governance.111
Regrettably, these are questions that society is
not pausing to consider. As Weber (1998:xvii)
observes:
[W]e may not like, or we may
rightfully fear, the burgeoning use of
alternative institutional arrangements
that potentially threaten cherished
ideals of liberal democracy, increase
the risk of agency capture and specialinterest government, or place citizen
input on a seeming par with policy
mandates from elected officials. But,
whether we like it or not, policy makers
and administrators are not waiting on
scholars to decide whether such
arrangements are appropriate or not.

111

If history is our teacher, than we must expect that
dominant normative ideas regarding appropriate
processes for natural resources management and
problem-solving will continue to change as the
evaluation standard, democracy, is perpetually
redefined.
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Concluding Thoughts
It is difficult to travel far into the literature
of the western watershed movement without
hearing that it is a marriage of Jeffersonian
democracy and John Wesley Powell’s vision of
watershed-scale governance institutions (Kenney,
1999b).
Given this historically-grounded
ideological background, it can be argued that the
arrangements under development are not entirely
novel or unproven. To a point that is true.
Local-level collaboration on natural resource
matters is certainly not new to the region, as
evidenced by community-based irrigation
systems, agricultural coops, conservation
districts (and associated planning processes; e.g.,
CRMPs), and by the tangential involvement in
natural resources of many other types of
business, civic, religious, and cultural
associations. However, Jeffersonian democracy
did not prevail in the Constitutional
Convention—Madison’s ideas of representative
democracy proved more persuasive; and Powell’s
ideas of local “hydrographic democracies” faired
even worse, giving way to the private rights
tenets of prior appropriation and federal
involvement in water development and
management via the reclamation program. Thus,
while many of the ideas currently in favor have a
long history, it is often not a history of on-theground experimentation. As Press (1994:137)
has observed, “This country has never truly
tested participatory democracy in environmental
dilemmas.” Additionally, to the extent that past
experimentation has occurred, it is difficult to
assess the relevance of those efforts, given that
the modern western watersheds movement is
taking place in an era of startling change in terms
of demographics, ideologies, and norms about
good government and democracy (WWPRAC,
1998).
We should be careful, therefore, to not
blindly lament the demise of all public
institutions and to nostalgically reflect back to an
unblemished and utopian past. The reality is that
in natural resources—as in all policy areas—we

continue to muddle along, and in recent decades,
our muddling has produced both successes and
failures, just as it always has. Using an on-theground measure of success, it is difficult to
conclude with any certainty that the existing
system is hopelessly broken; nor is the system—
actually a complex maze of many systems—an
unqualified success. Clearly, many policies have
very real shortcomings; yet, several of the
accomplishments of recent decades are nothing
short of astounding. The failure to effectively
address nonpoint source water pollution, for
example, can be countered with success stories of
point source regulation. Failures to limit carbon
dioxide emissions do not invalidate the
considerable national success in reducing lead
emissions and the international success in
reducing CFC discharges. And the generally
disappointing track record of the Endangered
Species Act should not invalidate recent efforts in
habitat protection and restoration, such as state
instream flow programs, experimental flood
releases from Glen Canyon Dam, and ongoing
ecosystem recovery programs in the Everglades,
Chesapeake Bay, California Bay-Delta, and the
South Platte Basin. More generally, modern
problems of decision-making inefficiency and
“gridlock” are largely offset by, and are
somewhat a product of, previous reforms that
have partially remedied the tremendous equity
deficiencies associated with historically closed
systems of resources governance and problemsolving.
In an era and culture where “sound bites”
and bumper stickers have replaced essays and
debates as the dominant means of policy
discourse, and where the lines between dogma
and science have become painfully obscure, we
have been conditioned to define both problems
and solutions simply.
In the context of
governance
arrangements
for
ecological
restoration and management, this approach might
be appropriate if western communities were
homogeneous and stable in terms of values,
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long-term goal, even though a short-term need for
this information already exists. Additionally, the
text pays more attention to the arguments of the
skeptics than the proponents, a deliberate (and
readily acknowledged) approach utilized to
address a strong under-representation of
dissenting viewpoints in much of the available
literature on natural resources governance and
problem-solving. Despite these limitations, there
is sufficient wisdom in the preceding pages to
reinforce
two
longstanding
conclusions
articulated in earlier publications of the Natural
Resources Law Center:112

economies, populations, and political ideologies;
if demands on resources were fixed; if
intergovernmental relationships were not a source
of friction and debate; if questions of private
rights and public responsibilities were nonexistent; and if the roles of scientific and public
decision-makers were clearly defined. However,
this is clearly not the case. Nor is it the case that
all parties active in these issues share similar
skills, resources, or interests.
Consequently, it is naï ve to think that
collaborative processes will emerge as a simple
and effective solution to the full range of resource
management and governance deficiencies.
Similarly, it is equally naï ve to think that these
processes are without merit and pragmatic
application. As Brick (1998:34) argues:

♦ (1) Guarded Optimism. Most western
watershed
initiatives
and
similar
collaborative efforts are promising and
exciting, but still largely incomplete,
experiments, and should therefore be treated
by policy-makers with “guarded optimism.”
This conclusion primarily reflects the youth
of most efforts, the lack of scholarly review,
and the on-the-surface legitimacy of concerns
raised by an apparently growing cadre of
skeptics.113 Reforms that modify the “who”
and “how” of decision-making can have
extremely broad and lasting implications, and
should not be pursued without considerable
deliberation and reflection, and without
assuring adequate fallback measures.
Existing research suggests that many of
the qualities ascribed to alternative problemsolving approaches, including processes
reliant on collaborative decision-making, are
not likely in practice to consistently achieve
the lofty goals assumed by some proponents.
Under certain circumstances, we should
expect collaborative approaches to lead to
successful outcomes; in other situations we
should expect the opposite. Unfortunately,

[J]ust because local collaborative
conservation efforts can’t solve all our
problems does not mean that they can’t
begin to address some of them.
Similarly, just because reliance on
national activism and law is no panacea
does not imply that it is not
indispensable.
Similar wisdom is offered by Bingham (1997:4):
In the legitimate search for alternatives
to improve our capacity to resolve
complex issues, we should not make
the mistake of assuming that existing
tools should be disregarded.
If
something must be “alternative” to be
worthwhile, we will miss the value in
what we are already doing right.

The Next Step Forward
This study admittedly does not provide a
definitive assessment of the merits of western
watershed initiatives and similar collaborative
efforts, nor does it provide the final word on any
of the “salient research questions” discussed in
some detail in the text. As a practical matter,
answering those questions must be viewed as a
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In particular, see Kenney (1997) and NRLC
(1998).
113
While difficult, if not impossible, to document
empirically, it has been the experience of the author
that skeptics of collaborative efforts have rapidly
proliferated in the past 3 years, and/or these skeptics
have become more aggressive in asserting their
concerns.
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many parties involved in the policy debate do
not appear to be fully cognizant of this fact,
and the research community has generally
not been highly successful in providing
useful guidelines for distinguishing among
these two types of situations. Until this
deficiency is rectified, caution should be a
guiding principle.

collaborative processes.
Ongoing survey
research by the Natural Resources Law Center
suggests that about half of the watershed
initiatives in the Interior West do not include
environmental representatives; furthermore, in
about two-fifths of those groups, membership is
not completely open.115 At a policy level, many
environ-mentalists have also complained about
being excluded from the drafting of the Enlibra
principles.116 Exclusion of dissenting parties has
also been a frequent criticism of the Quincy
Library Group117, the best-known of the
community forestry groups in the West, as have
questions about the “collaborative” nature of
internal decision-making in the effort.118 This is
not to suggest that the absence of dissenting
voices is often a deliberate practice; to the
contrary, the absence of many skeptics is often
not due to a lack of an invitation, but may reflect
other factors: e.g., a lack of resources (to cover
travel and time expenses), a lack of faith in the
process, or the belief that other processes offer
more bang-for-the-buck.119 It is worthwhile to
explore the reasons behind missing parties,
particularly if you accept the common tenet of

♦ (2) Scholarly Critiques. Reform efforts
should be designed and implemented
strategically, aimed at addressing agreedupon problems and subject to critical review
and periodic assessment.114
Learning
through experimentation is a legitimate
means of identifying improved institutional
arrangements only to the extent that these
“experiments” are faithful to the scientific
construction of experimentation—namely,
that issues and assumptions are well defined,
that information is collected and analyzed in
a credible manner to test those assumptions,
that measurable results are explicitly used to
shape conclusions, and that peer review is
used to validate results.
It is important to remember, however,
that normative issues are at the core of many
debates. Often, these issues are not readily
amenable
to
resolution
through
experimentation, but can be assessed only in
part through focused inquiries.
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This is highly preliminary survey results of
approximately 50 groups. Final results will be
published as part of the revised Watershed Source
Book.
116
Various personal communications with
environmental activists.
117
In congressional testimony regarding proposed
legislation to enact the Quincy Library Group’s
forest plan, Blumberg (1997:3-4) observes that the
alleged consensus product is “opposed by every
environmental group that works on forest protection
issues in the state of California.”
118
Speaking about the Quincy Library Group,
founding member Michael Jackson observes: “We
started out as a collaborative process but [we’re not
anymore]—now we’re a consensus-acquiescence
process . . . we intimidate the hell out of each other.”
(Cited in Duane, 1997 at page 795.)
119
In an attempt to secure participation of all
interests, the Applegate Partnership has offered to
cover travel expenses of any willing environmental
representative. Thus far, they have had no takers.
(Personal communication with Jack Shipley, October
8, 1999.)

Epilogue: Skeptics are People Too
It is unfortunate and more than a little ironic
that the skeptics of collaborative processes are
frequently isolated from the proponents, both in
terms of on-the-ground experiments and in policy
discussions.
For example, consider the
involvement of environmentalists (the most
common source of skepticism) in many notable
114

Arguably, assessments of this nature may not be
justified, unless welcomed by participants, for
activities undertaken without public funding and
focused solely on resources in private ownership.
These conditions are rarely satisfied, however, in the
types of efforts discussed in this research.
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consensus-building that suggests all concerned
parties need to be at the decision-making table.
The frequent subordination of dissenting
opinions regarding collaborative processes is
easily understood, as it can be hard to imagine a
reasonable party objecting to the goals of
consensus-based processes—a point articulated
by Rescher (1993:157-158):

understand the importance of a healthy
ecosystem to a healthy economy are
more likely to work to protect both.
These processes can also decrease
polarization and promote social
harmony in local communities, and
may achieve agreements about what
should happen on the ground.

To be sure, the widely favoured
allocation of a pride of place to
consensus sounds benevolent, irenic,
and socially delectable. Indeed, it may
sound so plausible at first hearing that
it is difficult to see how a person of
reasonableness and goodwill could fail
to go along.

Equally reflective are the words of Jim Britell120,
commenting on the Quincy Library Group model:
I am not opposed to local consensus
processes per se; for certain kinds of
problems where public assets are not
on the table and the parties do not have
large financial interests, they can be
extremely productive.
But I am
concerned that we are moving headlong
into adopting unproven new processes
that will make long term decisions
about the future of our public assets
without thinking them through and
before thoroughly testing them; and I
am especially concerned that forest
activists are not well prepared to take
on this new role of protecting the
public interest by serving as the
public’s representative and advocate on
such groups.

Yet, many reasonable people are concerned, as
discussed in the previous pages. Many of those
skeptics
are
far
from
irrational
or
uncompromising, but are simply seeking more
sidebars and protections—i.e., more caution—in
the use of processes which are frequently ad hoc
and unstructured.
It is useful to conclude by revisiting the
statements of some of the more outspoken
skeptics: namely, Louis Blumberg of The
Wilderness Society; Jim Britell, environmental
activist and consultant; George Cameron
Coggins, noted legal scholar; Reed Benson of
Oregon WaterWatch; and the Dean of the
skeptics, Michael McCloskey of the Sierra Club.
The positions they articulate regarding
collaborative processes should not be an affront
to the proponents, but should serve as a jumpingoff point in a thoughtful debate. For example,
few proponents should take exception to the
tempered remarks of Blumberg (1997:2) and his
simple plea for adequate representation of all
interests:

Even George Cameron Coggins (1999:603),
the self-professed curmudgeon, sees a
potential role for these processes, while
raising strong concerns about the devolution
of public responsibilities:
Collaboration, consensus, civility,
cooperation, and community of course
are not bad attributes or characteristics
in themselves.
They are entirely
appropriate for resolving local issues
over use of private property.
Confrontation,
controversy,
and

Collaborative efforts can play a
constructive role if all stakeholders and
interests are represented. They can be
helpful by generating dialogue and
fostering greater education about
environmental issues and the state of
the local environment. People who
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Taken from the article “Partnerships,
Roundtables and Quincy-Type Groups Are Bad Ideas
That Cannot Resolve Environmental Conflicts,”
accessed June 3, 1999 at
www.britell.com/text/tuse10.html.
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litigation usually are best avoided.
Consensual transactions, such as
Nature Conservancy land purchases,
serve many public and private values.
But national lands are not private
lands, and allocation of national
resources is not a local issue.
Ownership does matter. When the
subject is every American's natural
heritage,
devolved
local
collaborationism
is
entirely
inappropriate.

federal government must ensure that
national interests are protected even if
voluntary local efforts do not succeed.
There must be a clear course of action
if these efforts fail to reach consensus
or to meet resource protection goals. …
With those caveats, we do urge
federal agencies to work with voluntary
local groups as resources and laws
permit. The agencies can help by
identifying both the requirements and
points of flexibility in applicable
federal law, improving coordination,
supplying data and technical expertise,
and providing other assistance.

Commenting on western watershed initiatives,
Reed Benson (1998:267), speaking on behalf of
many in the environmental community121,
identifies a still broader range of concerns, but
returns back to a stance that is clearly
reasonable:

Finally, Michael McCloskey (in Harmon,
1998:1-2) offers a healthy challenge to
proponents and researchers alike, based on the
performance-based management (PBM) concept
identified earlier:

Within the environmental community, a
wide range of opinions exists on these
voluntary local efforts. We can agree,
however, on a few general points. First,
as noted above, many of the most
promising "cooperative" efforts began
in response to regulatory action under
federal law. In many cases, continued
application of federal laws seems
necessary to focus and motivate these
local efforts. Second, while many of
these efforts have shown progress in
bringing people together, they have not
yet demonstrated much success in
actually restoring and protecting
watershed health.
The federal
government should be cautious in
devoting its scarce resources to these
efforts, at least until they show that
they can effectively protect national
(not just local) interests. Third, the

At this point the burden is on the
promoters of [collaboration] to
demonstrate that it can work; that it
can be fair and involve all stakeholders,
especially where broad issues are at
stake; that it can respect agency
legitimacy; that it can get beyond good
feeling to produce management
solutions; and that it can be worth the
time it requires.
On this point there should be no debate.

121

Identified contributing authors include American
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